


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Havel on Czech Presidency, Postcommunist Prospects
93CH0165A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
23 Nov 92 pp 172-175

[Interview with Vaclav Havel, former Czechoslovak president, by Olaf Ihlau and Hans Werner Kilz; place and date not given: "Europe Stands at the Crossroads"]

[Text] *During the velvet revolution of November 1989, hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks swept away the communist system in Prague in peaceful demonstrations. The instigator and symbolic figure of the revolution was Vaclav Havel who had shortly before that time received the Peace Prize of the German booksellers' industry and was shortly thereafter elected to the office of president of Czechoslovakia. Now, Havel, 56, is looking for a new political start. The dramatist ("The Garden Party") and citizen of the world resigned the office of head of state of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in July because he could no longer prevent the breakup of Czechoslovakia into two independent states. Last Monday, Havel decided to become a candidate for the office of president of the new Czech Republic. What has thus far remained unclear constitutionally is the kind of powers with which the one-time dissident and most popular Czech can soon return to Hradcany Castle in the role of landlord.*

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Havel, shall we see the end of Czechoslovakia barely 40 days from now or does the federation yet have a chance to survive?

[Havel] The process is irreversible. Czechoslovakia ceases to exist at the end of this year; two independent states will develop from it. It is not a question of how it could be prevented. What is important now is to accomplish that as peaceably as possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] According to polls, 57 percent of Slovaks are opposed to the partition. And how about the Czechs?

[Havel] That is very difficult to estimate. No one here is happy that we are separating. Even Slovak society is internally split and perhaps even many a Slovak. Actually, Slovakia wants to stand on its own feet and emerge from the shadow of the Czechs, but it is also afraid to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why were the people not permitted to decide whether the republics should separate?

[Havel] I fought in vain for it for two years. Now, those who first opposed it are calling for a referendum. But it is five minutes after 12 and it no longer makes any sense.

On what should the Czechs be voting? And what alternatives should face the Slovaks? Slovakia has declared its sovereignty and has its own Constitution in the meantime. Should one now say: "As you were"?

[DER SPIEGEL] You are now a candidate for the office of Czech president. Originally, you had wanted to be president again only if you were granted extensive authorities...

[Havel] ...that is not true, it is not true that I was demanding far-reaching powers. But I do believe that the president must take on a firm logical and meaningful position in our constitutional system. He cannot be merely a decorative figure. So far, nothing has been decided, the Constitution is still in its infancy.

[DER SPIEGEL] As things are planned now, you are dependent upon the goodwill of the strongest party, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] of Vaclav Klaus, Czech prime minister. How do you get along with him; who will be at the wheel of this tandem arrangement?

[Havel] Oh, that is such a fashionable Czech issue. I believe that we complement each other very well. Our goals and ideals are in agreement. We are only using different accents. I would not like to reduce the problems facing the Czech Republic to the psychological relationship between two individuals.

[DER SPIEGEL] Prime Minister Klaus does not think much of "idealistic dreamers." That is aimed at you, is it not?

[Havel] I also do not think much of idealistic dreamers and I do not consider myself to be one of them. If one places emphasis on moral sources and spiritual dimensions of social life in politics, then it is a totally and even realistic policy, not an idealistic one.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will you not have to depart from your previous principles and demands—namely the demand that you be allowed to engage in "antipolitical politics" outside of the various government institutions?

[Havel] I used that concept 15 years ago in an essay. At that time, what was involved was the political weight of the civil and moral positions within a dictatorship. There was talk of Solzhenitsyn, Walesa, and the dissident movements. But the concept is not a dogma, it is not a doctrine. To use it polemically against me at this time is completely unjustified.

[DER SPIEGEL] After the collapse of Soviet communism, the people of Central and Eastern Europe were enthusiastic for democracy and the market economy. Now, there is social rejection and increasing ethnic tension. In the coming years, do the signals indicate nationalism, violence, and disintegration?

[Havel] We must oppose the dangers of particularism and disintegration, but, at the same time, we must continue to validate the will of the people to gain self-determination. Dangerous things can arise from this great historical movement—ranging all the way through civil war. To guide such development, to keep it under control, is the decisive task of these times.

[DER SPIEGEL] Basically, we are nevertheless experiencing a resurgence of nationalist demons from the time of the turn of the century. Eastern Europe is boiling, all the way from Estonia to the Balkans. How is it possible to defuse the ethnic hatred?

[Havel] It is a task for all Democrats of this region who wish to establish a bourgeois society and who are striving for collaboration with the international community of states. At the same time, however, it is a challenge for the West, which is obviously not yet fully aware of the dimensions of the problem. Disintegration radiates much like radioactivity. If the West does not intervene and does not help us with political effectiveness to master the dangers, it will some day suffer a fate similar to that besetting Eastern and southern Europe today.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does that mean that, in view of the Balkan conflicts, the West has failed?

[Havel] The West has not comprehended the magnitude of the revolution. It is a process that is comparable to the decline of the Roman Empire—in other words, no opportunity for daily political maneuvering, but rather a historical event of enormous significance. Much reflection is lacking.

[DER SPIEGEL] Specifically, what is it that Western Europe should do? Use military intervention against great Serbian expansionism?

[Havel] The events in the former Yugoslavia are only a part of a much broader series of events. All of us are noting that various geopolitical interests—French interests, German interests, and U.S. interests—are beginning to become differentiated today. Political unison, which had been compelled for a long time by the common communist danger, is dissolving. Now, the threat is from local disputes.

[DER SPIEGEL] And the West is looking on helplessly, as is the case in looking at the Balkans?

[Havel] Yes, it is grotesque: The West, that is to say, NATO, is preparing for a global collision with a giant enemy and then stands totally helpless before a network of local conflicts.

[DER SPIEGEL] What concept should the West then pursue?

[Havel] In its own interest, Western Europe must seek integration and thus be an example and a stimulus for the East in creating democratic systems.

[DER SPIEGEL] But now there is an eruption of various nationalisms all around. You first thought of this as a "historically understandable" development and expected that this phase would be overcome "rapidly and without all too much damage." Were you surprised by the ferociousness of the quarrels?

[Havel] Up to a certain point I had expected that, but not that it would result in such a drama, that such an

explosion would occur. In 1968, I had traveled through all of the Central Asian Soviet republics. I could feel even then that this was the last great power of imperialism and that the liberation process, which had encompassed all regions of the world, would also convulse this empire.

It was clear to me that there would be a large explosion, a conflict like the one which Africa had long since experienced, involving whites and blacks. Although I thought that it would take another 50 years. Now, it has already happened in 20 years. And who might have been able to foretell that there would be such conflicts as we are now seeing played out between the Dniester River region and Moldova?

[DER SPIEGEL] Dangerous inflammable materials also exist in your neighborhood: At the Gabčíkovo water management project, the Slovaks have rerouted the Danube River and have literally drained off the water from the Hungarians.

[Havel] In Central Europe, such conflicts are normally somewhat more restrained and milder. We have a different cultural and historical tradition which protects us against developments such as those afflicting the Balkans or the former Soviet Union. But, naturally, there is also the danger here of destabilization. It not only threatens those countries stuck in its middle, but also endangers the all-European balance.

[DER SPIEGEL] The existential revolution, upon which you based your hopes, the fundamental change in human consciousness, clearly failed to take place. Does it not again look like gross violence has scored a victory over intellect?

[Havel] I never said that an existential revolution would take place in 1991, 1992, or 1998. I only spoke of the necessity for human responsibility as a global responsibility, as the sole salvation in the face of the global threat facing the world. In view of the realities of today, that alternative appears as increasingly urgent to me. It is a long-range appeal rather than a revolutionary project. The expression existential revolution was intended to be used metaphorically.

[DER SPIEGEL] To what extent were the old economic and bureaucratic power structures successfully broken up after the collapse of communism?

[Havel] A whole lot did not happen here. All postcommunist countries are struggling with these problems. In our country, privatization of the economy made rapid advances. And yet, various roped-together parties of the old Communist Party nomenklatura are skillful in adapting themselves to the new conditions.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are the Czechs and Slovaks having just as difficult a time coming to terms with their past as the Germans? Although there is a "lustration law," officials of the Communist Party and of the state security apparatus continue to occupy many offices.

[Havel] We must look our own past in the face. We cannot say: What was is past, let us simply forget it. Dealing with the past must take place in a civilized manner and in ways which respect the law. However, none of the postcommunist countries have thus far succeeded in this endeavor. Our lustration law is also a typical example of how these things should probably not be handled.

[DER SPIEGEL] Because of economic difficulties, Western Europe is increasingly closing itself off behind bulkheads. What consequences does this have for the countries of Eastern Europe, which are hoping for an early attachment to the European Community?

[Havel] The quicker Western Europe grows together, the better are the chances for integration in our part of Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] Judging by the quarrels surrounding the Maastricht treaty, building on the consolidation of Western Europe seems to us to be rather courageous.

[Havel] Europe is now standing at a historical crossroads: Both halves are like mutually communicating tubes. Whether it is a matter of disintegration or integration—it impacts on us all. Maastricht is a great test.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could the disappointment over Western democracies lead to a comeback of the reform Communists, as recently occurred in Lithuania?

[Havel] That is not very well possible in the Czech Lands. But the disinterest of the West will most certainly be a considerable limiting factor with respect to the postcommunist countries.

[DER SPIEGEL] As a German, one feels that there is fear in your country of too strong an influence being exerted by unified Germany. The specter of Germanization appears to irritate many people.

[Havel] I do not share those irritations and I do not understand them either, although there are historical reasons for them. But if the Czech Republic pursues a sensible, self-confident, proud policy, then it is also not likely to be threatened by any colonization. We will collaborate with Germany as a large and rich country sharing the longest border with us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are the German investments sufficient for you?

[Havel] There could easily be more. Only 2 percent of our economic capital comes from abroad; 80 percent of that amount, however, is from Germany. Of course, we must also see that French, U.S., or Japanese investors come to our country. A one-sided orientation would not be good.

[DER SPIEGEL] You have said that being surrounded by Germans was the historical fate of your compatriots. Are you concerned over the xenophobia and the rightist extremism in Germany?

[Havel] Such manifestations can be observed not only in Germany, but represent a sickness of civilization which we must oppose on a worldwide scale. It is not specifically a German bad habit. Even in our country there are cases of xenophobia.

[DER SPIEGEL] You were one of the few Czechs present at the funeral for Alexander Dubcek. How do you see Dubcek's role today, some 24 years after the "Prague Spring"?

[Havel] His position in the history of our people, as well as in the history of communism, is unique. It was an attempt to make communism more humane in a peaceful manner.

It was truly a process of self-liberation of a society which was facilitated by the reform movement. One can criticize certain of Dubcek's political illusions and actions and yet his political importance is beyond doubt: He was a Czechoslovak who made European history.

[DER SPIEGEL] After you stepped down as president, you stayed away from active politics for a period of four months—time enough to perhaps write a piece on the presidential environment?

[Havel] Unfortunately, I am not the type who can shake items out of my sleeve just like that. I neither had sufficient time nor the strength to concentrate on writing. And besides, I am not outside of politics just because I do not happen to have a political position right now. I have been concerned with politics all of my life and will continue to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will you again sit at Prague Castle as president?

[Havel] That is not up to me. But, please: I am already president today—president of the Endowment for the Preservation of Prague Castle.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Havel, we thank you for this interview.

Outsiders View Slovak Prime Minister Meciar

93CH0109A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 15 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "Savior or Seducer—Europe Does Not Know Where To Place Vladimir Meciar"]

[Text] *B. Kohler studied political science and public law in Germany and Great Britain and is the Prague correspondent of the daily FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG.*

Foreign countries are having problems with Vladimir Meciar. They know Alexandr Dubcek as a politician who came 20 years too soon with his ideas on perestroika. Vaclav Havel remains in the memory as a reminder of the individual who wanted to prevent the parting of the ways of the Czechs and Slovaks and who came to grief as a

result. Vaclav Klaus finds himself in the drawer of sober analysts and pragmatists. But who is this Meciar, whom the Slovaks appear to be obeying? Is he or is he not a spoiler? Is he a nationalist or an opportunist? Is he a savior of his nation or its seducer?

Partition as a Greater Sin Than a Return to Communism

The uncertainty with which foreign countries approach the persona and the task of the Slovak prime minister has its cause in the policies that are being connected with him and his party. At first glance, Meciar is a nationalist because he justifies the separation of his country from the Czech Republic basically with a nationalist ideology: One day, the Slovaks will be better off materially, but, primarily, mentally and psychologically only if they are permitted to make decisions regarding themselves.

From the outside, it is difficult to judge whether someone is merely using the rhetoric of nationalism or he also believes in it. The West Europeans, without recognizing that Meciar actually has no deeper national vision for Slovakia, or that he at least is not proclaiming one, became extremely alarmed with regard to Slovak "nationalism." They consider the partition of an outwardly seemingly well-functioning Central European state during the period of new Balkan wars and threatening shocks from the east to be almost a greater sin than a return to communism. Europe, which is pressed by various crises and its own hidden nationalisms, does not want to deal with the finer points of the Czech-Slovak relationships of past decades. The sober thinking of political elites, which runs to categories of expenditures and profits, cannot comprehend why a nation would risk its relatively good economic standing, its secure borders, and its political stability for "emotional" reasons. In the eyes of the West, nationalism is an atavism, and its promoters are either considered to be seducers or are seen as being politically backward.

The Antiquated Method of Trial Balloons

The finding that it is precisely Meciar, as the undisputed initiator of partition, who is attempting to constantly slow down this process was bound to bring about chaos. In Bratislava, they like to justifiably stress that a total divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks was not what they originally had in mind. However, the tug-of-war regarding confederation, the dance about a union and promises of and cancellation of conversations with the Czech representation, did not earn Meciar the reputation of a strategically acting statesman.

During that period, both sides were undoubtedly trying out tactical games and plays on each other. However, Klaus came through as an even better tactician: He made his moves covertly, or at least it appeared that they were not the results of mere confused decisionmaking. In contrast, the constant release of trial balloons that quickly burst or must be immediately caught again may be a certain method, but it is not permanently effective. Any direct comparison with the Czech prime minister,

toward which Meciar is constantly exposed in the world, must be lost by the prime minister of the Slovak Government. In all respects, Klaus is closer to the Western comprehension of politics than is Meciar, whose past is the subject of stubbornly surviving rumors.

The Image of Slovakia in the World

In the West, Meciar is frequently labeled—because of a dearth of logical explanations—a "populist" or a "politician of power," with greater emphasis than other representatives of the people. In the rest of the world, the subject that Meciar's second ascent to office did not result in the liberalization of the climate in Slovakia is already hackneyed. Perhaps there is something to the fact that some foreign correspondents are not recounting the clearest picture of Slovakia and of his government. If, however, it is government policy rather than Slovakia as a whole that is criticized, the fault certainly lies, in full measure, with Meciar's Cabinet. The fundamental error in his information policy lies in the belief that it is possible to select those media and journalists who will report on Slovakia and on Vladimir Meciar personally. On domestic soil, this has been partially successful; outwardly, however, attempts to influence or restrict journalistic reporting merely have the opposite effect.

The fact that Meciar and his government, despite thoroughly good intentions, tend to put their foot in their mouth far too readily is also showing up in the relationship with Hungary. The Slovaks tend to enter every trap set for them by Budapest. Neither with nuclear products nor with covert threats are they able to force the Hungarians into compliance either on questions of minorities or regarding the dispute over Gabčíkovo. By demonstrating its verbal and political strength, Bratislava is, instead, only making its reputation worse. Of course, even in this area, responsibility for Slovakia's finding only scant support in the West for its positions is attributed to the "conspiracy" of the international press. The fact that it might be possible to begin with oneself and to at least think about the style if not the content of one's policy has seemingly not occurred to anyone surrounding the Slovak prime minister. Perhaps no one has the courage to tell him.

Need for Broad Political Coalition Stressed

93CH0135A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
16 Nov 92 p 4

[Commentary by Ladislav Hohos: "Is Meciar an Obstacle to a National Coalition?"]

[Text] In the informational noise level caused by particular outcriers, it is sometimes difficult to hear the realistic voices, or more exactly to distinguish the myths from the real facts. The truth probably lies somewhere between the interpretations as "the fulfillment of 1,000 years of efforts at emancipation" and a "historical catastrophe."

The historian J. Rychlik has hit the nail on the head. The coexistence of a larger and a smaller nation in a single state is possible either when the smaller nation voluntarily subordinates itself to the "democratic majority" or when the larger entity consents to the fiction of equality and recognizes the minority's right to a veto. "The first model was logically not acceptable for the Slovaks and the second for the Czechs, with the fusion of the two being an empty majority." Consenting democracy as a government of an "alliance of trust" capable of rounding out the empty majority did not get a opportunity with us, proof of which is, among other things, the confused reaction to the Gabčíkovo lawsuit. "If there is today no realistic possibility of keeping Czechoslovakia together, it still does not mean that the possibility of some kind of Czech-Slovak joint state is permanently excluded and will be excluded in the future as well. The task of the Czech and the Slovak representatives should therefore be primarily to maintain the maximum interrelationships." (LN [LIDOVE NOVINY] 29 Oct).

In the Central European area there are indeed stable geopolitical factors at work that are unfavorable for the existence of small states (Rychlik). Inevitably we will feel them in the short term, and even now we should be analyzing how much "will the vote of the independent Czechs and an independent Slovakia weigh" on the international scale (O. Krejci, NP 30 Oct). Are we supposed also to take seriously the pragmatic advice from across the ocean, for example, from A.J. Valuchek, the probable adviser to the future American President. The United States did not take part in the Munich accord and has never desired the breakup of the CSR. "The current situation worries America and it appears that your politicians should use the current situation to improve economic relations and not to divide up what they still have" (SP 6 Nov).

The tone of the ex-prime minister Jan Carnogursky is the expression of a responsible politician. "If, after the breakup, Slovakia came back into a joint state because it was not capable of an independent existence, it would create an obstacle because of its weakness and, understandably, it would not be able to place any demands for conditions of the future coexistence. It would simply have to accept what the CR would offer it. It is possible, and even probable, that in the future there will again be a joint state, almost certainly. But first Slovakia must be stabilized and must demonstrate its capability of independent existence and make the transition. And that is not possible sooner than in a couple of years. We could join back together then, either with the CR or with someone else, but always from a position of our capability of independent existence" (NO [NARODNA OBRODA] 2 Nov). In other words, it is only through our own efforts and our own work that we can defend ourselves before history, so that the position of equality is not just a fiction.

We truly need exceptionally capable politicians, but they are in short supply even in the advanced countries of the world. We truly need a "national coalition" activating all

forces without regard to party membership. But how can we achieve all that when the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] currently does not consider a coalition with the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] to be possible because of the person in the leadership position...

Gist of Conclusions From Conference on Czech State
93CH0109B Prague PRITOMNOST in Czech
No 8, 1992 p 3

[Article by Jan Vit: "On the Idea of Czech Statehood"]

[Text] The idea of Czech statehood was debated at Prague Castle by historians, philosophers, theologians, legislators, and political practitioners, at a damp time of the year, around All Souls' Day, a few days before the last 28 October spent under a common Czechoslovak roof—in other words, in style. In his introduction, Pavel Tigrid spoke of the closeness of the virtually existential confrontation of the future facing us. The Civic Institute, which deserves thanks for organizing the entire event, promised to issue a compendium of the presented contributions, and we are getting ready for this publication at PRITOMNOST—after all, it is our type of topic! And now, a modest review of several ideas we consider to be symptomatic. We are inserting them precisely around 28 October.

"The Czech state is actually coming into being unintentionally, primarily because it takes into account the Slovak right to self-determination. If its birth is not accompanied by a national triumph, we ask whether this is not actually its great opportunity." These are the words used by the section of historians in opening their final report. Fortuitous words. We have the unique opportunity presented by actually experienced skepticism. This time, there are no streamers and flags, no music in the squares, no firing from mortars, no founder's dizziness as was the case the last time we were establishing a state—in 1918. No case of being blinded by history, but, let us confess, bitter disappointment: The more deeply felt, the more valuable in terms of understanding our entire situation. Moreover, as the theological-philosophical section finds independently, paraphrasing Vaclav Belohradsky: "Doesn't all of today's planetary civilization tend more to call for one to be far more skeptical than previously toward the state? Is it not more appropriate not to perceive the state as a subspecies of eternity but, in a far more profane Godless image, as a functional and not an idealistic state, a state that is restricted and strictly controlled with regard to its mission, content, and scope?" Such a sober assumption is a good starting situation for us to be able to understand that the state is not an instrument of salvation, that, in its essence, it is not "anything more than what the citizens have decided to delegate to common organs." In contrast, however, we heard the conference say—also in the theological-philosophical section—that the state should be established on the idea of Good, Truth, and so

forth (the capital letters were clearly to be heard in the speeches made by the presenting philosophers). A symptomatic schism. No matter how much we do not wish to see the state only as a hollow skeleton of formalized structure, it is undoubtedly that in the first instance, and all of our lamentations regarding the hitherto inadequate political culture in our country will not cease if no understanding is reached in this regard. The state, regardless of whether it is perceived as being an institution interconnected by systems ties, among others, will never remain just an institution but will always be a human affair, perhaps a very human affair, using the words of Masaryk, and will always "incorporate a certain degree of villainy," as expressed by Madison. The state thus does not entail a Manichaean struggle between Good and Evil, as some of our philosophers would like to see, but involves substantive and sober recognition of human fallibility and, on that basis, a voluntarily accepted self-restraint on the basis of formal rules and laws, involving control of that "human, all-too-human" element. This pragmatic note has been sounded so few times in our history that it is not beside the point that it be emphasized at every opportunity. However, let us also concede a grain of truth to the seekers of ideas: As a result of their references, it is possible to fear lest the established state be credible, unquestionable, that people who will live in it can rely on it and would even be willing, as Jan Sokol reminded us in the editorial in PRITOMNOST No. 6, 1992, to make sacrifices for it. Something like that cannot, of course, be quickly anchored in a founding resolution. At the present moment, restraint is appropriate. If, together with the historians at Prague Castle, we find that the history of the Czech state does not contain a clear mission, the state must create that mission for itself (or find or capture one that has been overheard) on the basis of its own functioning and, at the same time, verify its viability. In the above-mentioned editorial, Jan Sokol reminded us that the state can hold together, as a stand-in for an idea, on the basis of a sensible practical policy or a well-led economy. And, for a start, it could even be such a basic principle that would call for the state not to be established in such a manner as to include a group that does not consider it to be its own. This is how Jiri Schneider of the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] somehow said it in the political section, and we are happy to endorse this substantive approach.

Bleak Picture of Post-Split Future Painted

93CH0134A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
2, 9 Nov 92

[Article in two installments by Dr. Peter Popesko: "An Iron Curtain Between Moravia and Slovakia?"]

[2 Nov pp 4-5]

[Text] The state is obviously breaking up and it will not take long before the "independent" Czech and Slovak republics also cease to exist. The young and middle-aged generation, misled by the glitter of the German mark and

the cosmopolitan conduct of the entrepreneurial and financial oligarchy, does not need its own state. It wants wages and profits in hard currency and the more splendid, at least externally, Western financial nobility. Unfortunately, however, even some of those who remember the pre-Munich CSR and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia are failing to notice the threat of extinction of their state and the threatening assimilation of their peoples.

We could ask ourselves the question of who needs or needed the other more, the Czechs needing the Slovaks or vice versa. The best answer to that question is provided by a look at history, at the period when the CSR was created in 1918. The current governmental representatives have hardly any interest in looking at that, however, especially those who are pushing their geopolitical ideas on the future of the CSFR from abroad.

The Slovaks—A Subordinate Tribe

The creation of the CSR in 1918 brought into the country 1.9 million Slovaks, 3.5 million Germans, 650,000 Hungarians, 600,000 Ruthenians, 80,000 Jews, a smaller number of Poles, and 6.5 million Czechs. The only groups that had a consolidated infrastructure of governmental and administrative power were the Germans and the Hungarians (they had enough intellectuals, that is, teachers, officials, etc.). The policies of the Masaryk government had two choices in its dilemma: to apply the principle of self-determination of the nations, that is, to offer the non-Slav Germans and Hungarians autonomy and to continue to live in Austria-Hungary in a reduced area or to put the Czech-Slovak majority in control. The reduced status of the Slovak population in particular forced him to choose the second alternative. Despite the fact that in the Pittsburgh Agreement it was stated that Slovakia would be offered autonomy, in practice it was not possible to implement it. Here are some important facts from the memoirs of Dr. Vavr Srobar, the minister for the administration of Slovakia, which confirm that.

Dr. V. Srobar in 1919 sent out a notice of competition for 3,000 teacher's jobs in elementary education; 26 people applied for them. The startup of teaching had to be supported by a levy of teachers from the Czech lands. Several thousand officials and minor functionaries were required to support the governmental executive. Considering the fact that from 1875 on there did not exist any middle schools at all on the territory of Slovakia and in 1919 only 265 of the original 3,000 Slovak elementary schools in 1871 still remained (but even in them there was 19 hours of instruction in Hungarian), it was not possible to ensure running Slovakia without Czechs. Gradually instruction was begun in Slovak in all the schools; only enough Hungarian schools were left so that every Hungarian student had the opportunity to attend a school in his mother tongue. No Czech schools were set

up. In the entire territory there were only 200 people who had a command of the Slovak language and could be used in the state services.

Several weeks ago, CESKY DENNIK called the Slovaks a subordinate tribe that the Czechs helped to come down out of the mountains 100 years ago. However, the Slovak people is not to blame for the fact that 1918-1919 found it in a reduced state. The decisive factor is, however, the cultural gene pool of the nation or the level of genetically based maturity of the people which had not been lost even after 50 years of Hungarianization.

It is obvious that the creation of a unified "Czechoslovak nation," which has been spat upon a thousand times, was an objective necessity for the transition period. Not even general M.R. Stefanik nor Andrej Hlinka demanded autonomy immediately because they understood that it was unrealistic as long as the new schools did not provide enough graduates to ensure the administration of the country. By the mid-1920s, however, these reasons for not granting autonomy had disappeared and the negative attitude of Prague led to a growth in tensions, particularly because the government had filled even the lower positions (school janitors, tobacconists, attendants, etc.), especially with former members of the Czechoslovak Legion, at a time when unemployment was forcing Slovaks into emigration for economic reasons.

Exclusively the Hungarian People!

Demarcation of the southern borderlands of Slovakia, where there were no sharp ethnic boundaries, was carried out in a way that left 650,000 Hungarians on our territory and 500,000 Slovaks remained in Hungary. At this time there are about 570,000 citizens in the SR who claim Hungarian nationality as a consequence of a weaker population growth and natural assimilation. After 70 years, the number of Slovaks in Hungary has dropped from 500,000 to 10 to 15 thousand because the pressure on Slovaks to become Hungarian has not eased up even today.

Every people has its own national philosophy which does not relax its hold, regardless of the political regime which governs it. The national philosophy of the Hungarian people was formulated in 1871 by Lajos Kossuth, the Hungarian revolutionary who was honored even under the Communist regime, who wrote: "I will never recognize any other nation or nationality under the Hungarian crown other than Hungarian."

The program of accelerated assimilation of Slovaks consisted of a plan to divide the Slovak people up into three ethnic groups. When it was already obvious that Slovakia was going to cease being a component part of Hungary, the Hungarian government of Karolyi established the autonomous "Slovak Republic" on the basis of the initiative by the Hungarianized Dvorczak. In some schools they began to give instruction in the Sarissky dialect. After the arrival of the Communist units of Bela Kun in 1919, that "republic" was recognized, but the new title of "Slovak Soviet Republic" was introduced.

Not the "Slovak Republic of Soviets" as the previous regime presented it to us and forced us to celebrate. The assimilation policy of the Red republic remained even under the banner of proletarian internationalism. At the head of the "government" was the Czech adventurer Antonin Janousek, originally from Nurnberg. What was particularly worthy of condemnation in his behavior was the fact that he proposed the ethnic disintegration of the Slovak people. Less well known is the fact that in Lucenec in 1919 there was a Communist government prepared for central Slovakia and one in Gyoeri for western Slovakia. They were not utilized for the simple reason that the Hungarian Red Army did not occupy any Slovak territory other than eastern Slovakia where the governments could have taken power.

The generations replace each other, but the national philosophy remains. Some current Hungarian politicians have risen to their offices on a wave of national populism promising to restore "Greater Hungary." The proof can be seen in the maps of pre-Trianon Hungary which are available in Hungary and were also presented at the world congress of Hungarians this year. A similar goal is supposed to be served by the Hungarian prime minister's data claiming that 1 million Hungarians are living in the SR.

The national philosophy of the Germans was and is expansion and the phenomenon of contempt for everything and everyone who is located east of the German borders. Not even two lost wars have changed that philosophy. Only the means have been changed in the "Drang nach Osten." Not even the presence of several democratic politicians in the FRG Government after the war changes anything.

[9 Nov pp 8-9]

A Replacement Marketplace

It is difficult to characterize the phenomenon of unlimited trust by some Czech citizens in their own government which promises that very soon we will be a part of the European Community. That promise has the same value for the present generation as would a promise that we will become part of China.

For several years now the Western world has been undergoing a severe economic depression accompanied by a marketing crisis that the Western countries have brought upon themselves thanks to the uncontrolled market economy. The European Common Market countries gained control of the markets of the Third World and destroyed them. According to their own data, which they recognize, the prices of commodities imported from the Third World dropped by 75 percent and their own products increased by the same percentage. Thus, for example, the African exporter now receives only \$25 for the same volume of goods for which he received \$100 40 years ago and instead of \$100 for the same goods, he now pays a Western company \$400. These markets are therefore plundered and insolvent. That is also the reason for

the sales crisis for the Western world. They have searched for new markets which will soon be plundered just the same as the markets of the Third World. We are again the witnesses of dividing up spheres of interest and the CR has been assigned to the FRG's sphere.

We are a replacement marketplace or market for the Common Market and the United States and therefore there will be no interest in us becoming producers and manufacturers and thus increasing the sales crisis for the Common Market and the United States. If we have a fishpond and we want to have a continuous production of fish, we have to raise fish as well and not just catch them. Raising fish, however, reduces the profit and therefore it is more convenient, after having fished out our own pond, to go fish in our neighbor's. That is what the Common Market countries are doing.

The Scenario After the Breakup

There are at this time about 4.5 million guest workers in the FRG, mostly dark-skinned ones, who people do not like to see there. They will gradually be replaced by white guest workers from the CR. The economic depression accompanied by plundering our market will have as a consequence both temporary and permanent social emigration. The government will present its *raison d'être* by a further and further selling off of the national property to the Germans and actual persons will likewise proceed in their mistaken attempts to get rich. The stomach, as is known, takes precedence over love of one's country. We should therefore not be surprised that many of our citizens are leafing through the records and searching for some ancestor with a German name for the purpose of acquiring another, German citizenship. It will not be long before our government gives in to the pressure of the Sudeten Germans and offers them Czech citizenship and the right to be, if only as a formality, a resident of the CR. In the second phase, they will offer them voting rights (the Sudeten party is registering here right now!) and these Germans will enter both in the parliament, or the CNR [Czech National Council], and the government. If they move guest workers from the FRG into the enterprises in the CR and settle them here, there can be no doubt of the election victories of the German parties. And thus, just as work is being done on a constitutional breakup of the CSFR, the CR will likewise in a constitutional manner request joining up, not with the Common Market, but as a federated country within the FRG. In order for the disappearance of the Czech state to be complete, the Moravian movement will get its wishes granted and Moravia will become an independent federated country. Bohemia and Moravia will then communicate only through the umbrella agency, which will be located in Berlin. However, all this will be preceded by the economic collapse, which the Czech Government will unleash on the Slovaks.

The scenario for the Slovak Republic will not be any happier. After the separation there will be a sharp decline or even a collapse in the economy which is dependent on final production by Czech enterprises. There will be a

trade war between the Czech and Slovak Republics and the creation of an iron curtain at the borders.

Like the Third World

Despite many years of propaganda, the Hungarian minority, except for certain militant splinter groups, has not been against the interests of the CSFR (or the CSSR) because here the citizens of the past 70 years have a higher standard of living than in Hungary. An invasion of the economy after division of the state, however, will bring forth attempts at joining up with the Hungarian motherland. Use will be made of the tried and true methods of political destabilization used in Yugoslavia and instigated by Hungary and Germany (the delivery of automatic rifles to Croatia and the supplying of weapons and equipment of the former GDR).

In the case of southern Slovakia, there will arise an uncontrollable situation which Hungary will resolve by sending military protection for its countrymen. Because the Slovak Army will be of low combat capability for two to three years, the entire territory of Slovakia will be occupied. Another opportunity will not occur so soon. The MR [Hungarian Republic] is already preparing that scenario through its foreign policy support, with the latest demands being for a permanent presence of observers in the countries where there is a Hungarian minority.

On the part of Germany and Hungary we can expect progressive and continuous blackmail.

A third (so far not global!) war is at this time being carried out against all those who defeated the Germans during World War II. Our governments are also supporting a concentration of the former countries of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" under a new crown, despite the fact that the Serbs are only protecting the territory inhabited by Serbs. The borders of Croatia were artificially established by Austria-Hungary and are not ethnic boundaries. Bosnian and Croatian divisions together with six German divisions murdered 800,000 Serbs during World War II. Germany and the Common Market countries look with satisfaction on the activities of the *mujahedin* who for 14 years murdered in Afghanistan and now are doing so in Yugoslavia.

A Munich by Our Own Hands

Who has planned the breakup of the CSFR? It is a matter of geopolitical interests formulated beyond our borders. It is not possible to believe that the Germans have come to terms with the reduction in their territory after their defeat in the war. That national frustration bears the fruit of neo-Nazism, revanchism and racism, which from time to time breaks out and in its most observable form has grown with the uncontrolled integration of the GDR. The breakup of the CSFR did not begin with a parliamentary crisis as some try to tell us. A representative of the Sudeten Germans recently stated, "We did not pay the Czechoslovak dissidents for it to come out any

differently than this." Thus the new Munich, fashioned more elegantly, psychologically prepared, and carried out by our own hands.

The breakup of the CSFR will not end the geopolitical transformation of Central Europe. For Germany, all "Landesgrenze" [national borders] are temporary. Sooner or later, it will also pressure Poland for it to return the territory gained, despite the current promise on the inviolability of the borders. That will be preceded by the same kind of blackmail that we were subjected to and the artificially induced economic collapse, which will force Poland to retreat.

Czechs and Slovaks! Those of you who still love your motherland, quickly forget it and cease loving it if you want to reduce its future suffering.

Future of Slovaks in Czech Lands Still Debated

93CH0116B Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 14 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Katarina Matejcikova: "Boundless Adaptability"]

[Text] Slovaks in the Czech lands have never been a "special problem." Gradually assimilated, they undoubtedly (and unhibitedly) spoke Czech. After 1 January, they will become—even if this sounds like a paradox—a large national minority in the Czech Republic. They will be Slovaks abroad....

"Every national minority in a foreign country has a certain support from its national state, in contrast to Slovaks. But let us take a brief look at history," says Jan Bobak, director of the Institute for Expatriate Slovaks of Matica Slovenska. "During the period between the two world wars, expatriate Slovaks were not acceptable to the official policy of Czechoslovakia because they did not define themselves as Czechoslovaks. This attitude survived even to the present. Our embassies considered only Czecho-Slovak clubs acceptable, and those received considerable support from Prague. It is therefore not strange that, in neighboring Austria, they recognized Slovaks as a national minority only recently—that is, as members of an independent nation!"

The truth is that, although Slovaks were recognized (only) in the Kosice Program as a nation, the concept of a unitary and indivisible Czechoslovak Republic and constitution persisted. Although Slovaks could speak in Czech offices in their native language, as could Czechs in Slovakia, we all know what it was like in practice. National consciousness of Slovaks manifests itself mostly in their own country; beyond its borders, many quickly forget. In contrast to them, many Czechs living in Slovakia speak good Slovak, but, in their family circle, Czech dominates, even though there are no Czech schools here. J. Bobak observes that Slovaks obviously considered it a sign of their ability if, after a few months' stay in the Czech lands, they spoke Czech. "I think it is quasi-cosmopolitanism within the framework of Czecho-Slovakia...."

Today, about 300,000 Slovaks live in Bohemia and Moravia. But this number also includes re-emigrants from Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia who alternately claim Czech or Czecho-Slovak nationality. The largest number of Slovaks came to Bohemia after 1945, when they replaced the forcibly expelled Germans in the border regions. Matica Slovenska took adequate care of them in the postwar years. It established several dozen Matica organizations. In 1947, regional radio stations in Liberec, Usti nad Labem, and Teplice began broadcasting programs in Slovak, and the newspaper SLOVENSKE HLASY was being published in the area. Slovaks had available mobile libraries with Slovak literature, and, in As, they established a Slovak branch library. After 1948, Matica Slovenska had to cease its activities for 20 years. Only in December 1968 was the Slovak Academic Club for college students established in Prague—but it existed only until 1972.

"I would describe today's situation as catastrophic," continues J. Bobak. The only Slovak school is the high school in Havirov. A Slovak library remained only in As, and the cultural institution is the House of Slovak Culture in Prague. In the Club of Slovak College Students "Detvan" (it was established two years ago), about 10 students are active.... The bookstore that sells Slovak books in Prague is being closed down because the building is going to be privatized. It is useless to enumerate the other reasons. It is beyond doubt that the assimilation of Slovaks in the Czech lands has reached a high degree. The absolute majority of them do not speak Slovak—in the regions with the highest concentration of Slovak population, approximately 20 percent of the people can speak Slovak. The Institute for Expatriate Slovaks has initiated comprehensive sociological research, which will determine the interest of Slovaks in the Czech Republic in their own national consciousness, in contacts with Slovakia and Matica Slovenska. "We have several projects ready," says J. Bobak.

"We want to provide education in the mother language in areas with a 50-percent Slovak population, a steady supply of Slovak press—mostly daily newspapers—promote the opening of bookstores with Slovak books and libraries, radio broadcasts in the Slovak language, and activity by Slovak priests and teachers. We want to expand Slovak culture through music and theater groups, organized exhibitions, and lectures. We would like to be able to establish local organizations of Matica Slovenska—first of all in the less assimilated areas with considerable population migration (for example, in North Bohemia, where Slovaks go to find work)."

Who knows how much the cultural workers, who are supposed to be familiarizing Slovaks in the Czech lands with Slovak national events of the past and the present, will fare, or what results the research of the problems of Slovaks in the Czech lands from the ethnographic, linguistic, or literary standpoint will bring. It seems as though the broadly conceived program wanted to save at the last minute what can still be saved. It is hard to believe that, after the official breakup of the Republic,

Slovaks in the Czech lands will awake at the touch of a magic wand and begin to muse over their identity. "In the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Slovak Republic, there recently was created a section with the responsibility of implementing the program for expatriate Slovaks—even to the west of Slovakia. Whether they will be interested in our efforts, however, is a question—the same as whether all of us want an independent state. I am afraid of their passivity, even if the Czech Government puts no obstacles in their way. They can have Slovak newspapers free of charge, recreation for Slovak children in Slovakia, everything that will be in our power to realize. Slovak adaptability is enormous, despite the fact that—or perhaps precisely because of it—this ethnic group is the only ethnic group that has managed to survive for a thousand years without having had a state of its own. "Even as far as the language is concerned," adds J. Bobak. It is also Matica Slovenska's goal for the Czech national minority in Slovakia to have all the conditions necessary for development—by establishing Czech schools, broadcasts...so that local Czechs (about 50,000) would become a real bridge between the two republics.

But it appears that, at the moment, we are all, on both sides, living with other worries, and the question whether all this had to happen and whether there should have been more of all this concern years ago, we would rather not ask ourselves anymore.

Strasky on ODS Congress, Federal Government

93CH0115A Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech
9 Nov 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Jan Strasky, federal prime minister, by Pavel Safr; place and date not given: "I Was Even Being Sentimental"]

[Text] [Safr] As we are recording this interview, you have already been the newly elected deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] for approximately an hour. As far as I know, on Thursday you were quite resolutely rejecting holding any party office. When did you decide to become a candidate?

[Strasky] Although it sounds unlikely, I did not decide to become a candidate until this morning—in other words, at the congress. First, I had to reject taking on a function, the essence of which was directing the everyday business of the party, and I did so because I am convinced that the reasons for my action are justified. However, I found it impossible to reject the confidence shown in me, insofar as the second function of deputy chairman was concerned.

[Safr] Is it true that you were persuaded by delegates from the ODS in the Federal Assembly?

[Strasky] Perhaps I do not measure up. Talk goes on and water flows beneath the bridge. It is true that last week several delegates spoke to me in private on this topic. However, they were not official negotiations.

[Safr] How do you evaluate the overall results of the elections at the ODS Congress and, incidentally, also the fact that Miroslav Macek is no longer deputy party chairman?

[Strasky] I do not know why I should evaluate the fact that someone was not elected. What is important is that I consider the positive result of the election—the election of other people to the office of deputy chairman—to be the best of all possibilities.

[Safr] During the negotiations, Vaclav Klaus publicized his intention of inviting you to join the expanded Government of the Czech Republic when you conclude your activities in the Federal Government. Several days ago, however, you told me that you would very much like to return to the bank. What do you say to the statement made by Vaclav Klaus?

[Strasky] I cannot pretend that in recent months this alternative has been directly and quite unofficially discussed, particularly in conjunction with the jurisdictions that are passing to the Republics, and because of the necessity to strengthen the Czech Government. Thus far, however, there has been no agreement to which I could refer. This is the first time I have encountered this unequivocal significance.

[Safr] The delegates to the congress are obviously satisfied with the results of the negotiations. You obviously share that satisfaction.

[Strasky] I share the satisfaction to the point at which fate encountered me.

[Safr] Let us pass on to a less idyllic topic. In your opinion, in what kind of situation did the Federal Government find itself after parliament, thanks to three missing Slovak votes, failed to approve its expanded program platform?

[Strasky] I would designate the situation as being extraordinary; of course, the entire political situation is also quite extraordinary. As far as the constitutional and legal side is concerned, it would appear as though nothing is happening because the original declaration was adopted by parliament and the Constitution does not recognize any supplements.

[Safr] It is interesting that the interpretation according to which nothing extraordinary is happening, an interpretation according to which the government may govern even though the submitted program declaration supplement has not been approved, was being promoted in the parliamentary plenum by communist delegates. How can this be explained?

[Strasky] I did not overly analyze this fact. Apparently, they are not seriously interested in seeing this government fall.

[Safr] Does the possibility exist that parliament may not approve the law on the demise of the federation? What consequences would accrue to the Federal Government from this situation?

[Strasky] We would clearly not be the first to react to this situation. Consequences based on the situation as it arises would surely be drawn by both Republic Governments and by the national councils. It is only after their reaction that the approach by the government of the federation would follow.

[Safr] What is your opinion of any possible financial settlement between the Republics as a result of the division of federal property?

[Strasky] We should negotiate as long as it takes to share in the property of the federation without leaving any kind of obligations of financial settlement for the future.

[Safr] In the circle around Vaclav Klaus, however, there predominates a position regarding Slovak demands for financial settlement, which I would call restrained acquiescence.

[Strasky] The divided property has many items. I was speaking more of a global problem of settlement. On the other hand, it is quite likely, for example, that a certain amount set aside for settlement will result from one or another of the subquantities of property that are located abroad. I know of another item that will require settlement and that is the quantity of money in circulation.

[Safr] As a lifelong accountant, you are obviously skeptical about the introduction of absolute fairness in dividing property.

[Strasky] I am convinced that a status that would make it possible to reconstruct history to the extent that we can now work our way toward a fair settlement cannot occur. I am trying to find very detailed and exact methods of settlement, but I am not setting myself a goal of creating fair piles and comparing them mutually.

[Safr] Do you believe that the Slovak side is interested in seeing to it that the division of property be successfully concluded?

[Strasky] I believe that both sides are interested in this and that the Slovak side is perhaps a little more interested. What is needed is for both states to be able to function. For example, it is completely essential that a division of the state bank be accomplished—a division of its assets and liabilities. The Slovak side has more interest because the majority of material assets are located in Prague.

[Safr] Is the adoption of a law on the division of property essential?

[Strasky] No. I have already signed the first attempt to formulate an agreement on the division of property. For the time being, what is involved here is more the design of a future agreement. I can well imagine that this

agreement would be augmented by the addition of several lines and that it could replace the law.

[Safr] You are the last head of the Czechoslovak state. It would appear that you are not a person who might suffer feelings of sentiment in such a position.

[Strasky] Perhaps it cannot be said quite that way. Much like the majority of the citizens, I, too, experienced feelings of sentiment at a certain moment. I have in mind the moment a person reaches an internal understanding that the demise of Czechoslovakia is essential. And these feelings are magnified if a person reaches this understanding while facing journalists. I experienced a period of such feelings in approximately mid-July, when Vladimir Meciar proclaimed that he would not lead his nation as a regional nation but, rather, as a state-creating one. At that time, I understood that we had no chance to change anything with regard to this, I would say, virtually natural process that leads inevitably to breaking up the federation.

Havel Viewed as Potential Hostage to ODS

*93CH0115B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
13 Nov 92 p 3*

[Commentary by Jiri Hanak: "The Crossroads"]

[Text] Like a storied hero, Vaclav Havel stands at the crossroads and is solving a classic dilemma. If he turns to the right, he will conquer the great Castle and lose a part of himself. If he turns to the left, he will preserve the small chalet and will lose absolutely no part of himself. If he goes straight ahead, he will get nowhere because it is precisely that road that is obviously the least negotiable.

The absurd situation is moreover further complicated by the bare fact that the nascent Czech Republic needs Vaclav Havel in the presidential seat. Any other head of state would be a signal to the surrounding world that something untoward is happening in the heart of Europe. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] would also like to see Vaclav Havel at the Castle and is making no secret of it. On the contrary, he remains its only candidate. Who other than Vaclav Havel could endow the nascent state with that necessary "human dimension" to elevate the meaning of its existence above the horizon of the mere daily pragmatic mundaneness? Even Vaclav Havel himself, I believe, wants to be president, and that is good. False modesty and provincial bashfulness is suitable for revivalist moralities, but not for practical politics.

Although all participants and those who are needed agree with the goal, the problem of the crossroads remains: How can Vaclav Havel become a supraparty president on the basis of the will and the decision of one such party, even though it is the strongest one? Can he, after that, remain elevated above party politics at all? The doubts are not only theoretical.

Frequent shrill creaking can already be heard today in the artificial harmony between the ODS and its sole

presidential candidate. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has, in recent days, repeatedly attacked the nonspecifically specific political dreams and the overly expansive foreign activity of Prague under the former government which is alleged not to reflect the importance and opportunities at the disposal of the Czech Republic. Vaclav Havel generally replies with the argument that the Czech Republic is not and cannot be an island unto itself, that it must take on its share of responsibility over what is happening in the world. He dares to obstinately persist in his view that human rights are indivisible and wherever they are violated that this also affects us.

Anyone who has been following the public statements made by Vaclav Havel in recent times can note more and more frequently some kind of "diminution" of the former Havel who was clear and was not putting up any reserves to favor Havel the presidential candidate: There is Havel the reticent, who is sometimes overly circuitous and uncertain in his responses; a Havel who does not wish to bump his head. In a recent episode of "What the Week Has Brought," his indifference to the duel between Miklosko and Klaus was downright striking. Only some weeks ago, that situation would have resulted in obvious support for the Slovak Christian Democrat by Havel.

It is not easy to be a supraparty presidential candidate dependent on the will and decisions of the largest party. The question is whether it is possible at all. Vaclav Havel is aware of the danger of becoming a hostage at the Castle and was even considering taking that previously mentioned direct road. The direct road is the road of the direct election of a president. Only it could guarantee the supraparty nature of the president, because he would not be beholden for his election to any individual party, but to all of the citizenry. However, the ODS is also aware of this and has no intentions of giving up its decisive share in electing the head of state. The fact that it took the field even with such a nonsensical claim that the direct election of a president would signify a serious threat to democracy in our country attests to how much it is interested in having a presidential hostage.

Vaclav Havel must weigh all possibilities, including the surprising one: not to be a candidate. We are familiar with a similar case from the recent past. President De Gaulle. When, in 1946, he did not wish to become the "property of the political parties," he resigned and embarked upon a march through the political desert. After 12 years, a helpless France sought him out. If Vaclav Havel were to exchange the Castle of Prague for his Hradecek residence, he would most certainly not live the life of a political hermit there. On the itinerary of foreign visits, Hradecek would be the same as the Castle of Prague. The words of the master of Hradecek would be listened to with the same degree of seriousness and attention as always. That is because Vaclav Havel is also already an institution.

Prospects of KDH-SDL Coalition Explored

93CH0135B Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK
in Slovak 11 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Miloslava Kodonova: "Slovakia on the Threshold of Independence"]

[Text] At the meeting of European Community representatives in London with representatives of the Visegrad group, John Major sidestepped a direct answer to the question of what conditions were necessary for the club of richer countries to accept an independent Slovakia and an independent Czech Republic among themselves. He only remarked that human rights and a liberal market economy will be maintained among them.

It is also under the influence of such personal contacts that the Slovak politicians are becoming more and more conscious of the European aspect of our sovereignty; just as in a joint state, we will have to adjust to such conditions of management, and also to governing that will make us capable of being included in the European structure. Without foreign capital and loans and without cooperation with important institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it will not work. It will not be possible to set out on the road to prosperity without accepting the generally valid rules of the market economy that have been tested and proved in the rest of the world, without exceptions and without any national specifics. The third and the third and a half paths can be thought up at one's desk in any desired number, but none of them has yet proved itself anywhere.

The discussions of the leadership of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] have also found agreement in just this European orientation of an independent Slovakia, when they designated our full membership in the EC as a future goal. Instead of an artificially constructed national state interest of an independent Slovakia, this inclusion into Europe could in itself become the motivating force and the common element that could theoretically bring the Slovak political scene together.

To achieve full membership in the EC for Slovakia is far from just a program for gaining practical advantages. It is connected, as we have already mentioned, with maintaining human rights and freedoms. In practice, this means that the government will not place limits on opposition politicians and journalists and accuse them of anti-Slovak actions but, rather, will aim not to violate civil rights itself and thus not draw the attention of Amnesty International or other organizations to itself.

A great problem for the governmental movement will be bringing the market economy to life, partly in regard to the fact that its economists are known for their connection with the moderate reform policies of socialism's economy. The minister for the economy, Ludovit Cernak, represents an exception among them as he judges

matters about recognition more in terms of substance than do his colleagues, obviously because he bears great responsibility for the development of the Slovak economy. He had admitted that the mobilizing effects of the new freedoms are already exhausted and that there also exists the possibility of social unrest. He is trying to establish contacts with the right-wing economists and considers it a realistic step to consult with the International Monetary Fund in order to gain concessions from it on the question of the deficit in our budget. His colleague Dolgos causes embarrassment over the level of his expertise, especially by his very rapid changes in his position on the suitability of coupon privatization.

The Party of the Democratic Left, which has suddenly taken the initiative in reaction to the chaotic behavior of the representatives of the government movement, announced that Slovakia is facing collapse. Disregarding its own participation in bringing about the current situation, there is another important question here. If the SDL really considers full membership in the EC as the goal for the political orientation of an independent Slovakia, does it also want to participate in the creation of a liberal market economy? Which of its economists would be capable of that? And how would they then justify their leftist orientation? And, if they should transform themselves in the image of the Western social democrats, who live in and are on close terms with a market economy but have their agenda based on its destruction, who would believe that just this SDL wants something entirely different, the implementation of a liberal market? And, then, if they had built one up, would they again destroy it?

The Slovak National Party, which based its program on the Yurigovski slogan from the Hungarian parliament—"We will hold on"—does not have anything else to do now that we have held on. A defensive policy—and this is not at all specific to just the Slovaks—is one that by its nature spends itself in duels, hostilities, and insults suffered; quiet work without an audience, applause, bonfires, and banners do not suit it. The statement by its representative that its member Ludovit Cernak is not in the government on behalf of the SNS but on behalf of the experts is no accident. Who knows, or only Mr. Prokes knows, what was really said.

The Christian Democratic Movement enters into the period of independence as an opposition force that is trying to make the governmental movement look ridiculous or even criminal. But its representatives, specifically Jan Carnogursky and Frantisek Miklosko, have confirmed their European Christian thinking even at the time of the totalitarian regime and have indicated their ideas on the future independent state. They have apologized on behalf of their generation and the Slovak Christians for the deportation of the Slovak Jews. They have thus joined in the thinking of Cardinal Lustiger on the postenlightenment period—that is, a period in which no democratic country can allow even the seeds of a repetition of such human tragedies as were played out in the concentration camps and gulags.

Not even the KDH has shunned attempts at rapidly becoming a successful party with a broad voter base, even though the program of including Slovakia into the European structure gradually, so that the populace would feel the effects of changes in the state legal status as little as possible, was essentially a well-thought out one. Some impatient voters did not, however, accept it. To its detriment, the movement quite late noticed that it was leaning toward economists of a socialist orientation, who were decorating the communist third path with Christian attributes deliberately selected, not from the broad Christian social teachings but from a single document. Just as the other political parties, the KDH today is facing the question of whether and to what extent it is willing to accept the inevitability of the market economy and to cooperate with the other right-wing forces in the interest of a democracy without attributes.

Shift in SDL's Stand on Federation Noted

93CH0113B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak
12 Nov 92 p 3

[Commentary by Stefan Hrib: "SDL Policy"]

[Text] At the time when Czechoslovakia still existed not merely in theory, its abolition was being decided by votes of the deputies in the Slovak National Council. At that time, Weiss's Party of Democratic Left [SDL] in effect decided the adoption of the Declaration of Slovakia's Sovereignty and the adoption of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic [SR]. It will do no harm to remind ourselves that precisely without the SDL votes the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS] would not have had the three-fifths majority necessary to approve the pure Slovak Constitution. As soon as it was done, it became clear what would follow. It was clear that as a result of the by and large logical breakup of the state, SR will be in a less advantageous position, that unemployment will increase there, that there will be problems with the Gabčíkovo dam, that there will not be resources for the social sphere and health care. What at that time was obvious, and what the previous "anti-Slovak" government repeated almost daily, is today a reality. Slovakia is facing a period of crises.

And precisely today, on the threshold of the independent existence of the Slovak Republic, surprisingly we hear from Peter Weiss' camp that SR is not prepared for independence beginning 1 January. The SDL chairman himself asserts that Meciar's government does not have a concept of an independent state ready, and points out the lack of legislative provisions for Slovakia. Let's leave aside for now the reaction of Meciar's HZDS, which last Wednesday called Weiss' party a threat to Slovakia. Let us also disregard the Wednesday statement of Vladimir Meciar himself on the need to correct the plurality of the press to meet the Slovak standard, or the statement of the Minister of Education Kucera on the need to solve the personnel problems of the Slovak educational

system, in which every teacher should attend to "fulfilling the announced program of the government" and not to political activity, which once more clearly confirms the fears of the previous government (at that time strongly rejected precisely by the SDL) that there is a possibility of undemocratic developments in Slovakia after the breakup of the state. In connection with the SDL something else, as a matter of fact, is interesting.

As recently as during the previous electoral term, that post-communist party, aligned with HZDS and SNS, sharply criticized the federal policy of the Civic Democratic Union [ODU], the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], and the Democratic Party [DS], nor could it find anything good in the economic reform they were implementing. After successfully convincing a great many Slovak voters that the federation is obsolete and the reform too harsh, and after the events that logically followed—including the breakup of the state—Peter Weiss' party today comes with the criticism of what it itself is responsible for to such a significant degree. That SDL conduct can be characterized as entirely pragmatic. When it was advantageous to criticize the common state, contribute to the breakup of that state, at the time of its breakup and consequent problems for Slovakia, point out that it is not prepared for an independent existence. It appears that this tactic has been successful. Peter Weiss is today the most popular politician in Slovakia. But it does not appear likely that this kind of conduct by the SDL will help Slovakia in the long term. For it is not clear when it will again be to Weiss' advantage to replace his current realistic stand by one that is diametrically opposed.

The statement of the Slovak prime minister about SDL being the newest threat to Slovakia is too harsh (the motive behind it is to transfer the blame for the future economic collapse of Slovakia from HZDS to others). But Weiss' post-November policy of the last three years, directed toward his own political gain regardless of its consequences for the citizens, can indeed be characterized as a threat.

Regional Cooperation: Slovak, Hungarian Towns

93CH0139C Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
10 Nov 92 p 4

[Interview with Laszlo Kovacs, head of the regional cooperation organization in Rimavska Sobota, by Laszlo Polgari; place and date not given: "After Rimavska Sobota and Aggtelek: International Regional Cooperation"]

[Text] *As we know, the threads of regional cooperation have transcended international borders by now. In Rimaszombat [Rimavska Sobota], Laszlo Kovacs, the head of the city office, initiated the association that set in motion both Slovak and Hungarian settlements, and that has already taken two specific actions in order to encourage cooperation. Just what kinds of actions were these? I asked the head of the office.*

[Kovacs] Our meeting in Rimaszombat last year produced only statements of intent and remained at the level of making acquaintances and friendships. At this year's meeting in Aggtelek, work was done by specialized committees; they produced specific plans. Since that meeting several of the plans have already been realized. For example, consistent with resolutions produced in Aggtelek, in late September we finalized a draft of the principles of cooperation and the organizational framework of the Regional Association. These documents will be adopted by representatives of the local governments before the end of this year.

[Polgari] Since this is an international regional association, who has expressed an interest in cooperating, and in what respects do you intend to work together?

[Kovacs] We started out by saying that in addition to building regional relations, we should also establish partnerships involving Slovak and Hungarian settlements. The recently prepared bylaws state that the association is open to any settlement, and therefore any Slovak or Hungarian settlement, or for that matter, any municipality in another country could join provided that they accept the principles and conditions stated in the bylaws, and provided that they are willing to cooperate in order to achieve the stated goals. The list of all the municipalities that have joined is long, therefore I would prefer to characterize the present membership of the association. In addition to representatives of county-districts in the vicinity of Rimaszombat, Rozsnyo [Roznava], Losonc [Luzenec], and Kassa [Kosice], the mayors of Vagujhely [Nove Mesto nad Vahom], Trencsentepic [Trencianske Teplice], Dunaszerdahely [Dunajska Streda] and other settlements were also present. I would have to list the names of 16 Hungarian settlements that expressed interest in establishing relations. And insofar as the scope of cooperation is concerned, suffice it to mention the fact that the already established committees specialize in the fields of culture, sports, tourism, health care, education, environmental protection, social affairs, public services, transportation, and telecommunications. In addition, we are also counting on establishing temporary committees in the future, if needed.

[Polgari] How is the association structured? It seems that streamlining the work of the committees you mentioned is not a simple task.

[Kovacs] The association is domiciled both in Rimaszombat and in Kazincbarcika. It meets on an "as needed" basis, but at least semiannually, and the board develops the annual work program and the budget, and also oversees the committee's work. The general meeting elects board members for three year terms. In Aggtelek, Vagujhely Mayor Jozef Varta, Rimaszombat Mayor Pavel Brndiart, Jaszbereny Mayor Dr. Levente Magyar, Kazincbarcika Mayor Jeno Ivanfi, and State Secretary Dr. Gabor Gyulay from Miskolc were elected to serve three year terms on the board. A president of the association will be elected before the end of this year.

[Polgari] At the beginning of our conversation you mentioned that you have already taken specific action in some respects. Could you tell us more about these?

[Kovacs] I could mention relations established between the hospitals of Rimaszombat and Kazincbarcika—the hospital directors and physicians have already met twice. Direct relations have been established between the gymnasiums of Rimaszombat and Hevese in Hungary. But I could also mention the case of Trencsenteplc and Kazincbarcika, here, too, most relations were initiated by the two hospitals, but the people from Kazincbarcika also took part in the Musical Days in Trencsenteplc, and organized recreational programs for young people. The nurseries of Tornalja [Safarikovo] and Kazincbarcika also established relations, and I could go on and on. But all this amounts to only a fraction of what we are planning to do. The profile of the Regional Association is still evolving, and its work program is still developing.

Planned Removal of Hungarian Signs Protested

*93CH0139A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian
12 Nov 92 p 1*

[Declaration by the Coexistence Political Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement concerning the order to remove Hungarian-language signs designating municipalities: "No Law Prohibits It!"]

[Text] Leaders of political movements, our parliamentary representatives, were asked during the past few days by a number of local governments, mayors, and heads of county-district road maintenance companies to take action against the removal of Hungarian language municipal signs, as ordered by the authorities. We are aware—and we have proof to this effect—that some transportation divisions of county-district offices at the precinct level are directing municipal (city) government offices to remove the Hungarian language signs, citing the provisions of Tt. [expansion unknown] Law No. 517 of 1990 concerning the division of the land area and municipal administration, Law No. 428 of 1990—the so-called language law, and Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 99 of 1989 concerning public roads. This, in turn, is based on an SR [Slovak Republic] Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Public Works Circular dated 16 October 1992 directing all county-district road maintenance companies of Slovakia to dismount all Hungarian language and bilingual municipal signs by 31 October 1992, based on the language law and Interior Ministry Decree No. 99 of 1989.

Our political movements wish to make clear that such instructions could only be issued on the basis of a distorted interpretation of the above-mentioned laws, because these laws do not prohibit Hungarian language or bilingual signs, all they require is that every settlement within the territory of the Slovak Republic be designated by a standard sign in the official, i.e. the Slovak language.

The law does not require that municipalities be designated exclusively (only) in the Slovak language. Accordingly, if local governments in settlements inhabited by Hungarians decide to install signs showing the names of their villages or cities in the Hungarian language in addition to the officially prescribed Slovak signs, such action does not violate the laws cited by officials as their source of authority.

Our political movements and parliamentary representatives have taken, and continue to take steps in order to revoke the above-mentioned directives issued by the authorities, and object to the use of Slovak policemen and traffic enforcement personnel in implementing these directives. The police is supposed to protect the legal and public order, and is not supposed to interpret certain laws.

The EPM [Coexistence Political Movement] and the MKDM [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] call upon the leaders of the affected local governments, municipal and city offices, and road maintenance companies not to be intimidated by such directives. This is not the first attempt to coerce minorities since the system change. We must not surrender rights secured in international documents, either by virtue of our own decision, or as a result of being forced to do so. At a time when we are at the threshold of independence, when every developed nation in the world and in Europe pays distinguished attention to political and social life in the Slovak Republic, and when Slovakia tries to prove to all international bodies that it secures minority rights to citizens of all nationalities within its territorial boundaries, we must not permit a situation in which our rights are limited based on decrees and circulars issued by ministries and the authorities.

Slovakia's Hungarian Minority Seeks United Front

Parties' Joint Statement

*93CH0209A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
7 Dec 92 p 4*

[Statement issued jointly by leaders of the Coexistence Movement, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, the Hungarian People's Party, and the Hungarian Civic Party: "Statement on Czechoslovakia's Cessation"]

[Text] Once again we are witnessing a watershed event in history:

As of 31 December 1992 Czechoslovakia ceases to exist. This is not a unique event, and it is not even unexpected, insofar as we are concerned. This has already happened once in the brief, three-quarters of a century history of this country. At that time the events had occurred mainly as a result of influence exerted by a foreign power. Now, however, the ideal of Czechoslovak statehood was defeated as a result of democratic processes, in the course of parliamentary elections held in June 1992.

But the political results of the elections produced neither legal foundations for, nor a democratic framework in which the country could cease to exist.

The turnaround in the history of statehood is seemingly consistent with the principle of national autonomy. Nevertheless, decisions concerning the birth or cessation of the country should be made in the framework of a national referendum, seeking the views of those directly affected by such change. This was not the case when Czechoslovakia came about, nor is this the case at present, when the country ceases to exist.

We are once again witnessing an antidemocratic process. Our future is being decided by political parties whose programs did not include the liquidation of the country. And it is equally essential to note that several hundreds of thousands of Hungarian voters did not cast their ballots for these parties.

For this reason, we, individually, and on behalf of our parties condemn the following facts:

(a) no popular referendum was held concerning the cessation of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of an independent Slovakia;

(b) the constitution of independent Slovakia violates

- private ownership rights,
- the scope of authority of autonomous local governments,
- the rights of national minorities, and
- fails to observe the principles adopted by the Helsinki Process;

(c) Slovakia's Government rejects the idea of calling for new parliamentary elections after the cessation of Czechoslovakia.

Leva [Levice], 5 December 1992

[Signed] Laszlo A. Nagy; Bela Bugar; Miklos Duray; Gyula Popely

Intellectuals' Statement

93CH0209B Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
7 Dec 92 p 4

[Statement issued by a group of ethnic Hungarian intellectuals in Leva on 6 December 1992]

[Text] The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is going to become two independent states as of 1 January 1992. This presents a new situation for every citizen; not only for nations in the majority, but also for those in the minority. Participants at the Leva meeting of intellectuals discussed the vital issues of Hungarians in Slovakia (protection of minorities, education, economy, social policies, local governments, culture, international relations, media), and considered actions to be taken as a result of the newly evolved political situation. Based on presentations and remarks at the meeting, the participants recommend the following:

— the establishment of a council no later than 10 December, to coordinate Hungarian parties and movements in Slovakia, in which participants compare their perceptions and actions regarding every timely, and in the long term, essential issue that affects Hungarians in Slovakia;

— the presentation of a joint document (memorandum) to European and international organizations by Hungarian political bodies in Slovakia no later than the end of December.

The meeting participants find it necessary to draft and to publicize a proposed minority constitution by the end of December, joint action by Hungarian political parties and movements in regard to issues pertaining to culture, education and local government, joint action in the international political arena, as well as active dialogue and cooperation with democratic forces in Slovakia.

The meeting participants regard as important the regular functioning of a permanent forum of intellectuals. They decided to meet again in Leva, in late January to establish such a forum. The forum will be open to everyone and will count on participation by every Hungarian of Slovakia desiring to act.

Further, the meeting participants regard as important to organize a special meeting to discuss current problems in education, with particular attention to the unresolved problem of teacher training.

Leva, 6 December 1992

The meeting participants.

Note: Any Czechoslovak citizen may join in support of this statement by calling or sending a telefax message to 0813/21244.

Appeal to Slovaks

93CH0209C Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
7 Dec 92 p 4

[Appeal issued by a group of Hungarian intellectuals to Slovak intellectuals, in Levice, on 6 December 1992]

[Text] The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is going to become two independent states as of 1 January 1992. This presents a new situation for every citizen; not only for nations in the majority, but also for those in the minority.

Participants at the Leva meeting of intellectuals discussed the vital issues of Hungarians in Slovakia, and the expected situation an independent Slovakia is going to face.

The meeting participants declare that having a democratic state of equal citizens is in our vital interest, a democratic state in which Slovaks, Hungarians, and citizens of other nationalities having various religions and political outlooks live in mutual respect, in which the right to be different is respected, in which an atmosphere of tolerance

and legality prevails. For this reason it is in our common interest that Slovakia become part of the European integration as a politically stable, prosperous state that consistently observes human rights granted to us in a constitution, in a manner that is appropriate from our standpoint. We are initiating Slovak-Hungarian dialogue within the country. The purpose of this should be that we become better acquainted, that we mutually do away with enemy images, that we dispel prejudices, and that we formulate a healthy social atmosphere.

Hungarians of Slovakia also want to take an active part in building a democratic country like this, one that regards us as equal citizens, and one that guarantees the preservation of our identity. We share a common fate and common interests, and the future evolution of these depends on all of us.

Leva, 6 December 1992
The meeting participants.

Anti-Semitic Acts in Slovakia Denounced
93CH0139B Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
11 Nov 92 p 3

[Letter by Istvan Dusza: "Who Are the Ones Who Smear Anti-Semitic Inscriptions Here?"]

[Text] Politicians thunder with increasing frequency: Journalists must be objective! Some believe that politicians have a right to expect this much, the rest should be left to "self-controlled ethics" or self-censorship. Journalists are even allowed to choose between the two. How splendidly graceful!

Having reached the point where an increasing number of us endeavor to present facts and information devoid of passion, some politicians keep busy to prevent the publication of even the facts. For this reason I am not surprised when the Slovak press—so clever to react to other information presented in Hungarian newspapers—has disregarded an exclusive report we published about the desecration of the Ersekujvar [Nove Zamky] Jewish cemetery. The Slovak Television and PRAVDA began to show interest in this outrageous incident a week later, but not much was to be gained by that, even though the anti-Semitic inscriptions and disgraced tomb stones of Ersekujvar did not represent isolated, separate incidents. Just before All Saints Day, the recently dedicated Holocaust memorial in Nyitra [Nitra] was also disgraced, together with the synagogue. Hasn't anyone taken note of this?

Similarly outrageous incidents occurred more or less at the same time in the Northern Italian town of Udine and in the Austrian town of Eisenstadt, both of which caught the eyes of the world press. The day before yesterday the television news also showed Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky paying his respects by standing guard at night at the grave of Jewish dead in Eisenstadt. Thus he demonstrated that his feelings about anti-Semitism amounted to more than election slogans and empty political demagoguery.

What is going on in Slovakia, compared to this? The same thing, but the politicians remain silent. In this area some mayors believe that anti-Semitic inscriptions and the desecration of graves are the results of some silly teenagers trying to call attention to themselves. All this is topped by the fact that it has become the function of the Slovak press to develop the "real and true image" of the government and of Slovakia. Surely, reports about the Ersekujvar and Nyitra events would spoil this cosmetic effect.

While in several large cities of Europe demonstrations are held to protest anti-Semitism, in our neck of the woods not even the Hungarian political movements condemn the disgrace perpetrated in cities whose residents include Hungarians. The silence that ensued after last week's events is incomprehensible. People whose dead relatives were disgraced by neofascist criminals would not even dare to dream about the president of the Slovak parliament or the head of government standing symbolic guard at tombs in some Jewish cemetery. Most certainly, they are preoccupied with partitioning the country, but as they, too, know, it is the internal conditions of the nascent Slovak Republic that determine the external conditions, and not the reverse.

All politicians are silent, for now. I regret that Hungarian parties and movements in the homeland also bury their heads in the sand; their leaders need no interpreter in order to understand the news. Or do they? I am available to serve as the interpreter.

Attempted Interference With CPSU Investigation
93CH0114A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
12 Nov 92 p 2

[Interview with Jiri Valenta, director of the Institute of International Relations, by Jaromir Stetina; place and date not given: "Who Does Not Wish To Learn the Truth Regarding the Intervention?—Alexander Dubcek Was To Be the Principal Witness in the Trial of the CPSU"]

[Text] *In Moscow, the Constitutional Court is looking into the crimes committed by the former Communist Party of the USSR. Will it also investigate the role played by the CPSU in the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968? LIDOVE NOVINY asked Prof. Jiri Valenta, director of the Institute of International Relations, for details regarding the situation.*

[Valenta] The court is also dealing with the activities of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in the international field. One of the items of evidence, for example, is the case of the Katyn Forest. The Czechoslovak Commission of Historians, which is dealing with

the intervention of 1968, presented the team of collaborators working for President Yeltsin with two sets of documents containing a number of items of evidence, including videocassettes, this past summer. Together with Dr. Kural, the deputy chairman of the commission, I handed the first portion of the documents, as commissioned by President Havel, to Mr. Ryurikov, the Yeltsin adviser; the second portion of the documents was sent by courier. On the occasion of handing over the first shipment, we had the opportunity to deal with Yeltsin's court team. The actions of the Constitutional Court made a good impression upon us as a result of their correctness and substantive approach, and we would be happy if our cooperation were to continue.

[Stetina] But some of the documents were lost from the shipment....

[Valenta] From the standpoint of the court, it was the most important document—it was Brezhnev's speech at the Moscow summit of the "Warsaw Five" on 18 August 1968. At that time, Brezhnev specifically stated that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU had met for three days and decided that intervention in Czechoslovakia would be undertaken. The lost document also contained references to the "letter of invitation" and to the treasonable activities of the pro-Soviet coalition in our country. Thanks to Mr. Ryurikov, we were able to recover that document. It was sent to President Havel, together with the so-called letter of invitation. Yeltsin's team—Messrs. Burbulis, Shachray, Kotenkov, and Makarov—was apprised of the importance of that document. Furthermore, somewhere "during translation," Czechoslovak documents regarding the kidnapping of Dubcek, Kriegel, and other individuals by Soviet organs in August 1968 "fell between the cracks." We had to resubmit them to Moscow.

[Stetina] Was anyone from our side preparing to testify personally before the court?

[Valenta] While we were in Moscow, we debated who it should be. Some Czech representatives did not expect that Alexander Dubcek would be willing to provide direct testimony and proposed that other individuals do so. However, as people who were somewhat initiated, we felt that it should be precisely Dubcek, with his personal experiences from the time of the invasion. Even Shachray, the principal representative of Yeltsin at the court, and Burbulis stressed this and requested that we make the arrangements. Upon returning to Prague, we went to visit A. Dubcek. At first, he was hesitant because someone from the leftist circles had interpreted matters for him, indicating that this was an action directed against Gorbachev. We convinced him that it was primarily a matter of an assault on Brezhnev and a matter of historical justice, of assistance to democrats in Russia. We emphasized that the Russians themselves consider his testimony to be important and that he is popular with them. After a certain amount of vacillation, Dubcek told

us at the end of our visit that he will travel to the court. "Hey, I will do that," he said.

[Stetina] That was in the middle of August....

[Valenta] We communicated Dubcek's decision to Moscow by telephone, and preparations for his trip began. Unfortunately, the court was suspended for two weeks and rescheduled for September. During this intermission, Dubcek's automobile suffered a tragic accident. We were shocked—we and our friends in the Kremlin. God, nature, or someone rendered impossible the presence of one of the most important witnesses before the Constitutional Court. When I found out about Dubcek's accident, I recalled that Yeltsin was telling me about two automobile accidents. The first happened to him personally, the second recently befell Shachray.

[Stetina] Why is so little known about the fact that Dubcek was to be the principal witness against the CPSU?

[Valenta] We tried not to disseminate this information too widely. From sources in the Russian Embassy in Prague, we found out that there are Czech and Slovak citizens who were telling Russian diplomats not to publish the "letter of invitation" and other documents because that would undermine collaboration between our two countries. In other words, even now, there exist lobbies in Czechoslovakia that do not wish the truth regarding the intervention to be published.

Dubcek's Autobiography Ready for Publication

93CH0116A Bratislava SMENA in Slovak
14 Nov 92 pp 1, 6

[Unattributed article: "With a Human Face"]

[Text] New York—An American of Czech origin, Jiri Hochman, a historian who teaches at Ohio State University, announced on Thursday that he and Alexander Dubcek finished writing an autobiography of this leading personality of the "Prague Spring." They finished the book one month before Dubcek was in the car crash.

Dubcek left personal testimony that throws new light on the invasion of 1968, on his abduction by the Soviets, and on what inspired him to become the man who tried to give communism a "human face," the Reuter Agency wrote in this connection.

Although much is known about Dubcek's career, there is also much about his life that is unknown, including how this party functionary, brought up under Stalinism, succeeded in making the effort to reform communism.

The autobiography, called *Nadej umiera posledna (Hope Dies Last)*, is now, according to the British agency, in the hands of his sons and of A. Dubcek's collaborators, who must first give approval for the Japanese firm Kodansha Ltd. to publish the book on 1 May, simultaneously in 10 languages.

The book contains thus far unpublished transcripts of the interrogation to which the then Soviet officials Leonid Brezhnev and Alexej Kosygin subjected the unshaven and dirty Dubcek after he was forcibly abducted to Moscow following the invasion of the Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968.

According to Hochman, the manuscript shows the depth of Kosygin's and Brezhnev's stupidity, when they alternately pleaded for cooperation and threatened to provoke a bloodbath.

Reuter says that "A. Dubcek was abducted together with five other members of the Presidium first to Poland and then to Ukraine. On 23 August, they brought him before Brezhnev and Kosygin for questioning. They decided not to kill him because they needed him. They assumed various roles. Brezhnev styled himself as a father figure; Kosygin, on the other hand, played the role of a bully. He wanted to get him over to their side, so that he would cooperate with them in their effort to find a solution to their invasion.

They wanted him to concede that the invasion was necessary to stop a counterrevolution. He refused, but, in the end, he was the last of the Czecho-Slovak representatives to sign the Moscow Protocol. It was de facto an agreement of capitulation."

According to Hochman, Dubcek at that stage still believed he could save many of his reforms. When he returned home, normalization began, and the state took over control of the newspapers, radio, and television. A. Dubcek was stripped of his power by colleagues who were willing to cooperate with Moscow.

Historian Hochman said that Dubcek was put under tremendous pressure to give up his ideas, which he never did. In the end, they sent him to his native Slovakia, where he spent 20 years as a forestry laborer repairing chain saws. He was under strict police supervision, his mail was confiscated, his telephone was monitored, and his family was not allowed to travel. The police also forbade him to have visitors or to be in contact with his former colleagues. Hochman said that Dubcek never signed Charter 77 on reform and return to democracy for one simple reason—they were never able to get to him.

"He never doubted that he was right, and, in my opinion, he got the idea of reforming communism because he had an upright upbringing and because, as a child, he was deeply influenced by the Lutheran faith. He was a profoundly moral man, who thought it possible that Christian principles could be combined with communism," says Hochman.

Slovak Writer Claims CSFR as His Country

93CH0113A Prague LITERARNI NOVINY in Slovak
18 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Miroslav Kusy: "A Right to One's Country"]

[Text] We shall probably celebrate New Year's Eve—as usual—at my friend Vilo Dolnik's place in Podbanske in

the Tatras. We have never before sung the Czechoslovak anthem after the midnight toast on that occasion. Now it is unavoidable. The women will burst into tears. And I, in order to suppress the helpless, silent fury that will at that moment rise within me, would probably just as soon set fire to and trample the Czechoslovak flag, as the symbol of spurned love.... *Endlich allein* [finally alone]?

Let us have no sentimentalities and resentment, no embarrassing nostalgia, the ideologues of a "civilized divorce" exhort us. After all, nothing is actually happening. Although there will be frontiers, the border guards and customs officers will be only symbolic, they comfort us. You will not even notice that you crossed them. You will come to Prague as before, and you will not even be aware that now you are already subject to regulations that apply to your new status as a foreigner. After all, it will be just a pure formality, they soothingly pat us on the back.

They are obviously deceiving us. They are not tearing the Republic into two parts just to have this drastic and expensive operation result in a "pure formality." This is a profound intervention in my civic life. A foreign status is no banal, insignificant formality. It is the expression of the essence of the matter: the rise of two sovereign states, independent of each other.

The representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] are, of course, still blabbering about a common, in fact about some kind of "unionistic" citizenship, which is a patent absurdity: citizenship of a nonexistent common state, a nonexistent union!

Yes, a foreign status is an entirely logical outcome of this kind of solution to the issue of the state setup, upon which our victorious representatives quickly agreed after taking over power in the two Republics.

But precisely this kind of solution, this object of your agreement, gentlemen, upsets me. I was born in Czechoslovakia, and I have lived here practically my entire life. Czechoslovakia has been and, until the end of this year, will continue to be my country. But, with your agreement, you have cut down this home of mine by two-thirds, you have expelled me from those two-thirds and assigned to me the status of a foreigner in them. Ludvik Vaculik's home was reduced by only one-third: I do not believe, though, that it should be sufficient reason for his "relief at the decision." You took away from each of us a substantial part of our home. You fundamentally curtailed our right to our country, which should be guaranteed to us by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Liberties adopted as the constitutional law of the CSFR, and, in my case, even by the very recently adopted Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

In this Constitution, the legislators are assuring us that "a citizen cannot be forced to leave his country. He cannot be expelled and turned over to another state" (Article 23/4). I therefore consider your agreement to be

a cynical mockery of this still fresh Constitution. Precisely with this agreement, you are forcing me to leave two-thirds of my country. You have just expelled me from those two-thirds!

True, none of these documents nor my new Constitution says anything about whether I have the right to a whole country, or if it is enough for me to be left with just a stump in order for the letter of the law to be fulfilled; they leave me in doubt as to whether I can define my country by myself, or if I have to accept the official decree on what I am assigned as a country. I had to swallow this bitter lesson in order to be able to understand the feelings and efforts of the Sudeten Germans, with their "tedious" continuing emphasis on their right to a homeland. From now on, we, too, Slovaks as well as Czechs, will be to some degree in the same situation. Both sides are already operating hard with the principle of collective guilt. Just listen to the voices of the victorious groups, the party bosses, and the media: The Slovaks did it to themselves, the Slovaks are getting what they wanted, there is no way to come to an agreement with the Slovaks. And, on the other side: The Czechs want to cheat us, you cannot trust the Czechs, the Czechs exploit us, swindle us, deceive us.... On both sides, the guilt is defined as collective guilt. And no one asks us whether as nations we accept it or not, whether we really assume the responsibility for the pronouncements that are blared at the world by the victorious politicians: The Slovak nation demands, the Czech nation will not allow....

True, we are being promised a "civilized" expulsion. During its first stage, they will not chase anyone out of their country, but it will be done the other way around: They will take the country away from people in sections—from some a third, from others two-thirds. But I am afraid that we shall not be able to also avoid the second stage of the expulsion: The foreign status creates marvelous legislative prerequisites for that purpose. It only depends on the circumstances whether people make use of them. Who will be the first to come with a claim to a "good job" held by a foreigner of "Czech origin"? Who will be the first to get the idea to resolve social problems by expelling foreigners of "Slovak origin"? Who will start the retaliatory measures for the first effrontery, stupidity, or provocation and put into motion the unstoppable mechanism of the well-known spiral?

The right to a country, which, as well as the country, you are now taking away from us cannot be swept off the table by disparaging it as a sentimentality of some demented idealists or a nostalgia of senile "Czechoslovaks." It is not by chance that this right belongs among the fundamental human rights. And, as is well known, there should be no tampering with those.

Possible Conflicts in Division of Federal Property *93CH0110A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 15 Nov 92 p 6*

[Article by Emil Szirmai: "The Breaking Up of Federal Property—Czech Tolerance Is Approaching Its Limits"]

[Text] *Politicians, regardless of whether they are Czech, Slovak, members of the coalition, or members of the opposition, rarely agree that the division of federal property must be just.*

Various notions regarding the expression of that lofty principle, however, frequently differ by a factor of billions. This is naturally given by the frequently articulated contradictory interests of both Republics. Absolute fairness on this point does not exist. Even if it did exist, it would not be directly applicable, even as a yardstick for dividing the office furniture in the building of the Presidium of the Federal Government. In practice, therefore, it is largely a matter of finding a criterion that would be economically sensible and, at the same time, fulfill the fundamental requirement of being politically passable; it must not become the source of future conflicts. The federal delegates who are scheduled to discuss an appropriate constitutional law this Wednesday and Thursday will obviously break a real sweat in seeking appropriate standards. Moreover, the Slovak side, in recent days, has come out with some proposals that actually disrupt the entire logic of discussions that have been held thus far and may even cast doubt on the compromises that have been achieved so laboriously.

Meanwhile, 524.7 Billion Korunas [Kcs] Are Languishing in the Bank

The law on dividing the property of the Federation has to do precisely with that amount. However, on this occasion, the delegates will be "cheated" of virtually Kcs243.7 billion. That is because the law does not deal with the property settlement of the transportation and communications industry; by including that industry, the current value of federal property amounts to Kcs768.4 billion.

And, for methodological reasons, the very figure Kcs524.7 billion understandably need not be precise. For example, basic assets are expressed in documentation in acquisition prices—in prices dating back to a past system of deformed prices—and many unclarties can arise regarding write-offs. (Only in defense areas and interior departments was a qualified estimate of property undertaken that more or less reflects the remainder prices. Real estate under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad will then be subjected to even market valuation, something that has been entrusted to a foreign consulting firm.)

The property values do not include some Kcs30 billion in investments by federal organs together with varying prices, current accounts, or cash, such as unexhausted budgetary resources or amounts for covering obligations due by the end of the year.

Given the above-mentioned exclusion of transportation and communications, it is possible to consider the decisive sphere regarding the division of property to be the Federal Ministry of Defense (Kcs426.1 billion), the Federal Administration of Material Reserves (Kcs43.5 billion), and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, where "only" some Kcs17.5 billion are involved. The property of these three areas accounts for approximately 93 percent of the total federal pie.

The situation will be complicated in dealing with dividing the property of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia, whose varied accounts receivable amounted to Kcs447.8 billion as of 21 October of this year and are opposed by once more greatly differentiated accounts payable of Kcs443 billion. Finally, an independent chapter is the relationship with the International Monetary Fund, which will, however, be progressing in accordance with the actual criteria of division.

To Divide "Out of One Vessel"!

The first cardinal, although seemingly innocent, problem arose at the very beginning of the legislative preparations for the property divorce. Should common property be at least legally divided at one time—that is, on the basis of a single constitutional law that would already outline the specific image of property settlement in all given areas, beginning with the Army and ending with the Center for Coupon Privatization? Or will it be more useful to first work out some kind of a "conceptual" law that would merely outline the general criteria and would leave the substantive solution of specific areas to independent follow-on legal standards? The second position was particularly being promoted by some Slovak politicians. Similar disintegrating tactics would hardly lead to anything other than critical time delays and bargaining in accordance with the principle of "grab what you can"; the political consequences are clear.

As is customary in our country, common sense prevailed only in part—the Federal Government actually did deliver a proposed law to parliament, a law that was clearly based on the first concept, but solving the problems of transportation and communications was deferred, for mysterious reasons.

Principles...

In dividing up federal property, it is primarily impossible to find any kind of singular all-encompassing criterion. The reason is prosaic: The property in question contains several spheres that differ in character and origin. They involve real estate as well as material property, state fiscal or monetary obligations and claims, and divergent property rights or obligations.

Specifically, it is necessary to deal with property created on the territory of one or another of the Republics prior to the development of the Czechoslovak state, property that passed to that state's ownership after 28 October 1918; it cannot be recommended that Prague Castle be divided in accordance with the principle of 2:1.

The submitted law therefore proposes to apply three principal types of criteria: historical, territorial, and the division of property according to population numbers—that is, a ratio of 2:1.

A special criterion—the number of holders of investment coupons registered in the individual Republics—was then selected for property settlement pertaining to the Center of Coupon Privatization (a ratio of 2.29:1 in favor of the Czech Republic).

Property divided according to the territorial viewpoint accounts for 42.7 percent of total property and is divided according to a ratio of 1.92:1; property falling under the criterion by population numbers accounts for 54 percent of all property; finally, property divided by the historical key accounts for approximately 2 percent and should seemingly be divided at a ratio of 7:1.

What is essential, however, is what the above-listed principles mean, whether economically or politically.

As the title itself indicates, the territorial principle states that property always passes to the successor state upon whose territory it is located; that is thus always true for real property. As for material property, the principle is usable exclusively in cases where such items form the indivisible appurtenances of real estate.

Where the territorial criterion cannot be applied, the principle of division according to population numbers in both republics comes into play—in other words, a ratio of 2:1. Thus far, everything sounds beautiful and problem-free.

...And Conflicts

Nevertheless, a serious dispute arose among the representations here. Whether and how this bone of contention will find its way this week even into parliament will not become clear until 29 October—in other words, a mere three days after the Javory summit—because, at the session of the working group for property division, a representative of the Government of the Slovak Republic gave a speech that contained totally new proposals that stand the results of previous discussions on their head. He stated that the dominant principle was the division according to population numbers, while taking territorial viewpoints into account, and he surprisingly had all property—in other words, not only real property—lumped under the territorial viewpoint. And this was not a spur-of-the-moment idea, which is best attested to by the fact that he presented his variation in polished legislative form. The Czech side declared the submitted version as being unacceptable, through the words of Minister Dyba.

What would the implementation of the Slovak variation mean? At best, the division of property worth billions would be left to chance; in the worst case (and this is more likely), it would be left to unabashed speculation. Pursued into absurdity, it is possible that all aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airline Corporation could fly away to

Slovakia on D-day and that all railroad rolling stock could be concentrated in Bohemia so that this property might then pass to the appropriate republic. Unfortunately, the invented example is not as absurd as the criterion itself.

The Slovak side shortly corrected its proposal; it seems that it recognized the nonsensical nature of a general application of the territorial principle to material property. However, it is possible that it will continue to insist on other related conditions: If, in applying the territorial principle to real property (which is, as has been stated before, in and of itself a sensible principle) a ratio of 2:1 is not achieved, it will include language in the law to compel property and financial settlement. (And that is a scandal.)

In certain cases, it is possible that the Slovak Republic might even profit a little, but, primarily, the entire operation would become obtuse and protracted—not to speak of “fairness.”

Other extremely dangerous dragon eggs, even from the international standpoint, are contained in the historical criterion, which also appears to be clean. The Slovak side is stubbornly pressing for the illegitimate expansion of the criterion to be included in the law—something that must be stressed. In the eyes of the Slovak legislators, the historical criterion should apply “also to the property of the former Slovak state, acquired during the time of its duration and that became the property of the Czechoslovak state.” According to Slovak Minister of Finance J. Toth, what this particularly involves is a part of the gold reserves held by the State Bank of Czechoslovakia. It is alleged that the majority of those reserves did not occur on the basis of joint management by both republics, but was taken over from the gold reserves of the Slovak state at the conclusion of World War II. The demand to release what I sense is seven tons of gold is not even substantively upholdable upon closer examination. However, the merits of the matter are not based on the price of the precious metal. One of the last laws to be adopted by the Federal Assembly would use this curious circuitous route to recognize the legal legitimacy and even the peculiar continuity of the fascist state. Analogous conduct by the Czech Republic regarding any property created under the German Protectorate would then even result in particularly unfavorable international legal consequences, particularly with respect to the relationship with the Sudeten Germans.

In the case of a property divorce, much like with the demise of a marriage, it is, of course, customary to moralize in a childlike manner. However, the language of the cited law makes it possible to exclude from property

division even that property that was acquired as a result of violent Aryanization. So, to be moral, let me withhold commentary.

Economic Efficiency as a Criterion for Division?

It is not possible to draw a direct line between the efficiency of the economy and the division of property because that would be a principle that would be most advantageous for the Czech Republic. Created national income (in gross prices) in the Czech Republic for the years 1968 through 1991 was Kcs7,671.8 billion; in Slovakia, it was merely Kcs3,117.6 billion. By using this method, we would arrive at a ratio of 2.46:1, despite any doubts regarding the credibility of statistical data from the period of central planning. We can, however, develop the proportion from the method by which the economies of the Republics shared in the creation of the federal budget, from the amount of assistance doled out by the federal redistribution pot to one or the other. In the same period, the Czech lands did receive somewhat “more” (a ratio of 1.32:1), but this “more” did not reflect the contribution to the creation of resources.

The very recognition of the territorial principle, together with the criterion of a 2:1 ratio, is an adequate expression of Czech gentlemanliness from the standpoint of the actual contribution made by the Republics to the formation of federal property. This is also attested to by the most recent experiences—last year, during the budget compilations, final victory was also enjoyed by “civic solidarity,” or, rather, by political compromise. According to objective indicators such as the national income, for example, the budgetary system for 1992 should have been constructed at a ratio of CSFR 35 percent, Czech Republic 45.18 percent, and Slovak Republic 19.82 percent, and not in the proportions approved, which were CSFR 35 percent, Czech Republic 40 percent, and Slovak Republic 25 percent. Nevertheless, it is certainly unnecessary to continue to keep “charging” the Slovak partners for the past, both literally and metaphorically.

Limits of Tolerance

During its negotiations regarding the division of federal property that have taken place thus far, the Czech representation has reached the very limits of generosity, if not actually crossed them. It is doing so in the interest of reaching a consensus-type agreement. However, it is necessary to be on guard: The notion that the Czech Republic should once more pay for that which it has already donated to Slovakia through the medium of the redistribution process is, after all, an unpleasant matter, but is mainly fraught with political danger for the future.

Yeltsin's Speech to Hungarian National Assembly
93CH0173A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 1 Dec 92 p 6

[Speech given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the Hungarian National Assembly on 11 November 1992: "Boris Yeltsin's Historical Address in the Hungarian Parliament; A Bow to the Memory of the Victims of 1956"]

[Text] *On 11 November, Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation delivered a speech of historic significance in the Hungarian parliament. Due to technical difficulties, only fragments of the speech could be heard by the Hungarian television audience at the time, and read in newspapers the next day. Since then, several remarks in parliament dealt with this event, and, as indicated by our readers: many would like to see the original text. To satisfy these wishes, we present the full text of Boris Yeltsin's memorable speech delivered in parliament.*

This is the first time in the histories of our countries that the president of a free, democratic Russia pays a visit to the free, democratic parliament of Hungary.

I am conveying to you the best wishes of the Russian people, a desire of the highest order expressed by Russians: to live in peace and understanding with the Hungarian people.

Russia has always shown great and sincere interest in the history, lives, and culture of your people. Political and trade relations between Russia and Hungary have been actively developing at the dawn of statehood. A treaty of friendship signed by Czar Peter I and Ferenc Rakoczi II in 1707 was one of the brightest stars in Russian-Hungarian relations. Unfortunately, as that usually happens in our history, the good times were followed by a more clouded era. We know that history nurtures the memories of the revolutionary years of 1848 and 1849, and the sad role Czarist Russia played in those days.

Caterpillar Tracks

Similar events took place somewhat more than 100 years later: I am referring to the tragedy of 1956. The Soviet regime did that to you. Caterpillar tracks upon which tanks had rolled have remained on the streets of Budapest ever since: they will remain there forever. I am certain that people in Hungary remember this event, and so do Russians.

That event taught a great lesson to humanity on totalitarianism and tyranny; people learned that these two factors do not remain confined within the borders of any given country: they also extend their poisonous tentacles to neighboring countries. There are no boundaries and no moral standards in this regard.

The fact that Russian soldiers were also forced to take part in these tragic events on orders from the then masters of the Kremlin is a bitter recognition, and all this took place only 10 years after the same Russian soldiers

made great sacrifices to liberate Hungary from the Fascist yoke. But one kind of ideology and tyranny only replaced another.

I regard the fact that the Hungarian people were first to rise against oppression as highly symbolic. The national insurrection was not in vain: it showed that not only individuals, but entire nations were beginning to recognize the need to get rid of communist dictatorship, that there was no future short of that.

Today we bow to the memory of the victims of 1956. The revenge of the system—the system that prevailed at the time—was terrible, and was not confined to Hungary: The GULAG was filled with new prisoners, people from Russia were among them, and very many people from the so-called socialist camp had suffered there in those days. The entire world could see for itself that no country produces heroes only, every country also also produces henchmen. Unfortunately, there is no exception to this rule.

No Catharsis Without Knowing the Truth

Not only the citizens of Hungary, but also the citizens of Russia must know the truth about this period. They will definitely learn the truth, and not only many years hence, but in the near future. I am not telling you this to fuel feelings of revenge inside of you. Justice cannot be done, and no catharsis can occur without knowing the full truth; the forces of progress cannot be set in motion without knowing the full truth; one cannot ask for, or receive forgiveness without having a conscience.

We signed an agreement today for mutual cooperation between our respective archives in the future. It should be obvious that additional, important information about the 1956 events will be revealed as a result.

Russia is prepared to cooperate in this regard, and there will be no obstacles in the path of such cooperation in the future.

The defeat of the revolution was unable to inhibit your people's yearning for freedom. In the waning days of socialism, Hungary gained more experience in building a market economy than the rest of the East European countries. Even under the strictest of conditions, you always enjoyed a greater degree of openness and pluralism than others. Pragmatism always prevailed over ideological barriers. There were good reasons for calling Hungary the "happiest barracks" in the socialist camp.

This was actually the saddest joke and compliment I had ever heard, even though the claim was well-founded.

At present we manifest great interest in your experience, in seeing the degree of flexibility, consistency and sobriety with which you are progressing on the path of implementing reforms, while preserving the stability of the country.

We do not want to blindly copy what you and your partners are doing, but we would like to learn from your

experience, to be able to organically combine the global experience and our own traditions, democratic values and the developmental needs of our multinational society.

We Were Living in a Kingdom of Curved Mirrors

We are living in new times, and new relationships between Hungary and Russia have dawned. The Russian people gratefully remember that Hungary was first to speak up in the days of the August coup, and that it was Hungary's voice that could first be heard not only by Russians at the Moscow barricades, but also throughout the world. The era of undissolvable friendship was undissolvable only under the fire of submachine guns. Actually, we were living with you in a kingdom of curved mirrors, but even then, people manifested good will and friendship toward each other, and this is most important.

The present task is to normalize our relations and to provide new dynamics, a new quality to these sentiments, and this is possible today. I am certain that after a short period of time we will be truly good neighbors and truly loyal friends. Our people have lived through very many dramatic moments, they have seen a lot, and thus expect a great deal from the present opportunity. This means that the deep-rooted changes in the social and political system have become an irreversible process. I do not believe that it is necessary to convince anyone about the huge reserves we have. Russia and Hungary are close to each other not only in a geographical sense, they also know very well each other's conditions, customs, traditions, and the potential of the East European market. The economies of our states have become integrated at a high level. If we were to succeed in setting this potential in motion, both Hungary and Russia could show serious results in the near future already. Establishing the legal and economic base is most important in this regard. Doing so is the function of parliaments and governments. This is so important that we must not delay action, we must vigorously begin to work at it. We will be unable to ensure favorable conditions for carrying further our economic goals, the present investment activities, unless we perform this task; capital will not flow, and we will be unable to regroup the workforce without performing this task.

Entirely new perspectives are opening up in our countries' mutual relations; in this regard I also have in mind the republics in Russia and in the region, because, as you know, the Russian agreement on confederation has been signed. Along the Volga, in the Ural area, and in West Siberia some nations claim that their languages are related to yours; they express very great interest in Hungary and want to cooperate with you.

We also reached an agreement regarding rules for the system of settling debts, issues concerning assets and finances, as well as issues that arose as a result of withdrawing the Soviet troops.

The fact that our two countries signed a declaration concerning national minorities is important in the framework of Russia's and Hungary's sphere of interest. We discussed these matters in detail with the leaders of Hungary. Negotiations and conversations were carried on in a constructive vein.

Voluntary Efforts

We are building relations based on new principles. In this regard it is very important to demolish what the old system produced.

The Warsaw Pact was a characteristic symbol of the past 40 years. The Warsaw Pact no longer exists, this part of the pain has ceased. We are conducting political dialogue at the highest level on a regular basis. This dialogue is consistent with international criteria, it is based on the principle of full equality. Russia follows this principle not only in regard to Hungary, but also with respect to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria. I do not believe that our partners could complain about Russia today, about Russia manifesting a conduct inherited from the Soviet Union, about showing the ambition of an older brother. We are very well aware of the price that must be paid for such brotherly embrace, and you, too, know that price, because even your bones were crushed as a result of that embrace.

I am certain that from now on we will be guided by the principles of fair partnership and voluntary efforts, rather than by forcible quasi-offerings of suspect prescriptions. We must become partners in building the democratic institutional system. The development of our relations must not continue along the path paved with the fossils of olden days. It does not make sense for us to pursue old, so-called federal relations based on dictates from Moscow. At the same time, it would be a grave mistake to forget all the good things that link our people. I wish to stress: our people, and not the regimes.

In these days a great opportunity presents itself to take advantage of the experience gained from global, European and regional cooperation. Even more so, because by now Hungary is seated in the UN Security Council. The fact that the next, highest level meeting in the Helsinki process will be held in your capital in 1994 is symbolic. This is yet another proof that Hungary is playing an increasing role in the world. The real success of the Budapest meeting will depend on our joint efforts. Russia will do everything it can to make this meeting a success. Russia is deeply interested in dismantling the logic of resisting change.

My generation still witnessed a Europe divided into two by a so-called super border, but allowing new fault lines to evolve would be a tremendous tragedy, break lines that operate along ethnic and religious divisions. The time has come for us to openly and candidly state: European security and stability is now being threatened by the region we called the socialist community not too long ago. For this reason we hold a tremendous responsibility in resolving this problem.

We must remember that above all, we are Europeans, that we are the beholders of, and heirs to this huge European treasure, and that we must conduct ourselves accordingly. Some huge political structures operate in Europe in this direction. The goal is clear: we must even out the transitional period to the maximum extent possible, so that normal, decent, civilized conditions prevail on our continent.

We must make a joint effort to avoid further shock, new cataclysmic events. This requires good will, we must coexist in order to accomplish this. All stabilizing factors must be supported. I believe, that this role must now be played by Central and East Europe. In this regard I should only have to mention the Visegrad-3 and the Central European initiative. I am confident that these will not become closed groups, and that they will develop consistent with the general European process. Russia is prepared to conduct dialogue with these structures.

Cooperation along the Danube could become a factor that reinforces stability. Even more so, because I see a future in expanding this cooperation to include the Black Sea zone. Russia regards this cooperative effort as open and is interested in it.

No Return

I have no doubt that Hungary and the rest of the East European countries are very familiar with the ongoing processes in Russia. These countries know from their own experience how difficult it is to transform. The road of transformation is difficult and bumpy. It is also difficult to change consciousness. The shadows of the past pull us back. At the same time, however, I am certain that there is no return from this path. Russia will continue on this strategic course. We have enough strength to resist those who wish to break down these reform efforts. We have accomplished a final reckoning with the communist past, not only in Russia, not only in Hungary, but in all of Europe. Russia will, by all means, build a democracy, a civilized state, and an appropriate market in which citizens become owners and in which citizens become free, and freely mold their own future. Our ultimate goal is to comply not only with Russian interests, but also to satisfy your country's citizens, as well as the citizens of Europe and the entire world.

I would like to close my remarks by quoting Count Istvan Szechenyi: "Many believe that Hungary has only existed in the past. I would like to believe that Hungary will exist in the future." I always believed this to be true, and will continue to do so. I will say this: Hungary will always exist. And there will be an honest partnership between our countries. There will be confidence, mutual liking, and an unceasing expression of interest.

Technical Snag Mars Delivery of Yeltsin's Speech
93CH0173B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 12 Nov 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Technical Scandal in the Parliament Building"]

[Text] The simultaneous translation equipment did not function yesterday during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's speech in parliament. Representatives could not understand the president's remarks as a result, and they were able to applaud only in response to hand signals by certain representatives who understood Russian. Representatives viewed this unprecedented accident of a technical nature as outrageous, and some demanded the dismissal of those responsible. We called the person in charge of technical matters at the National Assembly, but he was attending a conference in this regard. His deputy responded and said that the translation equipment had been tested five times during the day and that no fault in functioning had been noted. He was unable to pinpoint the cause, for now. At a lengthy conference yesterday evening, members of the technical staff went through every part of the equipment to find the fault. Gyorgy Szabad, president of the parliament, asked the technical chief to provide an explanation by this morning.

Military Journal Lauds Outcome of Yeltsin's Visit
93CH0173C Budapest MAGYAR HONVED
in Hungarian 20 Nov 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Z.F.: "Boris Yeltsin Has Apologized in Budapest for 1956; Final Accounting Has Been Made"]

[Text] Neither the Hungarian nor the Russian negotiating parties were disappointed after Boris Yeltsin's visit to Budapest. The Russians lived up to expectations in every respect: They were tough, but were prepared to compromise.

In his address to the plenary session of the National Assembly, the Russian president regarded his negotiations with Arpad Goncz and Jozsef Antall as rather productive. According to his statement, from among the seven agreements to be signed they managed to complete "six and a half." Based on successful negotiations at the expert level they agreed to mutually surrender demands made after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops (zero balance solution). True, Hungary is going to donate \$10 million worth of pharmaceuticals to the Russian army on humanitarian grounds. Hungary also agreed to examine whether it is capable of alleviating the housing problems of the withdrawn soldiers.

A joint declaration concerning the protection of national minority rights, and agreements on cooperation between the two countries' ministries of defense and ministries of culture, cooperation between archives, and to govern the mutual return of art treasures taken away during World War II were signed. Boris Yeltsin's gesture under the dome of parliament, returning to our country several documents related to 1956 and a few Hungarian works of art stored in various warehouses in Moscow, was truly nice. The Hungarian side returned the Russian president's gesture by presenting an icon and some archival documents.

At the same time it is also a fact that our common history has countless blank spots in regard to which the experts of the two countries should cooperate more closely. (It should suffice to make reference to the issue of the bombardment of Kassa [Kosice, Slovakia], or to nuclear weapons previously stored in Hungary....)

In the course of negotiations between Boris Yeltsin and Arpad Goncz, the Hungarian head of state confirmed that Hungary continues to regard Russia as a regional great power, and as one of the key factors in maintaining stability in the region. Hungary would like to be an intermediate link in the chain between East and West Europe, rather than conflict zone. In his response Boris Yeltsin stressed that the relationship between Hungary and Russia is one of cooperating partners. It is in the interest of both countries to take advantage of the mutual advantages produced by this partnership.

The Russian head of state also held lengthy negotiations with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. As government spokesman Balazs Laszlo said: The two parties spoke directly and openly in the course of cordial negotiations attended by a few. Boris Yeltsin expressed special thanks to the Hungarian head of government for standing up for Russian democracy at the time of the 1991 Moscow coup.

During the afternoon the Russian president laid a wreath in Parcel 301 of the Rakoskeresztur cemetery at the grave of Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his associates, and another wreath at the new Soviet military memorial, also in the Rakoskeresztur cemetery.

Boris Yeltsin delivered a highly successful speech in the Hungarian parliament, in the course of which he stressed that the uprising of 1956 had not been in vain. The 1956 uprising pointed out that not only individuals, but entire nations were aware of the fact that they had to free themselves from communist dictatorships. Speaking of the tragedy of 1956 Yeltsin stressed that the caterpillar tracks of tanks will remain on the streets of Budapest forever, and that this is remembered not only in Hungary, but also in Russia. Yeltsin stressed that knowing that Russian soldiers also had to take part in the tragic events creates a bitter feeling. Ten years after the Soviet army liberated Hungary from fascism, one tyranny was replaced by another. "I regard as highly symbolic that the Hungarian people were first to rise against the oppression. Today we bow to the memory of the victims of 1956...." Boris Yeltsin stressed in the speech, which evoked great applause.

At a late afternoon press conference Boris Yeltsin said that the negotiations produced good results. Instead of using our fists, we intend to take part in resolving the problems of Europe with our hearts and brains, the Russian guest said. Speaking of the agreements reached, the Hungarian head of government underscored the fact that they would remain within the framework of the

Vienna arms reduction agreement. Jozsef Antall, too, regarded Boris Yeltsin's and his team's visit to Hungary as productive.

Simultaneously with the meeting of the two heads of state the foreign ministers of the two countries also held negotiations. In conjunction with the South-Slavic conflict, Geza Jeszenszky and Andrej Kozierjev reviewed the situation of the region and found that due to the aggressive, nationalistic manifestations of the Serbian leadership the Yugoslav crisis must be settled only as a result of negotiations, by considering the interests of all minorities.

With respect to the historically significant Yeltsin visit one could draw the summary conclusion that although the visit closed with minus \$10 million from the standpoint of Hungary, this fact cannot be regarded as a retreat, it is more like a rational compromise. It was necessary, because this way we might be able to close a period in our history called the Soviet occupation. In this conjunction it is worth mentioning that the Russian press was far from being delighted as we were regarding these agreements: The Russian press found that the acceptance of the zero balance solution had at least as many opponents as it had supporters on the Russian side, particularly among the Russian military, who wanted to use possible Hungarian compensation, so called, paid for real property, to improve the conditions of their resettlement in Russia. Similarly, the Russian press also has reservations regarding the rescheduling of the Soviet debt, asserting that the related amounts were established based on a debatable method of conversion. Both the Russian and the Hungarian parties (and even the Russian press) agreed on the unimpeded future development of Hungarian-Russian relations, and that based on historical experience, both countries needed such development.

Ethnic Hungarian Leaders View Ties to Budapest

93CH0163B Budapest *BESZELO* in Hungarian
21 Nov 92 pp 13-14

[Interview with Miklos Duray, president of the Coexistence Movement in Slovakia; Ferenc Kormendi, a leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Voivodina; and other ethnic Hungarian leaders, by Ferenc Koszeg and Laszlo Nemenyi in Budapest in November: "Let Us Break Down the Borders—Questions to the Political Leaders of Minority Hungarians"]

[Text] *Representatives of organizations of Hungarians living on the other side of borders were present as guests at the meeting of Free Democrat delegates. The delegates were greeted by Janos Foti, leading member of the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Movement in Slovakia,*

and by Oszkar Vilaghy, leading member of the Hungarian Civic Party, and then several persons participated in the work of the foreign affairs section which, among other things, also dealt with the situation of Hungarians living on other sides of our borders. Following the debate, BESZELO invited those who were present to a brief roundtable discussion. The following persons were participants in the discussion: Miklos Duray, president of Coexistence; Gyorgy Gyimesi, president of Coexistence's Bodrogkoz organization; Bela Bogar, president of the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Movement; Ferenc Petrik, mayor of Kiralyhalmec; and Ferenc Kormendi, leading member of Democratic Union of Hungarians in Voivodina. BESZELO was represented by Ferenc Koszeg and Laszlo Nemenyi.

[BESZELO] In the aftermath of the collapse of communism, nationalism has revived with an unexpected force in the eastern half of Europe. However, this new situation also made it possible for the Hungarian minority to establish its own political and interest-protecting organizations. What can you say about your most urgent endeavors at present?

[Duray] If we believe that in the wake of the present change Central Europe will really get closer to West Europe, then we must define our policies from that perspective, regardless of the present impossible situation.

[Gyimesi] The new axiom in Hungary, namely, that what is good for Hungarians living on the other side of the borders is good for Hungary, is extremely important to us. This also means that the given Hungarian Government—and hopefully even the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] in case it will win the elections—sets its policies accordingly. It does not make any agreement that would be against our interests; on the contrary, it deals with its partners in accordance with our interests. For instance, the support of the regional political endeavors of minorities living on the other side of the borders is extremely important. We think that this is the way to solve the difficult economic problems, and we think that this is the way to solve part of the nationality problems as well. This could open up the borders to a great extent, and relations could become much closer. Individual autonomous territories—if they will be established at all—would strive for very close cooperation with adjacent regions in Hungary and Subcarpathia. In the past, these territories were administrative and cultural units, they are also bound together by language dialects and, even after 74 years, they still depend on each other because no other cultural, administrative or political centers have been developed in these regions since.

[Petrik] We in Bodrogkoz are better off than other regions populated by Hungarians because we actually achieved autonomy without waiting for a government decision or a constitutional decision. Every local government in this region is in the hands of our own Hungarian movements and—this is really not typical—we also

control the offices of the state. Of course, it is questionable whether we can maintain our control over the state offices in the long term or if our people will be replaced by new people of the new government. The border is the main obstacle to cooperation. In our case, the obstacle in specific terms is that at present not a single border crossing station is operated in Bodrogkoz. The closest one is further than Satoraljaújhely and, thus, towns only a few miles from each other can only be reached with a 50-mile detour. This is why we are pushing for the establishment of a free zone of tariffs along the two borders. This plan has already been presented to the Hungarian Government, and we also talked about it with cabinet members; in particular, I exchanged ideas about this issue with Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa, Geza Jeszenszky, and Ivan Baba. Of course, we also approached the Slovak Government. Wherever we went, we were assured of their support, but the border has not yet been broken through. In their criticism of the government the SZDSZ representatives would have the worthwhile task here in the foreign affairs committee help the government make good on its promise.

[Foti] During the times of the party state, administrative territorial restructurings took place to our disadvantage in Czechoslovakia. Two hundred and seventy elementary schools were closed, our native language was degraded to a colloquial language. Following the velvet revolution, during the great euphoria when we all loved each other, we were told that the internal political situation was not yet ripe for dealing with the minority issue. And now, after the 1992 elections, they actually want to curb minority rights through legislation. I expect a solution to the minority problem in Central East Europe through an international agreement on minorities which would be guaranteed by the UN and which would be signed and respected by all member states.

[BESZELO] What do you expect from the SZDSZ in connection with a minority policy, i.e., is there anything specific that you disapprove of?

[Duray] Hungarians living in the minority must develop good rapport with all parties because all parties have both positive and negative endeavors. Accordingly, we are striving to establish non-partisan party relations. And we wish that the parties in Hungary not expect us to become sister parties either. This applies to both the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the SZDSZ. We do not expect anything from the SZDSZ beyond what the present legitimate government stated last August, namely, that it will support every effort as defined by the legitimate political representatives of Hungarians in the minority.

I think that the issue of supporting national minorities is not a party issue but an issue of all Hungarians. It is not our fault that we are not an integral part of the Hungarian nation even though we consider ourselves to be such. It is because of our situation that we cannot influence Hungary's party policies. In specific terms about the SZDSZ: We are developing good relations with it in our region. We are extremely

glad that the SZDSZ has taken these first steps toward us. It provided tangible financial and spiritual support for the launching of our regional paper. And now it supports our effort to establish a municipal university in Kiralyhalmec. The SZDSZ leadership promised to establish an international Zsuzsanna Lorantffy Foundation, the draft proposal of which I gave today to Imre Mecs who would be the Hungarian curator of this foundation. This would be a very effective support, which we would find hard to substitute with anything else, for we cannot solve the problem of Hungarian higher education in Slovakia by ourselves or with just the help of the Slovakian government.

[Kormendi] Under no circumstances can we accept that the situation and problems of Hungarians living outside of Hungary become subject to party struggles.

We know, for instance, that a satellite television channel is being planned, and we fear that the startup of this channel may become questionable because of internal party struggles. We wish that broadcast on this channel would begin. A large number of Hungarians in Vajdasag [Voivodina] live in areas where they cannot receive Hungarian Television's programs. Satellite television, the only channel of information, would be essential for us.

[BESZELO] The subject of the debate is not that the SZDSZ thinks that there is no need for such a program. We completely agree with anyone who says that there is a great need for it. But the SZDSZ wants the satellite channel to be a public service channel which is integrated into the system of public television. Thus, it wants to present Hungarian culture, language, information and, of course, politics, but in a nonpartisan manner and not from the aspect of a single ideology.

[Bogar] As a Christian-Democrat, I would add to the foregoing that we would also welcome help in the training of the clergy. No Hungarian Catholic priests have been trained since 1950, and this will soon lead to a situation in which a Hungarian will not be able to hear his native language from the altar either.

Impact, Political Connections of Skinheads

93CH0163A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
21 Nov 92 pp 7-8

[Article by Ottilia Solt: "The Skinhead Enigma"]

[Text] *Interior Minister Boross is adhering to his stand and, as he stated, he will resign only if the prime minister asks him to. But it would be wise of the prime minister not to depend solely on information given by Interior Minister Boross on issues of internal security but to obtain information directly from the National Security Office, or perhaps from the attorney general, and then to decide whether he has absolute trust in his powerful interior minister. For those conservative national youth, who are eagerly supported by the parties of the government coalition and whose presence at the state ceremony on 23 October on Kossuth Square was not disapproved of by the*

interior minister, not only would not hesitate to commit murder but are also dissatisfied with the government. At least this is what the manifestos and poems circulated among them indicate. The attempt to track down the murderers of Zoltan Danyi of Salgotarjan (32) has led to such discoveries.

As it is known, Zoltan Danyi was beaten to death by 15- to 16-year-old skinheads. One of them is a student at the Lenkey Military Academy of Eger. It was around the time preceding Danyi's violent death in Salgotarjan that it was made public that the skinhead movement had also penetrated the Szeged Military Academy. The press steadily informed the public about the fascist ideology of the skinheads and their violent actions against Gypsies and colored foreigners, especially in Eger, where repeated attacks lasting several days have been occurring for two years. Many beatings of foreigners and Gypsies were without the least of consequences. Numerous legal actions were initiated, many were aborted, some are still in process, but the skinhead movement is steadily gaining ground. The skinheads appeared in organized groups both at Torgyan's Day of Anger and the great demonstrations of the government parties, at the demonstrations against the presidents of television and radio (including the media demonstration at the 15 March national celebration), and at the counter-demonstration during the official celebration on Kossuth Square on 23 October. Irrefutable facts surfaced in the wake of the 23 October scandal, proving not only the existence of an organizational link between Torgyan's Smallholders Party and the skinheads but also that Pofosz [National Association of Former Political Prisoners], the interior minister's favorite organization (which, incidentally, has also acquired a key place in the World Federation of Hungarians), has become the main organizer of the skinheads. And here is the culmination of this long list: the karate-chopping and baseball-batting Gypsy killers of Salgotarjan were there on Kossuth Square on 23 October to boo the president of the Republic; they were members of the Independent Hungarian Youth Front that was established that same day in the Pofosz headquarters; of the National Youth Union that is being organized at the office of the Smallholders Party; and of the military academy. Both the murder and the 23 October guest performance were directly connected to those few fascistoid (violent nationalist and racist) bits of ideology which hold the skinhead movement loosely together. However, the professional and daring organizers do not allow the flow of events to be subject to spontaneity. Let us see how one military cadet skinhead gives his own account of 23 October: "We went to Kolumbusz Street, to the meeting of the Smallholders Party. It was mentioned at the meeting that we would go from there to the Parliament building. Major Szoke said that when the president of the Republic delivers his speech, we should begin with rhythmic clapping and should continue until he stops speaking—for President

Arpad Goncz is unsuitable for this high post because he does nothing significant for the benefit of our country, he allows foreign immigrants and students to enter our country, and he does nothing about the Gypsies. He allows them to be in the country and to force Hungarian citizens out of their country." (Unfortunately, in seeing these words, images of Ketegyhaza come to the mind of the present writer. The Smallholders Party has a strong foothold in the town, and even the mayor had won the elections as a smallholder. About a thousand people were demonstrating in front of the mayor's office for the release of the "white" young men who were suspected of carrying out the act of retribution against the Csurars. And I heard from citizens, who were neither young nor skinheads: "It is Arpad Goncz's fault, Arpad Goncz gave so many rights to the Gypsies." And let me here praise the Police Headquarters of Bekes County and the National Police Headquarters for closing the investigation: those who demolished the houses of the Csurars and the arsonists have not been found. Our congratulations! Here is a bit of decoding advice for the readers of the news. The message of the police is: He who does not burn down the houses of Gypsies he does not like is a fool. You can count on us, guys!)

First it was only Laszlo Romhanyi and the Christian National Union who showed a keen interest in the violent cult of the skinheads—they had met with those of Eger already in October 1990 in the restaurant Expressz. (The first significant skinhead action of Eger took place in September 1990.) However, "Pepe," a prominent Eger skinhead, received a letter on 20 July 1992, signed by Jozsef Torgyan, Miklos Garamszegi and Geza Gyimothy, requesting that he recruit members for the Smallholders Party, and to nationally organize a youth faction, a faction of veteran traditionalists, and a faction of retired persons (!). The organization of the National Youth Union has been going on since the summer of 1992 in Eger's Smallholders Party office on 18 Szechenyi Street (it is a fine downtown section, across from the venerable Dobo High School), its leader being "Roy," i.e., skinhead chief Tamas Sneider, the hero of several violent acts for which he was held partially accountable. Since at least 16 October, Roy has been leading the National Youth Union's regional unit, which includes several counties. (This was the date on which the new known membership ID's were issued.)

Not later than August 1992, the skinheads also aroused the interest of MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Deputy Chairman Istvan Csurka. He had warm words for them in his famous study, so no wonder the activists of the youth faction offer the Hungarian Way Foundation's proclamation together with the National Youth Union's membership application in the smallholders' office in Eger; these activists, in addition to being members of the ritual community of skinheads (with boots, shaven heads, and shouts of "Oi" for greeting), are also members—if I am correct in my calculations—of four registered organizations (National Youth, Veteran Traditionalists, and the Youth Faction of the Smallholders Party), and I have yet to count the Independent

Hungarian Youth Front and the Hungarian Way Foundation, or such deviations as Mr. Gyorkos' neo-Nazi party of Gyor. The skinheads of Eger are also connected to the latter. Even if one of the organizations is outlawed, like that of Mr. Gyorkos, enough legal ones remain. The director of the military academy may, through a commander's order, prohibit his students from becoming members of legal and formal organizations, but he cannot so simply break ties (which are conspirative and private) with secret skinhead organizations. And he can continue to acknowledge, with some embarrassment, that Hitler's pictures are hidden in the lockers of some of his students and that strange guests with backpacks and shouts of "Oi" are crowding the dance floor at the regular weekend school disco parties.

But it is not only BESZELO that is aware of all this in the late fall of 1992, in the wake of a murder; the National Security Office, the prosecutor general, and the police have also been continually aware, at least since May 1991. (To our knowledge, that was the time when he [as published] wrote his first comprehensive report on the skinhead phenomenon to the prosecutor general, the Heves County Prosecution Office's superior.) The identity crisis of these organizations may perhaps be an explanation why they recognize only one certain task they must carry out, namely, a ban on news. There is dead silence on the part of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the police, and the National Security Office. Perhaps these organizations do not really know what they are protecting. They protect constitutional order and every citizen of the country—for no one should think that violence stops at the Gypsies or perhaps the Jews. Individual journalists and prosecutors have received warnings. Perhaps these honorable organizations protect only our individual parties and our government.

Presence of Skinheads in Military Academy Denied
93CH0147B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 16 Nov 92 p 5

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Gyorgy Gazsi, officer at the Szeged Military Academy, by A.F.; place and date not given: "There Are No Skinheads in the Military Academy"]

[Text] *For the third time, the Szeged Military Academy has been implicated in the actions of a youth movement that fosters the extreme and dangerous ideology of hatred against strangers. This happened first in connection with the 23 October events, then in connection with a Szeged forum, which dealt with extremism in Hungarian society, and in connection with the Salgotarjan tragedy. It was in this connection that Lt. Col. Gyorgy Gazsi, officer at the Szeged Military Academy, made a statement to our correspondent.*

[Gazsi] They want to create the semblance of a skinhead problem in Szeged, at all costs. It is indeed true that

some of our students were present at a Szeged forum, which dealt with hatred against strangers and racism, and they expressed some extreme ideas, but none of our students participated in the 23 October events in Budapest. And we had absolutely nothing to do with the murder of the Gypsy boy in Salgotarjan.

[A.F.] It is being said that the skinhead movement has taken root in your Academy, too.

[Gazsi] There were some signs, but we launched an investigation, and talked with the four boys who participated in the aforementioned forum. They said that they do not belong to any extreme group, do not have regular meetings, and do not maintain relations with other organized and extreme groups. In other words, the allegations were unfounded.

However, all signs indicate that there is indeed a skinhead movement in Csongrad County. Unfortunately, we cannot avoid the surfacing of this phenomenon. Force should only be used as a last resort; otherwise we must talk and argue, and we must change the circumstances.

'Gypsy Civilian Guard' To Protect Gypsies

93CH0153C Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
12 Nov 92 pp 2190-2191

[Article by "kacskor": "Spybabies"—reprinted from HEVES MEGYEI HIRLAP 4 November 1992, page not given]

[Text] "Mr. Berki, do you think it is necessary to have a Gypsy civilian guard in Kompolt?"

"I tell you, sir, as it is, it is very necessary, because they protect us, protect the Gypsies.

"But as I heard, they protect the Hungarians from the Gypsies.... Because the Gypsies are stealing more and more."

"No, sir, this is not true; we have to be protected. Take me, for instance. Two skinheads wanted to beat me up recently, but I knocked both of them out. Here, in Kompolt!"

"If this is so, Mr. Berki, would you like to join the civilian guard?"

"No way!"

"Why not?"

"Because I am a criminal, that's why!"

According to Mayor Pal Farkas, crime is on the increase in Kompolt, and so is the discontent of the Hungarian population, the damaged parties. The criminals are mostly Gypsies, and among them, only a few really problematic families. The police visit them three or four times a week.

"They do everything, from cat-burglaries to stealing chickens," the mayor says. "When the inhabitants of a house die, because we have many 'old people's houses,' that house is gone within a week or two, because the Gypsies clean it out from the cellar to the attic. They use the wooden floor for firewood in the winter, and the furniture, too."

This is the reason why the second civilian guard was established in the summer, which, in contrast to the first one, consists only of Gypsies. The commander is Istvan Urmos.

"We started with 12 people, but six of them have dropped out since then," the commander says. "We took the initiative, and the mayoral office supported us; they gave us walkie-talkies."

"Have you used them in action yet?"

"In this short time, we already prevented two break-ins. It is strange, but this matter turned out to be useful to the boys, because the Gypsy civilian guards are young, 18 to 25 years old, not like the Hungarians. First, they considered it a game, but after the two cases they realized that it was not a game. We are on duty three times a week. We patrol the village in groups of two, from 2100 till 0100. We check the area of the stores, and note the license plates of strange cars. I check the kids once every three days, and in the meantime, I keep the log. From time to time we coordinate with the mayor, and then I inform him of the events."

"What do the local Gypsies think of you?"

"They don't like us. When they see the boys patrolling, they shout to each other, look, here come the spybabies! We can't make it clear to them that we are there for them, too. So that what happened to the people of Ketegyhaza would not happen to us. If I were in charge, I would expel these Gypsies from the village, even though I am a Gypsy myself. The matter has not yet gotten out of hand, but it could happen that people lose their patience...."

"How is your relationship with the police?"

"We have established very good relations with the police station in Kapolna. We often meet them at night."

The other civilian guard of Kompolt, that of the Hungarians, was established last January with about 60 individuals at the initiative of the mayoral office. By now, their numbers have decreased, too; only 28 people patrol the village under the leadership of Zoltan Farkas, the mayor's younger brother.

"Does your work show results?"

"Vandalism and nightly rowdiness have decreased somewhat in the village. Around Christmas we had a successful operation. The Gypsies wanted to break into the supermarket of Kompolt. We succeeded in preventing the burglary. It is another success that by now the

Gypsies hate us as much as they hate the police.... The Hungarian population is satisfied. And the police, too."

"What do you think of the Gypsy civilian guard?"

"They haven't been working long enough to form an opinion. They are moving around, they are working, we can see them...."

"Why do you think the problems are only with the Gypsies in the village?"

"They don't have a smidgen of intelligence. They look for trouble, and when they are drunk, nobody can manage them. If a few Gypsies show up in a disco here, it is better to leave, because one can get hurt. My wife used to work in the pub in Kompolt, and the Gypsies stabbed her in the back several times. Leaders at higher levels have no idea what is going on in Gypsy colonies.... No, this is not racism. But here, in the villages, everyone becomes a racist after a while. We need laws, strong and strict laws, and then maybe the problems will be solved. Talking about laws, we have a pet peeve, that we are not regulated by law, either; we have no rights, and without them, the civilian guard is not a real civilian guard. For instance, there is no law of protection. This is why so many people dropped out, because they were threatened...."

History Journal Urges Rational Ethnic Relations

93CH0161A Budapest HISTORIA in Hungarian
No 8 Oct 92 p 16

[Article by Ferenc Glatz, editor in chief of HISTORIA:
"About Slovakia—Friendly Commentary in Connection
With the Birth of a New State"]

[Excerpt] Slovaks have been afraid of Hungarians for centuries. They say that until 1918 the Hungarian nation-state hindered the development of the Slovak nation. They are right. It is useless today to exonerate Hungarian nationalism anymore, not even with the fact that it was no more intolerant than any other contemporary national ideology. (They are justified to still talk about the closing of three Slovakian high schools, the 1907 Chernova shooting, etc.) Then, after 1918, it was the Hungarians who began being afraid of Slovaks. It is useless to exonerate for our friends abroad the dislocations of people between 1945 and 1949, the stripping of Hungarians of their citizenship, the forced Slovakization, and the tricks of administrative zoning policies. And period-historians on both sides are delivering their arguments for up-to-date quarrels....

There are accusations that Hungary—or someone else—threatens the new state's territorial integrity, as happened in 1938. It is known that not even fools speak of border revisions as a means of solving the minority problem. Hungarian society is unable, both in labor organization and emotionally, to "process" even the Hungarian surplus labor force that is flowing in from Transylvania. It is childish, therefore, on the part of certain neighbors to speak of the danger of Hungarian

territorial aspirations and a threat to the territorial integrity of states. As we have said, the middle class is writing its own report card. It is people with an inferiority complex who need an "enemy image": to scare Romanians or Slovaks with Hungarians, in part with Jews, or Germans....

Many extreme ideas are emerging in the countries of the region: in Hungary, Romania, onetime Yugoslavia, Ukraine, or Slovakia. It is irresponsible on the part of the new national middle classes to accommodate these extreme ideas and to elicit a feeling of territorial threat. It is a sign of weakness on the part of politicians when, instead of acknowledging that internal economic and social difficulties are unmanageable, they allow national slogans, demonstrations, and showy national airs to rule the field of politics—even if this also provides an opportunity for the masses to temporarily vent their emotions and grievances in the wake of the past regime's Soviet internationalism. Unfortunately, we see this today in the entire region.... But it is not merely a sign of weakness but a sign of irresponsibility when emotions are let loose or even roused against another national or religious community—be that of Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, Gypsies, or Jews.

New principles of interstate relations might emerge. It must be recognized that if a Slovakian politician speaks in Pozsony in support of Hungarian national autonomy, he may be the wisest representative of the Slovakian national ideal. Do not deny others what you want for yourself. It must be recognized that the minority issue is not an internal issue. (This was a basic principle of the Soviet-type state.) One must not become irate if the Slovak government demands from neighboring states absolute personal autonomy, collective rights, autonomous education and—if circumstances warrant it—even territorial autonomy for Slovaks living in the neighboring countries. It must also be recognized that the Hungarian Government's similar demands are not any less justified. A sensible government opens its state borders to its neighbors and welcomes any assistance that ethnic minorities living in its territory may receive. Superior education of citizens can take place only in their native languages. In this way the tradesman, the educated peasant, or the learned intellectual will become an asset. In Hungary, the citizens living in a territorial and administrative unit (both Hungarians and non-Hungarians) will benefit if these workers do their jobs correctly and well. Products will be better, fruits will be shinier, and offices and schools will be more accommodating. And they pay taxes there, which support the community. A sensible government is glad when native-language editors abroad prepare textbooks and send good native-language teachers for the national minorities living in its administrative territory. Finally, culture and professional knowledge can flow [back and forth] freely; norms of customs, and idiosyncratic comportments and flavors, which have been isolated for centuries by state borders, can freely be refined....

We will not give up our image of the future even if history and the present indicate otherwise. The issue here is not only history's fairness anymore! [passage omitted]

Interior Minister Boross on Political Scene

93CH0156C Budapest KOZTARSASAG in Hungarian
13 Nov 92 pp 64-68

[Interview with Minister of the Interior Peter Boross by Peter Balla; place and date not given: "No Need for Theatrical Gestures"]

[Text] *The persecution of crime concerns the public and therefore it is not something to be pursued by private enterprise, according to Interior Minister Peter Boross (age 64). The centralized character of the Hungarian police is its greatest advantage, Boross said, citing the results of a management study conducted by a Western firm. In response to Peter Balla's questions, the minister discussed concerns related to alien control and the internal affairs of the police, and said that he saw no need for theatrical gestures, and that this was the reason for not tendering his resignation after the 23 October events.*

[Balla] A proposed legal provision concerning private investigations had been drafted in the days of the Nemeth government. The draft was slowly forgotten thereafter.... Is it at all necessary to regulate private investigations by law, and if so, when could we expect to see such provisions? We would need these to create some order among the various firms operating as limited liability corporations.

[Boross] As of today a government decree regulates security services that protect property, and only one sentence in this decree prohibits the maintenance of private investigators' offices, and conducting private investigations for financial gain. This provision is no longer responsive to present needs. We will define the legal status of organizations providing protective and security services after parliament adopts the police law, and all this will be done in the form of detailed legal provisions that settle the issues involved in private investigations. It would be very important to follow this sequence of legislative action. I have great hopes that parliament is going to adopt the police law very soon.

[Balla] Do you have in mind a law dealing with private investigations?

[Boross] Not necessarily. In part, because I am aware of parliament's capacity, and I cannot expect parliament to adopt such legal provisions in the foreseeable future. And in part because this issue can be satisfactorily dealt with in the framework of a government decree.

[Balla] Some people believe that there is some aversion to private investigations on part of the state behind the delay, i.e., that the police regards private investigators as competition. Is this the case?

[Boross] Private investigations could be used mostly to fill gaps, they have their own purpose in the private sphere, of course, and we will have to be careful in defining their permissible scope. I am unable to accurately define this scope at present, because in order to do so we must consider very many other legal provisions which have yet to be adopted. One thing is certain, however: The persecution of crime, exposing criminal activities—just as the administration of justice—are public affairs, and therefore should not be pursued in the form of private enterprises. Quite naturally, we would also have to provide rules for what a private investigator should do with information about crimes he becomes aware of. And we would also have to provide guarantees to prevent private investigators from violating privacy rights, of course.

[Balla] The initial drafts of the proposed police law included an alternative by which local police organizations would be established as part of local governments. In its present form, as approved by the government, the proposal no longer includes this alternative. I am asking this question because local police would alleviate a few of the burdens now carried by the "state" police....

[Boross] Let us begin by saying that in Hungary the concept of local police is linked to some inaccurate perceptions. According to a widespread, mistaken belief, local police units would function entirely under the supervision of local governments, just like cultural facilities or some other institutions. Nowhere in the world is it this way. This kind of structure would really not respond to the crime situation as it evolved as of the late 20th century. In places where police forces operate under local governments they are thinking about ways how to get rid of them. A management analysis of the police conducted by a western firm found our centralized system to be the No. 1 advantage. Police units linked to local governments are also exposed to a host of other limitations. I need not tell you that local powers would greatly influence the jurisdictional limits of the police. Today's situation requires very rapid reassignments, mutually shared information and opportunities to mobilize. The most dangerous crimes were committed locally only long ago. Chicken thieves in villages no longer present the main problem. Networks are being formed, they operate on a regional basis, in other words, every logical consideration supports the idea of centralizing efforts to persecute crime. It is yet another matter that one should not appoint someone to a police leadership position without first seeking the opinion of the local government. I would strongly reprimand a police leader if he appointed a police chief in spite of protest registered by an entire city.

[Balla] The supreme prosecutor recently predicted—or, to be more exact, did not rule out the possibility of—that organized crime would become integrated not only with the economy, but also with the political sphere. Some police officers predict that this is going to coincide with the Expo. To what extent do you recognize this as a real threat?

[Boross] No doubt, the forecasts of police professionals throughout the world are depressing. One could assume that Hungary is not the only country that faces real danger, instead, the entire world is threatened. Certain countries are particularly endangered from this standpoint. The appropriate structure, developmental stage, mobility, and centralized character of any police organization worth mentioning offsets this threat at least in theory. But due to the organized character of crime yet another, extremely odd issue arises. It is dangerous to deal with this issue as of today, because some inadequately refined brains could misunderstand it. I am talking about the relationship between personal liberties and criminal activities. The greater the scope of personal liberties, the more favorable the terrain for criminal activities. What can be done in a situation like this? What is more important, to have strong personal rights or to prevent criminals from using personal freedom as a feeding ground for their own activities? The exact scope of records on individuals to be kept is still a dilemma; it is to be resolved in the future. At this time we are making efforts to strengthen personal rights, and this is natural in the aftermath of the past decades. But we must be aware that the idea of restricting civil rights has already been raised in professional writings published in other countries, in response to fears about crime. These writings present the following supportive theory: An individual surrenders certain personal rights in order to reduce the personal threat presented by the spread of criminal activities. Just think of the vast scope of authorization one Italian official received to liquidate the criminal activities of the Mafia.

[Balla] Let me add something to this in conjunction with ratifying the Council of Europe agreement. Many people have criticized you for your position on alien control. But beyond this, wouldn't the ratification of the agreement lead to a situation in which the dilemma you just mentioned would be decided in favor of personal civil rights? (The Council of Europe agreement has been ratified in the meantime—the editor.)

[Boross] Yes, it could. And yet I feel that incidents similar to the one in Rostock ultimately determine the outcome of such endeavors and initiatives, in other words, the present perception is subject to certain changes. Many countries experience very grave problems; they exist even if veiled. Some of these problems are animosities of an ethnic nature. Hungary has escaped the consequences of the guest worker era—it was accompanied by a large-scale admission of alien ethnic groups. Countries with fledgling democracies must, initially, limit their inclination to admit people. Fostering negative views about people already in Hungary is not the issue, but we must not allow as many foreigners to enter as we did after 1989. I have not changed my mind about the need to be more stringent in this regard, for the sake of the country's peace. Undoubtedly, gaps exist in our laws, but we could become the "bag" that collects everything unless we impose restrictions. Everyone goes where he still can. This could become an extremely dangerous source of tension in Hungary.

[Balla] One cannot avoid discussing the issue of crimes committed by Gypsies. Is it appropriate to talk about "Gypsy crimes" in Hungary?

[Boross] No, because we must be very careful with the words we use. Many people misunderstand these words; once misunderstood, they are blown out of proportion. If I use the term "Gypsy crimes," you will call it the "hatred of Gypsies," and the third person will claim that an ethnic war is raging in Hungary. Thoughts evolve in this sequence. The record shows that the number of crimes committed in Hungary by people of Gypsy origin is indeed high. One also has to recognize that the reason for this can be traced to the peculiar situation in which most Hungarian Gypsies find themselves. The traditional life style of Gypsies has disintegrated, while that group has fundamentally not become integrated with Hungarian society. The inclination for deviance, for a criminal life style increases in any ethnic or social group anywhere in the world under such transitional conditions. The problem is that based on professional forecasts we must continue to be pessimistic in this regard: One could ask whether hopes for achieving a degree of integration, similar to the one that has begun in the United States, are justified at all. Despite such integration, U.S. statistics show that the proportionate crime rate for black people continues to be high. Various Gypsy organizations could play a very important role in settling the Gypsy population and integrating it with society, but this involves detail work, and cannot produce quick, spectacular results. Some Gypsies, on the other hand, do not regard this as the primary role of Gypsy organizations. One hears aggressive statements, and dramatic situations are being described. If anyone in the Hungarian parliament would assert that Gypsies in Hungary lived like slaves, such statement would convey the kinds of exaggeration stated, but would nevertheless evoke very adverse reactions. We must avoid using the term "Gypsy crimes" as much as we can, but we must face the fact that the crime rate among Gypsies is rather high.

[Balla] Corruption has not avoided the police either. A recent case involving the criminal division chief of the BRFK [Budapest Police Headquarters] has stirred up a storm. Would you draw the appropriate conclusions should it turn out that these criminal acts, these violations of discipline have not lapsed, irrespective of who is involved? (Meanwhile, the head of the National Police Command told a press conference that although General Bodracska had been disciplined, he continues to enjoy the full confidence of the leadership—the editor.)

[Boross] Quite naturally, I am in touch with the National Police commander in cases like this, I receive certain information, even though I do not regard conducting specific inquiries into such cases as part of my official functions. A finding concerning the commission of a crime must be made if criminal conduct can be proven without doubt. The inclination of the police to cleanse itself is evidenced by the fact that most of the foundations for proceedings initiated against officers were

exposed by the police itself. Another problem arises if we ponder whether it is possible to establish special conduct criteria for police leaders right now, in 1992. We must take into consideration the odd process that began in 1988, when future police careers were surrounded by an existential crisis, by uncertainties. I know that you expected a response more specific than this, but I will not give you a more specific answer. I told you about the kind of spectacles I use to view these life situations. Understanding and the objective assessment of situations have their limits, and beyond those limits it would be inconceivable to manifest understanding and to weigh situations. Stringency prevails at the police today.

[Balla] Irrespective of the position held? Regardless of who is involved?

[Boross] This kind of judgment is entirely independent from the position a person holds. The police is producing extraordinary results regarding organized crime, and it strikes at persons who establish rather broadly based criminal networks. We must be prepared for organized crime figures making rather heavy charges against police officers. This method is constantly being used by this kind and group of criminals. Such charges could be true, or could amount to a hoax. The saddest thing is when such charges are true, nevertheless we must take all necessary action against policemen who have "erred," at the same time, however, we must also initiate proceedings against people who have made unfounded charges violating a policeman's honor.

[Balla] To what extent are our policemen prepared to use weapons in situations that periodically occur, when this becomes unavoidable? Does training prepare them to shoot when they have to shoot, and not to risk their lives unnecessarily?

[Boross] In the olden days some shockingly untrained and not fully trained policemen were assigned to perform street duty. We announced a program involving a minimum of two years of police training, we have established shooting grounds, the number of shooting practices has increased and has become more true to life.

[Balla] Could the right to possess firearms become an individual right? Not counting people with criminal records, sick people, and others, of course.

[Boross] I was the one who proposed the government decree that made increased stringency possible with respect to possessing firearms. Why? We are faced with the eternal dilemma of whether to arm everyone or almost no one. As it turned out, not even in a single case during the past 15 years has anyone been able to defend his, or his family's life with a weapon acquired for self-defense purposes. This, as well as other considerations made me conclude that as of today, it would be appropriate to restrict the right to possess firearms in Hungary, and to reinforce sanctions against persons illegally possessing firearms.

[Balla] Based on professional considerations, many people are dissatisfied with the proposed police law, because, for example, immunity—mistakenly called plea bargaining—or the use of secret means should be part of the law on criminal procedure, if for none other but consistency with the system of laws. Do you agree with these assertions?

[Boross] These issues are appropriate matters of concern. But it would be very complicated to change individual elements of the law on criminal procedure. Accordingly, incorporating these provisions as part of the police law could, from a theoretical standpoint, not be the most fortunate choice, but those who drafted the legislation were guided by practical considerations, i.e., that parliament would pass the legislative proposal concerning the police before it would amend the law on criminal procedure.

[Balla] At the club frequented by criminal lawyers a very interesting view of an extremely prestigious professional could be heard regarding "plea bargaining." He said that plea bargaining already existed in practice under certain circumstances, even without having related rules expressed in the form of law. He said that such rules would only cause additional problems, because in instances when a policeman promises immunity in exchange for certain information given by a criminal, it would be appropriate to guarantee a policeman's ability to keep his promise. Based on the legislative proposal, however, the supreme prosecutor would be the one to decide such cases. What happens if the supreme prosecutor subsequently disagrees with the "plea bargain"?

[Boross] Some differences in perception between the prosecutor's office and the police can be noted, but these differences are also based on the different functions of the two organizations. For example, with respect to holding people in custody, the practice followed by prosecutors is more liberal than what the police would expect. The police should promise immunity only after checking with the prosecutor, because only then is there a better chance for being able to keep such promises. It is obvious, however, that the supreme prosecutor would delegate this authority to the county level, just as he does with other types of authority assigned to him.

[Balla] Permit me to ask a personal question. Aware of the fact that you have previously been working as an enterprise director, has anyone from the former III/III [State Security department] unit asked you at any time to write a report about someone, and if so, what did you do?

[Boross] I have never gotten into an embarrassing situation like that. The fact that the enterprise I worked for was rather marginal has something to do with this, it was a place where situations like this did not occur. And so, I never met these "comrades".... Policemen frequently came to visit because occasionally we had some ordinary crimes; for all I know they could have been III/III men in disguise, but I don't believe so, because these cases were

not of that nature. I did not even know who their confidence man was at the enterprise, if there was one. This may seem odd, even more so because in my subsequent position I could have found out such things. But I did not even look for such things, based on principle. Generally speaking, I am an advocate of having to know how to keep a secret, and how to say "no" to things, and one need not necessarily involve himself in things which have no significance.

[Balla] When I first met you as the minister in charge of supervising the civil secret services, I had the impression that you were an apolitical person. Why did you agree to play a party role exactly at this point in time?

[Boross] It was no secret to anyone that I felt rather close to the ideals represented by the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. We have reached half time, I am a member of the cabinet, the cabinet is a coalition cabinet, and I decided to make my belonging absolutely clear to the outside world.

[Balla] Do you continue to hold the view you expressed at our first meeting? You said that people are generally attracted to the middle of the road.

[Boross] What I said was this: Hungarian history teaches us the lesson that (except for the insane year of 1919,) extremes could only make gains when the country was under foreign influence or military occupation. All of Hungarian history represents a kind of "quarrel," nevertheless the mentality reflected by Hungarian history is one that is free of extremes. I continue to regard this as the definitive feature even today, I am convinced even today that a right-of-center policy line—to sound more like a politician—is appropriate from the standpoint of Hungarian historical traditions and mentality, the kind of policies represented by, let's say, Jozsef Antall. Any other policy would be short-lived, and would threaten with an upset.

[Balla] Suppose that on 23 October the demonstrators had worn "pufajkas" [quilted jackets suggesting subservience to communist interests]. Would the police have remained inactive?

[Boross] The garb people wear who actively disrupt order makes no difference whatsoever. The police is going to take action against such people. The MDF parliamentary faction has drafted a legislative proposal to ban signs and emblems that suggest a rejection of Hungary's freedom, regardless of whether those are linked to 1944 or to 1948 and the years thereafter.

[Balla] Sandor Olah has asked you to formally hand in your resignation. Why didn't you?

[Boross] Sandor Olah has asked me to make a formal gesture, which I refused to make for several reasons. First: because there was neither a substantive nor a procedural reason for me to resign. Second: I, (just as the other cabinet members,) have placed my political career

in the hands of Jozsef Antall, and he has not asked me to resign. Third: There is no need for theatrical gestures in politics.

[Balla] On 15 March 1991 the police was able to break up a small group in an instant. Why couldn't the same be done in this instance?

[Boross] On that memorable holiday an isolated group expressed its feelings in opposition to the government in a way that offended not only the government, but also good taste. I should not have to quote the obscene word that appeared on the banner. In addition, the small disruptive group whose conduct was obviously illegal could be isolated or removed, but in instances involving several thousands of people one could, at best, launch a frontal attack in order to evacuate the square. Particularly in an instance when the illegality of the conduct manifested is not apparent.

[Balla] How are you going to be able to prevent situations like this from occurring in the future?

[Boross] There are countless cases in history throughout the world in which certain groups and individuals, motivated by their own interests, or instigated in the interest of others, have disturbed ceremonial functions. This obviously cannot be prevented in the decades to come. One could, of course, brandish the police force on national and state holidays, just as the Kadar system did on 15 March or as October approached, as we all could see. We do not intend to resort to such means in a democracy. Nevertheless, one should be certain that anyone committing crimes sanctioned under criminal law or as rules violations would be confronted on such occasions by the appropriate organs. And if an organization operates illegally—I assume your question also pertains to this matter—it is within the authority, and it is the duty of the prosecutor to act according to the provisions of Law No. 2 of 1989, concerning associations.

Impact of Danube Diversion, Negotiations

93CH0199A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian
1 Dec 92 pp 11-13

[Interviews with citizens and a local official of the Szigetkoz region; Laszlo Karpati, the director of the Ferto Lake International Park; Adrienn Hajosi, expert adviser to Minister Ferenc Madl; and with leading environmentalist Janos Vargha by Peter Trebitsch; places and dates not given: "One Way or Another, Hungarians Suffer the Consequences"; Salty Savanna in the Place of Szigetkoz; Dependent on the Whims of Slovaks"]

[Text] *Ever since the Danube flood wave when three locks on the dam washed away arguments detailing the magnificence of the Bos [Gabcikovo] structure, many people hoped that the Slovaks would at last give up. But hopes attached to the London agreement have dissipated, and a repetition of the same is feared as a result of proceedings*

at the International Court of The Hague. While travelling in Szigetkoz, Peter Trebitsch talked to people who personally experienced the consequences of diverting the Danube. He conducted a face-to-face interview with the minister's expert adviser, and a leader of the Danube Circle reported on the Brussels negotiations over the telephone.

[Trebitsch] Private farmer Andras Makai of Dunakiliti is one of the residents of Szigetkoz who dared to protest the Bos-Nagymaros construction as early as 1987.

[Makai] We can sense in our immediate environment the impact of the great Danube and what its absence means; this is in our genes. At the ministerial and environmental protection levels so-called grand politics play an important role, and the people at those levels disregard the realities we experience in Szigetkoz. The radio, the TV, and journalists should not come here at this time—in late November or early December—to find dead fish and dead, dried-up forests! If the C variant functions as originally perceived by the Slovaks, and if we do nothing about the Szigetkoz floodplain, you should come here next August or September to see tree tops in the forests of Szigetkoz. They will be dry, and it will stink in the ditch, if there is no water in it....

Confronting Insanity

[Trebitsch] This might sound like a cheap joke, but we're reaching the point where not even birds come to this area anymore....

[Laszlo Molnar] I've been walking these forests for 30 years, moreover, I've been a professional hunter for 32 years. I asked my son to bring me out here today, to at least take a look at this catastrophic situation. I cannot imagine any way to reverse this situation. To stop the construction? They wouldn't stop it after having worked so hard for it! A flood that really reaches the foot of this dike will sweep away this entire stretch of land, because it is composed of sand and gravel. One way or another, the Hungarians suffer the consequences. The Czechs let as much water flow through as they want; they control the whole thing. Isn't that the truth?

[Makai] Further thinking and further action to protect the floodplain will be unavoidable if the Hungarian and Slovak Governments are unable to agree based on the proceedings of the International Court at The Hague and the London agreement. Sir, my worries are not about people starving in Somalia. As a human being I am obviously concerned about that, too. But as a resident of Szigetkoz I am worried about my own environment. Logic tells me that if the ground water level is not high enough, the forests in the floodplain are going to die out. Agricultural activities are going to come to a halt if we are unable to raise ground water levels from Dunakiliti almost to Asvanyraro with the help of the Zatory-Cikola branch of the Danube. We have 30-40 centimeters of top soil on top of the Szigetkoz alluvial cone; we will have to obtain water for irrigation from deeper levels, from wells to be drilled, if the ground water level sinks further. One

could estimate that the upper layer of humus would be washed away into lower levels within three to five years, and whether we like it or not, we are going to have a salty savanna 30 kilometers long and 15 kilometers wide within five years, or acacia forests at best, unless we act now, if our government fails to reach an agreement in London or in The Hague, unless we directly interfere in an attempt to salvage what can still be salvaged.

[Trebitsch] Mrs. Menyhart, Agnes Magyar is a member of the Gyor-Moson-Sopron County general assembly, and within that body, of the environmental protection committee. I know that nowadays there hardly is a meeting in which this subject is not discussed.

[Mrs. Menyhart] As members of the general assembly, we, the mayors from this area and the representatives of various settlements would like to see as many professionals from this region involved as possible: hydrologists, environmentalists, and soil conservation professionals. We feel that these are the people who could be held to account in this area, who could assume responsibility for their actions. We have already lost several months of time, and we feel that this loss of time is due to the fact that the construction had not been taken seriously. Only belatedly did we hear that, yes, they will go on with the construction, but they won't have enough money; and once they recognized that they had enough money for the construction, they came up with the idea of cancelling the agreement. That didn't work either. In other words, we have witnessed a number of things, which made us lose confidence. And this includes me, who has no doubt about the mistake implicit in the whole dam.

[Trebitsch] The Szigetkoz district for conserving the scenery belongs to the Ferto Lake International Park, whose director is Laszlo Karpati.

[Karpati] The arguments we used in an attempt to halt the Danubiosour have now become a reality; we hoped to achieve at least some results by arguing against this insanity on grounds of a national park, a protected scenic area certified as such by Europe....

Ebb or Tide

[Trebitsch] But this is not what has happened.

[Karpati] Things did not happen that way, we committed ourselves to the zero alternative, and in my view, the parliament made an appropriate decision in those days, because it expressed the view of the entire country. Things have changed in the meantime, Slovakia did not follow our line of thought, it was not possible to reach an agreement with them regarding the zero alternative, and what happened has happened. The way I see it, the present situation with the diversion of the Danube is about the same as the situation envisioned in 1977, when the agreement was signed. In other words, we receive water when the Danube floods, some water dribbles when there is no flood, but we are entirely at the mercy

of the Slovak Water Authorities who might some day promise this or that, but do nothing at present.

[Trebitsch] And it is solely this situation on which an improvement of conditions in this district hinge. Simply put, whether we receive or don't receive water from there.

[Karpati] That's exactly the case. Perhaps it would be beneficial to demonstrate to the country and the world the kind of drying up processes the diversion of the Danube catalyzes. But the people of Szigetkoz are not going to understand why they have to be the subjects of an experiment. As early as this year we will be faced with irrigation, drinking water, and other problems. What the entire region needs is a comprehensive sewage system and a comprehensive irrigation and drinking water system. If this is the case, if the situation caused by the diversion of the Danube becomes permanent, we will also have to reassess the overall, regional land use plan. The Danube is going to flow in an isolated basin from Pozsony [Bratislava] all the way to Szap [Palkovicovo], and this could happen in the course of five years, 10 years, I don't know when, because part of the channel is already isolated but the reservoir is not... well, I don't know what exactly is going to happen. A huge drying up process will take place in the area. This is my view. The Hansag area is going to be affected first, but I am very concerned that later on it will also affect Lake Fertő.

[Trebitsch] Is there a realistic chance for reaching a specific agreement at the present negotiations in Brussels, in your view, Dr. Adrienn Hajosi, Minister Ferenc Madl's expert?

[Hajosi] We have the London agreement and everyone insists on abiding by its terms. This agreement must be enforced. The present negotiations would have served the same purpose, but a technical situation presented itself as a result of which achieving that purpose became impossible. I have in mind the return of 95 percent of the Danube's water.

[Trebitsch] Is there a promise?

[Hajosi] Someone signing something amounts to more than a promise, it also means the acceptance of an obligation. The flood has proven that no buildings exist to enable the immediate return of 95 percent of the water. Some unexpected events took place at the construction after the diversion. For example, the four locks built next to the diversion dam that were supposed to determine the water levels have malfunctioned. They were unable to restore them ever since. The same thing has happened to one of the locks built for ships. All these things presented unexpected technical situations whose consequences must be assessed. Some time must pass before the Slovaks can perform their obligation, one has to recognize this.

[Trebitsch] Would it follow from what you just said that no further negotiations were necessary?

[Hajosi] Both parties have begun to jointly request the International Court at The Hague to resolve this problems, in other words, both parties have agreed to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court at The Hague.

There Is Crisis—No Plan Exists

[Trebitsch] People in Szigetkoz are concerned that they are going to be left to their own in a situation that could become more aggravated.

[Hajosi] This lack of confidence appears to be entirely justified, it keeps returning due to the terrible situation. There have been examples for this in earlier phases of the construction, but I do not believe that this lack of confidence is well-founded, because parliament's decision is based on a professional decision.

[Trebitsch] Regardless of this, do you have some kind of contingency plan to manage the crisis?

[Hajosi] A crisis management plan should be prepared primarily by the Czechoslovak party. They should have some kind of an emergency action package for flood situations. In the present situation we are able to tell that the breeding period [as published] is going to be critical because the water is supposed to appear in that period. The fact that a sudden drop in the volume of water has occurred as a result of the diversion causes great concern, the effects cannot be fully assessed at this time. I don't know how to correct this situation, or whether it can be corrected at all. So far we had a Danube, now we don't. The job is to reacquire this Danube.

[Trebitsch] Janos Vargha is on the other end of the line in Brussels. He conducted negotiations with a few representatives at the European Parliament and took part at a press conference organized by the World Fund for Nature Conservation. Meanwhile, of course, he kept track of negotiations that ended the other day.

[Vargha] Expert delegates of the Common Market recommended that the dam be placed in operation and that the consequences be examined, and only after that should one interfere. The head of the committee made several attempts to rule out the discussion of issues that could be embarrassing or unpleasant from their standpoint. The Hungarian delegate filed a separate opinion regarding one of these issues. This took place when the Hungarian party questioned the truth of an argument according to which the Danube had to be urgently diverted due to a threatening flood. One of the Common Market directors in charge of East European affairs gave instructions regarding the discussion of this matter, suggesting that this issue not be discussed. This represents a totally unacceptable interference in the work of experts, in my view.

[Trebitsch] Is there a chance that Hungary is going to receive that certain 95 percent agreed upon in London?

[Vargha] If the navigation route is to be maintained, releasing 95 percent of the water in the Danube basin is practically impossible from a technical standpoint because the inferior quality of the works under the C variant is not suited to permit this. This condition could only be met if the Danube were rerouted into its own basin.

[Trebitch] What means, what arguments can you think of by which the Hungarian negotiators could persuade the Slovak negotiating partners to do this?

[Vargha] Unless the Slovak Government recognizes that this is also an elementary interest of its own, we must request a preliminary decision from the International Court in The Hague even before it pins down responsibility for the things that are happening. Alternatively, we must file an appeal with the UN Security Council.

Effects of Gabcikovo Dam on Residents Described

*93CH0154B Budapest KOZTARSASAG in Hungarian
13 Nov 92 pp 58-61*

[Article by Janos Adonyi Sztancs: "Will Szigetkoz Be the New Place of Discontent? Good Times for Plunderers"]

[Text] Szigetkoz [area in northern Hungary bordering Slovakia] is becoming gloomy. The people who live there are just now beginning to wake up, enraged, become frightened, and swear. What is happening to them, what is happening around them? What is happening to the Danube, to the islands, to the backwaters? Water is disappearing from under landings and anchored boats, and wells dry up in many places. The water monster of Bos [Gabcikovo] sparked anger and fear. It is still unsure at whom the anger is directed. But when the people of Szigetkoz are faced with the first catastrophic results of agriculture, the anger may take on radical forms. Some think this is where the new place of discontent will be. Janos Adonyi Sztancs traveled around in Szigetkoz.

"What can happen to us next, what can happen to us next?" The old woman in Asvanyraro laments when I ask her about the water in the well. Then she sees the camera in my colleague's hands and flees into the house. "Newspaper? I've never been in a place like that. Not in court, either. What do you want from an old hag of 78? Take pictures of the young ones!" she shouts from her door.

We make a deal: No photos. We only want to know if there is any water left at the bottom of the well.

"Today, the bucket went under," the woman says, "but it hit the bottom." She suddenly looks me in the eye and says accusingly: "Hasn't it been enough yet?"

"What?" I ask dumbfounded.

"Listen! I married my husband in 1941. What we scraped together by 1945, the Russians took. Because they ordered us around like dogs. What we scraped together from 1945 to 1954, the flood took. But so much so, that we ate from other people's plates, with other

people's spoons. What we made between 1954 and 1959, the cooperative took. Now they take our water? Hasn't it been enough yet?"

Imre Boosy, the young mayor of Asvanyraro, is glum.

"I will move away if they don't restore the original conditions. I was born here, and I love this place very much, but I wouldn't be able to look on the agony of the village."

"Do you think the situation is that disastrous?"

"Look, if things remain the way they are, the village will lose all of its assets. Half of the working people live from agriculture and forestry. But when the land becomes a desert because the water table is several meters lower, the trees will dry up and everything will be over. Fifty people are employed by the water management fleet. They cannot cruise about in a puddle. Incidentally, earlier we were planning a marina, because this village could become a paradise for tourists. People were renting out many rooms, especially to Austrians and Germans who came here to fish, boat, or hunt. But it is doubtful whether they will come again next year...."

The world press has discovered Asvanyraro. This is why we have to cut the conversation with the mayor short. He is expecting a group of journalists who are coming here on behalf of the World Foundation for the Protection of Wildlife.

"Where will you take them? What will you show them?"

"I will take them to see the man who did not have running water in his house before because he claimed the water in his well was better. Yesterday he came to me in despair that there is not a drop of water in his well, how will he water his livestock?"

Imre Boosy has become adept at giving interviews. He was visited by Swedish, Japanese, German, and English TV stations who, as he said, mostly pressed him to say "when there will be a Sarajevo here, when will there be a blast with the Slovaks?"

"The only thing I don't understand is," I quickly ask the last question, "if the ground is cut from under the feet of the people of Szigetkoz, why were there so few people at the demonstrations against the power plant?"

"Actually, from here about 100 of us went. But otherwise there were really not many of us. People are used to their fate being decided above, and regard demonstrations as fruitless. Now however, when they see what happened, they are becoming more and more nervous; they would like to do something, but don't really know what. It is a fact that what happened cannot remain unpunished. As soon as we receive intelligent counsel, we will sue someone in the spring."

We meet two people fishing at the village landing place. They go for pike and perch.

"We will come here until the wetlands disappear altogether," they say. "The shells show that the level of the backwaters went down at least one meter overnight."

Indeed, all along the bank one can see the shells, showing where the water level was a few hours earlier.

We leave the village and drive on along the Danube. At Cikola island we ask a group of women at the bus stop for directions.

"What will happen to us?" they complain. "We are full of unemployed people. They keep a lot of livestock, but there is hardly any water in the wells, and it costs a lot of money to water the livestock with running water. If we were as irresponsible in bringing up our kids as the people who made a decision about the power plant, where would this country be?"

We drive on. We stop in front of a house at random. Mrs. Karoly Bergauer readily shows their well. It is bone dry. Can they still cool watermelons in it? In Szigetkoz, the water in the wells rises or falls as the Danube floods or ebbs. But up to now, it has never dried up.

In Kisbodak we talk to an old man, Lajos Horvath.

"When I was a child, I heard that when King Matyas caught the robber knights, he had them sewn into leather and thrown into the Danube. This is what they should do now. What kind of a thing is this, to steal the river?"

At Dunaremete we cross the embankment again. We find a man of pensionable age. He is working with a fishing net, catching small crucian carps. He does not want to tell us his name, because "too many people" know him in Gyor-Sopron county. But he has an opinion. It turns out that he is a professional. He used to be officially in charge of this area.

"The people of Szigetkoz would have had to be educated and shaken up in time, so that they would have been aware that the water table would go down 6-8 meter. But once we reached this stage—because now we are at the beginning of a catastrophem—they should have instituted emergency measures, for instance, to save the offspring of fish."

"Who should have done this?"

"The county self-government, together with the Water Authority. The latter could have determined where, at which segment of the river, there are hollows to which the offspring of fish could have been transferred. A part of the stock could have been saved."

Suddenly, the dam-keeper, Peter Dicsofi, rides over to us on his rattling motorcycle. He and the man with the fishing net recount how the thieves, the profit-grabbers gather up the fish stranded on dry ground or in the puddles. The time has come for plunderers and for wild boars. These large wild animals pick up the fish from the shallow waters or the mud and make a feast of them.

The two men familiar with the waters also agree that once the first poor harvest in Szigetkoz is in, the situation could turn explosive. Because here, they used to grow such good corn on the cob as few places in Hungary. But when the local population is faced with the dreary realities, Szigetkoz can easily become the new place of discontent.

Orban Supports Government on Gabcikovo

93CH0149B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 16 Nov 92 p 4

[MTI report: "The Government Should Be Supported in the Gabcikovo Case, According to Orban"]

[Text] The government must not be attacked for the situation that has evolved regarding Bos [Gabcikovo], regardless of the magnitude of the mistake it made by only reacting to events and for having gotten this far. We must endeavor to confine the scope of the dispute between Slovakia and Hungary so that it remains a legal problem. We should not allow things to acquire an appearance as if we had gotten mixed up in an all-out conflict with the Slovaks, and as if there were a potential for the region to develop into a crisis zone, according to FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] parliamentary faction leader Viktor Orban on Saturday in Szekszard, where a body of men called the mayor's conference—established by the local government cabinet of FIDESZ—held its first meeting. Regarding Bos, Orban made it clear that in today's situation we must do what the government does: to persuade the Slovak side to abide by the agreement.

In several other respects, however, Orban criticized the government. He stressed that the budget deficit could catalyze an inflationary avalanche, if the volume of individual deposits declined. Orban also analyzed the conduct manifested by parties seated in parliament. He discussed in detail the actions to be taken relative to FIDESZ's election campaign. He said that it would be preferable to elect people to serve in the next National Assembly, who understood politics. The faction leader warned about the disadvantages the country could suffer if local government coalitions dissolved during the main segment of the election campaign. Therefore, we must endeavor to pursue normal cooperation even during the election battles.

The FIDESZ mayors' conference—attended by more than 100 FIDESZ mayors, deputy mayors and local government FIDESZ faction leaders—considered proposals and proposed amendments to be introduced in the National Assembly today by the young democrat's faction relative to the proposed budget law. The essence of these proposals is that local governments want to receive at least the minimum amount of support they could expect, in order to prevent a situation in which governance at the local level becomes impossible. The

fate of schools, faculties and other vitally important institutions depends on the extent of support to be provided.

Communists Accused of Election Impropriety

93CH0156B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 13 Nov 92 p 6

[Unattributed article: "MSZMP Without a Candidate?"]

[Text] Special elections were called for 22 November to fill the vacated National Assembly representative seat of the fourth voting district in Bacs-Kiskun County. Running with the support of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party], independent candidate Laszlo Magyar submitted 778 signatures by the established deadline to support his nomination. But as Kunszentmiklos village clerk Sandor Gergely said, 305 nominating slips were not filled out properly: 27 of them were not signed by the persons whose names the slips bore, and on 278 slips voters have failed to indicate which party they supported. The MSZMP argues that Laszlo Magyar is an independent candidate who agrees with the party's views. This is why either the "MSZMP" or the "independent" designations on the nominating slips should be acceptable. Moreover, considering that this is a special situation, no indication of party preference at all should also be acceptable. Despite these statements, after the local election board rejected this claim, the national election board also followed suit, although its rejection prevailed only by an extremely slim margin. The Supreme Court is the MSZMP's last hope.

SZDSZ Prospects, Relations With MSZP

93CH0162A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
14 Nov 92 pp 8-9

[Interview with Peter Tolgyessy and Ivan Peto, candidates for president of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Gabor F. Havas and Ferenc Koszeg; place and date not given: "Close to the Finish: BESZELO Interview With Ivan Peto and Peter Tolgyessy"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [BESZELO] Let us leave the past behind, although all questions originate from the past. Ivan, you said last year that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] can find an ally only within the opposition. On the other hand, Peter always emphasized that the SZDSZ must be a center party and spoke of openness in all directions. Fidesz [Alliance of Young Democrats] is considered a partner by both sides but, at the same time, a single ally is not enough in the present political situation. Where can the SZDSZ find other coalition partners?

[Tolgyessy] There have been significant changes since last year. The issue ceased to be who the third partner is; now the issue is who represents the dominant force. The MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] is the true great winner of the by-election. In my view, they have a chance to become this dominant force. This is not yet decided,

but the real question today is whether the dominant role—i.e., the opportunity to form a government—in the elections will be played by the liberal center or the MSZP. In the East European countries the tendency seems to be that the successor parties are gaining ground. I would not be pleased if, while strongly opposing the government, we failed to notice—similar to 1990—that our real rival in the elections will be another party: at that time it was the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and now it will be the MSZP. If the free democrats' cooperation with the Fidesz becomes closer than before and if debates within the SZDSZ subside, then we have a chance to occupy the dominant position. After the first issue is resolved, then we can raise the second issue: who should be our future coalition partners. I think that the government parties will probably change, if not before the elections, surely afterwards. Every government party rallies extremely different forces. There were people in the MDF who considered Csurka's study a fascist manifesto, and this is a sign of great differences. Sandor Olah's decisive stand in connection with the 23 October events allows the assumption that there is a line even within the FKgP [Independent Smallholders Party], which is progressing toward the center, and such forces can also be detected in the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. We do not yet know at present what is happening on that side. And neither do we know to what extent the forces in the MSZP which want to preserve the late-Kadarian setup are able to hold on to their leading roles. However, the SZDSZ must, for the time being, deal with the first issue, namely, with the conditions for success at the elections and with making the liberal center into the dominating force.

[Peto] I think it is unfortunate that what the SZDSZ has to say is determined by the fact that the assessment of the MSZP is better now than a year-and-a-half or two years ago. I cannot imagine that an already successful MSZP would get more votes than the two liberal parties together; thus, Peter's interpretation that the MSZP might become the dominant force, is wrong.

[Tolgyessy] Are you sure about this, even in terms of the number of mandates?

[Peto] I am sure because the SZDSZ has a realistic chance to be successful in the individual election districts, and the Fidesz is assumed to get many votes on the [party] lists. On the other hand, the two liberal parties' capability of forming a coalition is better than that of the MSZP. It is to a great disadvantage to the MSZP that none of the parliamentary parties wants to be its coalition partner. Of course, many things may change in a year-and-a-half, but the MSZP, even if it were larger in itself than any other parliamentary party, would still be smaller in the sense that it would find it extremely difficult to find a serious coalition partner. In this sense, the MSZP is not a force that is suitable for governing. When I said a year ago that we must find allies within the opposition, I meant to say—and I still mean to say—that an ally is a permanent partner. I have never thought of

the MSZP as an ally, and I do not think that there is anyone in the SZDSZ who would want to make any sort of an alliance with the MSZP. We are also in agreement that it is still too early today to arrive at an opinion with regard to our postelection possibilities, with the exception of the Fidesz. Any unfounded commitment could only result in a disadvantage. I, too, find it improbable that, following a possible defeat at the elections, the MDF will stay together in its present form. If this is true, then those forces within the MDF, which although distant from us, are nevertheless willing to operate within the framework of democracy and are not looking for antidemocratic solutions to present problems, could even be, in principle, coalition partners in a liberal coalition.

[BESZELO] Last year, when this issue was raised, it was repeatedly said that the personalities with whom cooperation is possible can be found in the parties of the coalition. But I believe that the MDF also has its liberals, and there is Sandor Olah among the smallholders, [but] this is not a really significant issue. The only issue that seemed significant last year was whether the SZDSZ could cooperate with Prime Minister Antall in a way that would strengthen the prime minister and, through him, the faction within the MDF, which observes the rules of democracy, or which does not believe that Antall is striving for this or is able to represent this within the MDF, even at the expense of cooperation with the opposition. This is what I see as the essential issue of last fall, but I believe that this issue has already lost its significance.

[Peto] I agree with that. Possibly, we may still have had the illusion last year that Jozsef Antall would try to assimilate his own internal right-wing opposition. This could have been a rational idea albeit unacceptable to me. But the past year demonstrated that this would not happen, but rather that it would be he who would integrate—perhaps against his will, but this is a secondary issue for me—into an MDF that is increasingly defined by right-wing radicalism.

[Tolgyessy] The past year went by in the spirit of the MDF's power policy; aggressiveness has already appeared on the streets as well, and the situation has become much worse. At the same time, I think that the problem continues to exist. On the one hand, no real laws that require a two-thirds majority are being legislated, only the law on personal data protection has been passed, and there is still no police law, media law, national security law, or General Accounting Office law. Both the country and the opposition are losing out on the absence of even minimal cooperation. I state with conviction that this is not good for the opposition either, it spoils the political atmosphere, and does not help the economy either. On the other hand, we must also consider that if the liberal center will win and form a government with its partners, then it will be in its own interest to have a really constructive opposition. Because the present government majority will likely retain a

position of one-third even after the elections. The question whether society will be divided along the lines of political differences is a key issue in Hungarian politics. The government parties have a great responsibility in this.

[BESZELO] Is the opposition also responsible for the strained relations?

[Tolgyessy] Yes, to a certain degree, but this is not significant. Without doubt, there have been some arrogant manifestations by the opposition, there have been some superfluous evaluations that elicited angry replies from the other side. I think it is important for the opposition to be very decisive but also to remain moderate in criticizing such endeavors, for otherwise a formidable escalation may take place, leading to a real Weimarization. But it can also lead to very serious conflicts when a governing liberal center is opposed by an adversary that also builds on social demagoguery. At the moment, the country is lucky that the extreme right-wing demagoguery cannot touch dissatisfaction with the economy because it is governing, but its capacity to create conflicts will increase immensely as soon as it will be out of the government. It would be in the interest of the center to remain in the center because a division of the political structure would have a destabilizing effect. It is an illusion to think that, in the aftermath of an election victory, supporters of the present government majority would disappear from the scene. Instead, we should learn to live together—this is also in our own interest. But, without any doubt, the situation has become much worse this year. The opposition has no other choice left but to strongly oppose all endeavors to power.

[Peto] We can speak of the responsibility of the opposition only in the sense that the opposition has a significant influence in Hungary. But the opposition can hardly be blamed for the strained situation. From the first moment, the government coalition was extremely intolerant toward the opposition. Without doubt, we have not always spoken out in the most appropriate manner, but such things do happen even in the most stable democracies. For instance, Hungary's opposition would hardly allow itself the degree of contempt the German social-democratic party displayed against the government in connection with Germany's unification. The way I see it, the government coalition is more intolerant to begin with, trying to balance its own lack of ability and success with impatience toward the opposition. There is very little we can do about this situation, for I completely agree with Peter that the SZDSZ has never used social demagoguery, which is a very effective weapon against the government. On the other hand, the extreme right wing, in opposition, may even become a force that is adequate for destroying democracy by using the weapon of social demagoguery. [passage omitted]

Smallholders Party Power Struggle Viewed*93CH0175B Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian
13 Nov 92 p 2*

[Article by Tivadar Partay: "The Historical Smallholders Party"]

[Excerpts] I barely finished my article printed on the previous page, when a colleague called from the editorial office and read to me the MAGYAR HIRLAP report on the previous day's "meeting" of Dr. Torgyan, Sandor Olah, and Dr. Imre Boross at Obuda, in the new Sipos restaurant. The article, in which I predicted that the anticoalition attack in parliament could not have had any other purpose than the forming of a new party and the disintegration of the coalition, had not yet gone to print, it had only been typeset. That writing of mine was not based on my ability to predict things, but on logic suggested by the sober mind.

But not even in the wildest dreams would it have occurred to me that a few months after Sandor Olah delivered a highly acclaimed speech before several hundreds, moreover, several thousands of people about the despot "whose hands are tainted with blood," and with whom "he would not be willing to cooperate in the same fold," would he, the puritan presbyter, sit down with the same person at a table covered by a white table cloth and discuss the founding of a new party. I would not have believed anyone telling me that.

All three of them are going to piously preach that they are making a sacrifice in the interest of Smallholders Party [FKgP] unity, whereas the truth is that in all three of them, only a sense of being disregarded had caused the feeling of offended vanity to arise! Anyone who does not recognize this is more blind than I am!

And to top this pseudo-sanctimonious statement, they are celebrating the establishment of the FKgP. The celebrants are those who had falsified and betrayed the entire mentality of the celebrated old party! Mr. Torgyan is first in line; his new constitution is the direct opposite of the spirit espoused by the old Smallholders Party. Then comes Mr. Boross, who did not shrink from debasing the old spirit among shouting dervishes at the Jurta on Sundays. And finally, Mr. Olah, who has declared that the FKgP had been liberal ever since its establishment, and who was capable of crediting his post-1945 successes (!?) to Budapest Jews. In reality, Torgyan would never have defected to the Reds, had he received a ministerial appointment on time. Had Boross acquired a leadership role..., but it was Torgyan who prevented this, and Olah, too voted against him at Erd. He told me so, because by that time I was no longer there. And Olah has this exaggerated self-esteem and feeling of being neglected, because when positions were distributed, some people of far less worth were appointed as ministers. These three form the marvelous bouquet. And money, of course, which, according to them, (and I agree) appears to be attracted to Torgyan. And the amount of that money is not small! About 160

million forints for six months. This represents an ample sum to satisfy everyone, and even some reserves can be set aside for the elections. But what could become of a marriage like this, involving three people?! This is hard to figure out. Even the purest of logic can only stumble about in this regard.

How could these three be compatible? Torgyan, whose methods do not tolerate contradiction (the presently manifested quiet piousness is only on the surface) and who cannot be harnessed, with his own Far Eastern, and local Red sponsors; Boross, the soapbox orator without following, who always bets on the wrong horse; and the most shrewd, and perhaps most ambitious Olah. How could these three be compatible? And how is the new party, the child to be born from this marriage triangle, going to look like? It's bad to even think about it! Torgyan, who in his spare time celebrates in Russian, Boross, with his inherited traditional monarchist attitudes (his father led the monarchist wing of the FKgP in Szombathely alongside Albin Lungauer), and Sandor Olah, the Reformed Church presbyter chieftain who plays the role of a puritan....

While Torgyan's relatives advocated democracy at Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures, Romania] with sticks and axes, Sandor Olah began to sing the Transylvania Anthem at the national board meeting. (I do not know what prompted him to do so. Could it be that he wanted to be noticed? It's possible!) And Mr. Boross mistakenly proclaimed in the shadow of the Sacred Crown that a conspiracy had existed within the FKgP as early as in 1946. True, soon thereafter he celebrated Dezsó Sulyok, but he was surprised when I told him that Sulyok, my dear, good friend, belonged to the monarchist branch of the FKgP. It was not customary to proclaim such things to the world in those days. We were Smallholders! And there were no differences between us!

[passage omitted]

Boross and Torgyan, and now Sandor Olah, the one regarded as most reliable, are trying to become ministers or something over the struggling, agonizing body of the FKgP. And all claim that they want to save the unity of the FKgP, a unity they, themselves have disintegrated! Behind the smiling masks we can see the wolf's teeth, the wolf's skin behind the sheepskin. "Watch out!" the guard warns, but his warning could once again be in vain!

What has this country become? What is going to become of our democracy? An orgy of pirates rampaging in wild waters? Two or three men get together at a restaurant, a tavern, and form a party.... But they find that the new party is not going to attract followers. Well then, why not expropriate the old one by saying that what we have is not the real Smallholders Party, this is not the same we had before!

[passage omitted]

MDF Presidium Member Bethlen Criticizes Csurka
93CH0180B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 25 Nov 92 p 4

[Interview with Istvan Bethlen, National Assembly representative and member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's presidium, by Laszlo Jasz in Budapest on 25 November 1992: "Before the MDF Presidium Session; No International Conspiracy Against Hungary Exists"]

[Text] *Great interest has been expressed in last Wednesday's MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] presidium session. According to one report, Vice Chairman Istvan Csurka was called upon by the rest of the presidium members to retreat. Csurka claimed that this report was inaccurate, nevertheless no one corrected the statement and no substantive information has been received from anyone ever since. We inquired from National Assembly Representative Istvan Bethlen, a member of the MDF presidium, before today's session.*

[Bethlen] You are placing me in a difficult situation because that was a closed meeting. Therefore, I would prefer not to report on what transpired at that meeting. I would much rather refer to statements made by members of the presidium since the publication of Csurka's writing. To the clear-cut position taken by the prime minister in parliament, the warning by Ivan Szabo about difficulties in negotiating with international financial and economic organizations, which provide us serious support, if at the same time we call them Jewish bankers. Balazs Horvath said that in the aftermath of Csurka's writing even the air around the MDF grew cold, and he also said that after Jozsef Debrecezeni's writing the air inside the MDF froze because of a statement that I, too, find unacceptable: Debrecezeni claimed that the establishment of national socialist foundations was involved. I could go on mentioning Sandor Lezsak and others, but I am not going to talk about myself.

[Jasz] In other words, you feel that the by now famous closed session had been preceded by open and clear-cut statements.

[Bethlen] Short of referring to last Wednesday's meeting, I can say that the members of the MDF presidium have regarded, and continue to regard the effects of the Csurka writing on economic policy, financial policy both in Hungary and abroad as rather unfortunate because of a few expressions he used, as for instance, his anti-Semitic tone of voice.

[Jasz] Accordingly, the terminology used by Csurka is in part unacceptable for pragmatic reasons. Could you explain this in somewhat more detail?

[Bethlen] What Istvan Csurka says is simply not true. Csurka is not an economist, a financial professional. He, himself has stated this many times, and indeed, he has no knowledge of these things. It is not true that the international economic world of finance is conspiring against Hungary. The opposite is true. Just think of it: At

the end of the year the government states that next year's budget deficit is going to be 70 billion forints, and reports accordingly to the IMF and the World Bank. This takes place at a time when at least two dozen professionals in Hungary know that next year's deficit is going to amount to at least 200 billion forints. Then, in February, it turns out that indeed, the deficit is going to be 200 billion forints, nevertheless the World Bank and the IMF continue to treat Hungary on the basis of the original agreements. There is no better proof than this of the goodwill manifested by these two organizations. Why should we attack the international organizations at a time when they manifest, and I emphasize this: the greatest possible goodwill?

[Jasz] On the other hand, I also believe that we should rule out anti-Semitic manifestations not merely because of the financial situation in which we find ourselves.

[Bethlen] Excuse me, I separated things in this discussion. To begin with, it is not true that a Jewish conspiracy exists in the international banking community. Saying such a thing is odd because in general, the people we have been negotiating with recently were not even of Jewish origin, but even if they were, such statements would be unfounded. But the problem far transcends this issue. I was most shocked by the fact that this issue arose precisely on 20 August, on St. Stephen's Day, when we celebrate the spirit of a thousand years of Hungarian statehood, the essence of which is that Hungary does not exclude, but receives people.

[Jasz] Returning to the party, don't you see a threat that the MDF is embarking on the path of the Smallholders?

[Bethlen] Not at all. I am constantly travelling throughout the country, even to the smallest villages, and I find that 95 percent of the membership regards itself as belonging to both the national-populist trend and the national liberal trend based on the most beautiful Hungarian traditions, and on modern Christian democratic foundations. So much so, that this alleged dispute among factions is a problem that does not exist in broad segments of the MDF membership.

[Jasz] Nevertheless, this is a duel between the liberals and Csurka....

[Bethlen] I have very much in common with the national liberal traditions. My great-great grandfather, Miklos Wesselenyi, was quoted recently by national liberals, who, in my view, do not interpret these ideals appropriately. Wesselenyi called for tolerance. Well, those who use his words were the ones who said things about Csurka's writing which I cannot accept either. One cannot refer to national liberalism, to tolerance first, then go on and make a totally inappropriate condemnation of a writing, even though that writing had an awful lot of mistakes and was published at the worst possible time. As I stated to Jewish organizations that invited me, I am not willing to discover national socialist ideals in Istvan Csurka's mind. And one other thing, we have

become familiar with this automatic reaction during the past 45 years. Whoever stands next to Istvan Csurka for whatever reason, is automatically recognized as a national socialist or a fascist sympathizer. Let's not start this again.

[Jasz] Once again it's Wednesday, what is going to be the mood at tonight's presidium session?

[Bethlen] The mood is going to be very good. I must say that even at the last meeting I once again felt like in the first half of 1990, when it was a joy to participate in the MDF presidium meetings. Not only the MDF remains a unified force, but the MDF presidium also takes actions as a united body. Irrespective of the difficulty of the topics discussed, regardless of how tough those debates were, they were open and looking forward.

Charges Against MDF Ethics Committee Discussed

93CH0131A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian
27 Oct 92 p 13

[Interview with Istvan Elek, Hungarian Democratic Forum National Assembly representative, and Gyorgy Szabad by Gabriella Lantos; place and date not given: "Forum for Obsessions or Limits for Ethics; To Whom Will the MDF Belong? Either He, or We"]

[Text] *It has been reported that 43 MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] representatives have signed a protest statement expressing disagreement with the way the party punished Jozsef Debrecezeni, Istvan Csurka's adversary. The statement mentions a grave confusion on part of the MDF ethics committee concerning its role. This appears to be proven by the fact that soon after issuing the statement, another delinquent representative was called to face his accusers: Istvan Elek, who openly attacked Csurka. A new development in these events is that the signatories of the statement include certain politicians who do not regard themselves as the party's liberals. One such representative is Gyorgy Szabad, the president of the National Assembly. Gabriella Lantos asked him and Representative Istvan Elek to grant an interview.*

[Lantos] It seems that the ethics committee has exceeded its authority, and you have been saying the same. Instead of examining issues of ethics, the committee has intervened in a political dispute. It thus took the side of Istvan Csurka. This intervention, on the other hand, amounts to a political statement.

[Elek] Yes, that's it. But I must add that unfortunately, the rules of ethics give ground for errors like this. It is a miracle that similar things have not happened before. In the ethics committee a few people are entrusted to make judgments regarding the borderline between political and ethical questions.

[Lantos] To what extent does this body represent the likings, the views of MDF members?

[Elek] It expresses the mood and the sentiments of a majority of the MDF members. This can be seen from letters received by both MAGYAR FORUM and us. There is no doubt that from an emotional standpoint, a majority of the MDF membership stands behind Istvan Csurka today.

[Lantos] Why has there been no firm statement made since 20 August in the MDF by those who disagree with Istvan Csurka?

[Elek] I have been saying this for weeks: we should speak clearly, if we seriously believe that we must indeed convince the MDF membership that only sober, rational politics can lead to success, and not the kind of politics represented by Istvan Csurka. Caution, the dreading of conflicts could explain the lack of such statements.

[Lantos] Could this be explained by the fact that they, as well as your group clearly recognize that in this party the Csurka kind of voices are louder, and that there would only be a small chance for you to succeed?

[Elek] I do not think so, because even if they recognized this, they would be working against themselves. I tend to believe that a certain psychosis has evolved within the MDF, the consequence of which is a belief that anyone who criticizes those who pursue political discourse within the MDF are "playing into the hands of the opposition," or "divide the MDF membership." For a long time we have underestimated, they are underestimating the effects of Istvan Csurka and of this political style. The balance must be drawn, and therefore I say that they have pursued the wrong kind of politics, we have conducted the wrong kind of political discourse.

[Lantos] But the point is that for quite some time, the issue had not been the political style, but a rather tough power struggle which has at stake the question of to whom the MDF belongs....

[Elek] Of course, and I have clearly said so in my MAGYAR NEMZET article: Having seen Istvan Csurka's determination and commitment, I see no solution but to make clear that it is either him or us. I cannot imagine a situation in which he, with his obsessions, could play a role in the MDF's leading body.

[Lantos] Is it conceivable for a person to remain for a long time in a party in which such obsessions emerge, even if these obsessions are not harbored by the leading political body, but only by a member of the leadership?

[Elek] I believe that at this time it would be sufficient to prevent Istvan Csurka from becoming a member of the leadership body. But he could even be excluded based on what the bylaws, the party's program and the rules of ethics state. An ethics investigation against him could be initiated by someone. But we did not feel that this would serve a purpose.

[Lantos] I am afraid that as presently composed, the ethics committee would not exclude Istvan Csurka from the party for an ethics violation.

[Elek] Yes, this is undoubtedly true.

[Lantos] Could the present, 43-member group of protesters become the core of an action that results in a firm position taken against Istvan Csurka?

[Elek] We have been talking about this for weeks. These politicians, ministers, state secretaries, and National Assembly representatives are held in high regard by the MDF membership. They could have some effect on the MDF membership if they conveyed the same, firm critique of Csurka's politics that had already been expressed to insiders so many times. Therefore, we should have no other program prior to the national congress than to convince the MDF membership of the validity of our concepts.

[Lantos] Is it conceivable for you to quit the party if you lose, and turn into some kind of political factor that has a chance to prevail? After all, from the standpoint of MDF members, Csurka's political style and method is the one they espouse.

[Elek] I doubt that one could pin hopes to quitting the party and forming a new party in the near future. The existing parties have the great advantage of having their infrastructure, and these parties obtain publicity. They have acquired, and are still acquiring such advantages, and outside forces find it hard to compete with these.

[Lantos] Accordingly, your group would not be able to quit?

[Elek] I did not say that, because our tolerance has a limit and the MDF, too, has some kind of limit. It's a collective party, a people's party, all right, but this does not mean that it must encompass the full spectrum of Hungarian political thought.

[Lantos] How should we interpret the fact that your name is among the signatories to the statement?

[Szabad] My first comment is this: I made a statement not as a member of a certain group, but as a member of the MDF. My second comment is this: I am convinced that the MDF is strong enough to settle internal disputes through actions other than disciplinary action. Organizations that function within the MDF are trying to harmonize their own operations with the prevailing rules. One could also view this in different ways, of course. This is why I have written a note above my signature conveying my feeling that this determination could be subject to appeal.

MDF Liberal Elek on Jan Congress Prospects

93CH0149A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 16 Nov 92 p 4

[Interview with Istvan Elek, Hungarian Democratic Forum National Assembly representative, by Janos L. Laszlo; place and date not given: "Istvan Elek: The Party Elite Has Spoken With a Delay"]

[Text] *"They should move toward the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] center, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall suggested to representatives of the Liberal Forum Foundation at their weekend meeting. Is there such a center at all?" we asked Istvan Elek, one of the well-known liberal personalities.*

[Elek] Yes, there is such a center, but we are not the only ones who must accept Jozsef Antall's advice in order to make that center truly visible. Politicians belonging to the political elite of the MDF should also pay attention to what we have to say, and in this regard we have been asking them for quite some time to state their positions in more definite and clear terms. Antall criticized us for agreeing to the definition liberals as suggested by Istvan Csurka and his followers. The image created by this definition conveyed the sense that only a few people cast out to the peripheries of the MDF were liberals, and that one should simply get rid of these to resolve the problems. The prime minister also disapproved of the tactic we used to react: manifesting an attitude as if we were offended outcasts. Antall believes that we should act with the proud knowledge that we are an integral part of the party, a fundamental component of the party representing an ideal.

Although this makes sense, the rest of them should also provide more clear signs regarding the common denominator we could jointly represent. We have gotten this far because the image of the MDF has evolved into that of a party ruled by extremes because too many people have failed for too long to speak up even in defense of our basic standards.

[Janos] At the conference, the party chairman distanced himself more firmly than before from Csurka's views. The question is, whether this has come too late?

[Elek] We will really find out whether it was too late only at the January congress. The prime minister's statement might have come too late if the new national leadership of the MDF does not include representatives of the national liberals and the Christian democrats, and if the balance shifts in the direction of Istvan Csurka and his fellow politicians. I, too, sense that the tone of voice being used is becoming more forceful, but I regard the letter from the ambassador to Washington, as well as statements by Sandor K. Keresztes, Tamas Katona, and Geza Jeszenszky, in which they clarified how the related to Csurka's frame of mind, as just as important.

[Janos] What are you going to do if as a result of the national congress you lose every leadership position?

[Elek] We must react individually or as a group, if the trend whose hallmark is Csurka prevails in the MDF. I am afraid that each of us will provide different answers. Some of us could say that they had enough of politics and retreat to their normal occupation. We might witness the rise of an organization within the MDF with a character better defined than before. Yet another theoretical possibility would be for some to quit, or to change seats and

move to other parties in parliament. This trend appearing as a separate party has the least chance.

[Janos] What would you have to do to come closer to the center if you were to accept the prime minister's suggestion?

[Elek] We knew before that we could not have long-term opportunities unless we gave clear and practical answers to problems that preoccupy the membership. Our weekend conference was also designed to prove that behind the disputes over daily political issues we also have a relatively coherent idea about the past three years, and thus also about the direction we should henceforth be taking.

[Janos] The fact that Imre Furmann, Tibor Balazsi, and Mile Lajos felt obligated to quit the Miskolc organization of the MDF does not give rise to much optimism.

[Elek] If I find myself in an atmosphere like that, I, too might take my hat and say that I've had enough of it. It is hard to bear a situation in which not a single person in that group rejects the unfair accusations leveled against the liberals—claims that liberals are "paid agents."

[Janos] According to information received earlier, you must face the ethics committee on 20 November. What are you doing to prepare yourself for the hearing?

[Elek] I have not received official notice of the ethics committee's desire to deal with my person. And I heard only rumors about dropping from the agenda the proceedings initiated against me and Istvan Csurka, on grounds that the committee felt that disputes of a political nature, as shown by documents submitted, did not require an inquiry into ethics.

[Janos] What do you think of the report according to which Gyozo Kisteleki, the chairman of the MDF's ethics and disciplinary committee has served a one year prison sentence for a fatal drunk driving accident?

[Elek] It came to me as great surprise. Surely, no favorable light is shed on the party if the background of its ethics committee chairman includes an accident like that.

Text of Antall Letter to Goncz on Media Chiefs

93CH0175A Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian
13 Nov 92 p 4

[Letter dated 6 November 1992 to accompany a formal proposal for the dismissal of Hungarian Radio President Csaba Gombar and Hungarian Television President Elemer Hankiss, from Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President of the Republic Arpad Goncz: "Let Us Put an End to the Untenable Situation"]

[Text] *Our prime minister's 6 November letter to the president of the Republic is a significant step in the ongoing media war. This writing is of documentary value and expands on Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's position*

regarding the media war, beyond the contents of the formal proposal submitted. This is why we present the unabridged text of the letter.

Dear Mr. President!

Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 1 Section (1) of Law No. 57 of 1990 concerning the order of appointing the heads of public service media (Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, Hungarian News Agency), I submitted to you today a proposal to relieve of their duties Hungarian Radio President Dr. Csaba Gombar and Hungarian Television President Dr. Elemer Hankiss, and to appoint Sandor Sara as vice president of the Hungarian Television, and further, to authorize Mr. Sandor Sara, as duly appointed vice president of the Hungarian Television, to temporarily act as president of the Hungarian Television.

Mr. President, permit me to state my position regarding this issue by expanding beyond the contents of the formal, official submission.

Mr. President, as I already informed you of my views in a letter dated 3 November, personnel action at the two media cannot be delayed further because of the situation that evolved at the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television, the urgent need to provide nonpartisan information, and due to the government's need to exercise its supervisory authority. It is my firm belief that the lack of results produced by six-party negotiations that had begun based on our 29 September agreement, and had ended on 27 October, could be clearly attributed to the conduct of the opposition, and to its unwillingness to compromise.

In my judgment, persons participating in the political negotiations on behalf of the coalition and the government did everything they could to successfully conclude the negotiations. The fact that the government abstained from taking any action that could have endangered the negotiations between 29 September and 27 October 1992, was also supposed to contribute to the successful conclusion of negotiations. In the end, however, the lack of results produced by political mediation made it necessary for me to initiate action with respect to personnel issues at the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television, based on the government's responsibility that flows from its supervisory authority, and consistent with legal provisions in force as well as with applicable rulings proclaimed by the Constitutional Court.

Once again, I would like to call your attention to the following, Mr. President, when judging my proposal.

In the course of a year the Constitutional Court has dealt with the power of the President of the Republic to appoint and to dismiss officials in three decisions (No. 48 of 26 September 1991; No. 8 of 30 January 1992; and No. 36 of 19 June 1992). Even the President of the Constitutional Court states that these decisions define clearly, and with a mandatory force, the constitutional

conditions and limitations for the exercise of the appointing power and of the power to dismiss officials, as follows:

When exercising his constitutional power to appoint or to dismiss officials, the President of the Republic must examine proposed personnel issues from a procedural standpoint, and may examine such proposals from a substantive standpoint. According to the Constitutional Court decision, the constitutional exercise of this power does not permit an expansive interpretation of the related conditions. The president of the Republic must not establish additional criteria beyond the requirement of meeting the legal preconditions applicable to appointments and dismissals.

Law No. 57 of 1990 concerning the order of appointing the heads of media establishes as the legal condition for appointing or dismissing such persons that a hearing be held by the National Assembly committee having jurisdiction. It flows from this requirement that in examining whether legal conditions for appointment or dismissal prevail, a single, factual finding must be made as to whether or not the committee has held a hearing. In other words, an appointment or dismissal must not be conditioned by the extent or ratio of committee support a person proposed to be appointed or discharged enjoys. Accordingly, the President is not at all bound by the position taken by the committee, moreover, in weighing the issues prior to decisionmaking, committee support must only be taken into consideration if the law expressly so requires.

I am informing you, Mr. President, that the persons I recommend to be dismissed and appointed have, at my request, been heard by the National Assembly Committee on Culture, Science, Higher Education, the Television, the Radio and the Press, at that committee's 5 November 1992 meeting, pursuant to the provisions of Law No. 57 of 1990. (I am enclosing the related official report issued and signed by the chairman of the committee.) As a result of this hearing the legally established precondition for dismissal and appointment has been met.

Regarding the above, I note that due to opposition conduct frustrating the negotiations that lasted until 27 October, and in light of the previously cited Constitutional Court decision, our agreement of 29 September, which had as its goal the achievement of a negotiated two-thirds majority support, has, by now, lost its meaning. As I indicated upon reaching the agreement, requiring a two-thirds majority support by the National Assembly committee exceeded the necessary minimum ratio of votes generally required for committee approval, nevertheless in this case I agreed to the higher ratio, strictly as an exception applicable to a onetime political agreement, and only in order to resolve this issue. I also indicated that this solution should not be used as a precedent in the future.

Based on the Constitutional Court decision, the president of the Republic may also examine substantive issues concerning personnel actions, if the legal criteria for appointment or dismissal have been met. The president of the Republic may reject an appointment if he has substantial ground to believe that making the proposed appointment would gravely disturb the democratic functioning of the state organization. Insofar as grave danger is concerned, the president of the Republic may review only the personal aspects of a nomination, in other words, his rejection can only be based on the choice of the person nominated. Examining the utility, the timeliness, the entitlements linked to the position to be filled, and related issues are outside the scope of presidential power. Deciding these issues is within the exclusive authority of the person making the nomination, and the person who countersigns the fulfillment of the proposed nomination, because he holds political responsibility for the person proposed to be appointed. The president of the Republic may determine that the democratic functioning of the state is gravely endangered, if he has substantial ground to believe that as a result of the proposed appointment the organ affected by the appointment would become incapable of performing its basic functions. Even in such cases the president of the Republic can reject an appointment only if there is substantial ground to believe that the threat specified by the president of the Republic is expected to materialize, if such threat cannot be mitigated otherwise, and if the grave disturbance indicated presents an imminent and direct threat.

As shown in the proposal, I recommend the appointment of Sandor Sara—an internationally recognized cinematographer and director—as vice president of the Hungarian Television. The fitness of Sara Sandor to hold this position is also indicated by the fact that at the hearing a 64-percent majority of the committee having jurisdiction supported his nomination—although I must, once again, call attention to the fact that the extent of committee support is not a legal criterion for appointment. This ratio nevertheless indicates that within the committee, ruling party representatives are not alone in believing that Mr. Sara is fit to serve in this position.

The Constitutional Court rulings also define constitutional criteria for the exercise of presidential powers regarding dismissals. According to these decisions, the president of the Republic must not review the dismissal itself, but only the issue of succession that arises as a result of a dismissal. Accordingly, the president of the Republic can refuse to sign a dismissal only if the function of the dismissed person would be performed without the president of the Republic exercising his appointing power, i.e., automatically, by a person (e.g., the dismissed person's deputy), whose appointment the president of the Republic could reject consistent with the constitution, based on rules applicable to appointments. The president of the Republic must support his refusal to dismiss a person by presenting facts. These facts should reveal whether there were substantial and unavoidable

grounds to believe that an imminent and direct threat was presented by the person of the deputy, a threat of incapacitating the given organ in perform its basic functions. The justification for the refusal must state the facts that serve as its basis in sufficient detail to enable National Assembly representatives to make a well founded decision in each case whether to initiate a Constitutional Court proceeding to hold to account the president of the Republic.

I am informing you, Mr. President, that as a result of dismissing the president of the Hungarian Radio, the Hungarian Radio would have only one executive who had been appointed by the president of the Republic pursuant to Law No. 57 of 1990: Dr. Laszlo Csucs. Based on the provisions of that law, he would be supposed to temporarily perform the president's duties.

As a result of dismissing the president of the Hungarian Television, and appointing the new vice president, two vice presidents—both legally appointed by you—would be heading the Hungarian Television. For this reason, until a new president is appointed, it is necessary to temporarily assign the functions of the president to one of the vice presidents. My second proposal serves this purpose, according to which Sandor Sara, the vice president of the Hungarian Television, would be assigned to temporarily perform the duties of the president.

In both instances, this situation would prevail only until the appointment of new presidents to head the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television, to be made parliament adopts the legislative proposal on the radio and the television. As indicated in my 3 November letter, the two vice presidents, acting as presidents, would ensure the appropriate functioning of, and consolidation within the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television. I envision their authorities as having a "managing" character, i.e., they would not be authorized to make organizational or personnel changes having a potential of incapacitating the two media in performing their basic functions.

Respected Mr. President! Aside from proposing personnel changes, the government has done everything in the past, and will continue to do so in the future to have the National Assembly adopt the legislative proposal on the radio and the television by the 30 November 1992 deadline established by the Constitutional Court. In order to resolve this issue as soon as possible, I did not, at this time, nominate new presidents, but instead agree to make appointments for presidents only after the adoption of the media law, and by taking into consideration the views of the opposition.

In contrast, should the present leaders of the public service media remain in office, the government would not be able to accept responsibility to provide the supervision required by law presently in force. Under present budgetary conditions, the uncontrolled utilization of public funds presents a particular concern, and prompts additional considerations. It is possible that

different approaches must also be sought in this regard. These issues must be acted on, because they also have an impact on the 1993 budget.

I request you, Mr. President, to judge my recommendations regarding personnel changes by taking into consideration the statements contained in this letter, and to also do everything possible to settle the media issue, to have the media law adopted as soon as possible, so as to put an end to the untenable situation caused by the media problem throughout the country, and to the undesirable constitutional and political situation that exists.

TV Battle: 'Panorama' Editor Wins First Round

93CH0180A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 21 Nov 92 p 4

[Interview with Alajos Chrudinak, editor of Hungarian Television's "Panorama" program, by "szitan"; place and date not given: "Chrudinak Wins First Round"]

[Text] *Proceeding in the first instance, the Budapest Labor Affairs Court yesterday voided and declared illegal Hungarian Television President Elemer Hankiss' decision to relieve Alajos Chrudinak from his duties as head of TV editors for the program "Panorama."*

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Are you going to enter your room in the editorial office tomorrow and occupy your chair?

[Chrudinak] Of course.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] But someone is already sitting there!

[Chrudinak] This is not true, because my successor and three of his associates who agreed to perform the functions assigned to them by the TV president work in a different room. Let me explain; of my 45 member editorial staff only seven were disloyal. Two of these are retired. Hankiss wanted me to kick them out before, but I did not comply with his request. The rest of my colleagues stood up for me. Thus they have failed to disintegrate our community both in an intellectual and a physical sense.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] So then, are you going to continue your work tomorrow as if nothing had happened?

[Chrudinak] I was already in there at noon today and held an editors' meeting, and we will repeat the same on Monday. We continue to work. The effect of all that had happened in the recent past was that two "Panorama" programs were not prepared under my supervision. Everyone knows that the president did not kick me out, he merely transferred me and made an attempt to "steal" from me, and to assign to others the program I managed. To accomplish this he appointed someone to take my place, but that person withdrew. Thereafter he issued a competitive announcement to fill the position, but only

one person applied; he did not recognize that he was assisting in a series of illegal actions.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Were you certain that the court would rule in your favor?

[Chrudinak] We cannot be certain of anything in today's world. Various dilatory tactics could have delayed the ruling for a long time, but this was not the case. Incidentally, Elemer Hankiss did not appear in court. His lawyer told me that he had learned of having to defend the television president's decision only the night before the hearing. He did not know what to say. In the end he walked up to me and expressed his congratulations.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] One way or another, tomorrow you must meet the other party to the suit. Isn't this unpleasant from your standpoint?

[Chrudinak] From my standpoint? Why don't you ask this question from the one who reneged on his own promise and acted contrary to the will of the entire editorial staff, moreover, in an illegal fashion?

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] I think you'll agree if I say that the battle is not over.

[Chrudinak] I agree, it's not over, because Elemer Hankiss is able to do whatever he wants to do in the situation he is today. His decisions cannot be overruled by anyone at the television, nor could anyone comment in some form regarding his decisions. He can suspend, or kick out anyone. We are helpless! I have no idea who is going to restore the original conditions.

Deadline For Media Law Unmet; Battle Continues

Talks Break Off

93CH0181A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
28 Nov 92 pp 1,4

[Unattributed article: "A State of War Again on the Media Front; Tamas Katona Says That Forcible Methods Only Aggravate the Situation"]

[Text] *Since yesterday, there has been a state of war again on the media front. After negotiations broke off, correspondence between the president and the prime minister resumed. It is a realistic danger in this situation that the MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] radical wing and those who employ spectacular actions to "appease" this faction may urge administrative measures against the two presidents to enable the prime minister to relieve them of their office. Tamas Katona made a hint to our correspondent that the possibility that the government will use its employer's rights is not to be excluded. And, because the media law will not be legislated by the specified deadline of 30 November, the process regarding the 1974 resolution by the Council of Ministers on ordering government supervision of the media will be put on the Constitutional Court's agenda again.*

The previous events are familiar: on 29 September, the president and the prime minister struck a political agreement that they will look for persons qualified to head these two institutions; that they will make their recommendations to Parliament's Cultural Committee which will in turn decide by a two-thirds majority vote on the candidates' qualifications; and that, subsequently, Hankiss and Gombar will be removed from office and one president and two vice presidents each will be appointed.

The agreement included compromises on the part of both parties: Goncz gave up the prerequisite of passing the media law, and Antall gave up his right as sole appointer, i.e., agreed to the necessity of a two-thirds majority vote.

However, following the negotiations by party factions that unsuccessfully ended on 27 October, the prime minister rescinded the 29 September compromise because, in his assessment, the opposition had abandoned him. And now, according to indications, he very much wants the changes in personnel, so much desired by the administration, to be implemented even before the legislation of the media law. He has two reasons for this. One is that he can decisively stand against his party's radicals only by being able to say good-bye to the media presidents who are under ferocious attack. In this way he could prove that he can accomplish things even with a "more moderate" policy.

On the other hand, the prime minister does not want to wait for the legislation of the media law that has been delayed for so long. Government circles feel that, because of the compromises, they might be at a disadvantage after the law goes into effect in the appointment of the media chiefs. Incidentally, the peculiarity of the situation is indicated by the fact that even the most absurd ideas for solving the media issue have followers in political circles.

It is being said, for instance, that media functions should be distributed on the basis of parity: the government "supplying" the TV president, and the opposition supplying the vice presidents, with reversed roles in connection with radio. It seems that the affair's "standstill" is driving the fantasy of those who are thinking of a solution toward irrationality.

Unlike Antall, Arpad Goncz holds that their agreement cannot be considered void. Furthermore, that the administration is trying to create a nonexistent office by appointing an acting vice president, and that is unconstitutional and dangerous.

Although the prime minister made a promise to limit the authority of the acting vice president, the other vice presidents, who are independent from the latter, can do anything—they can fire people, they can introduce new rules—because their activity can only be controlled by an actually appointed president. (The source of the lack of

confidence might be the "entrance" of Gabor Nahlik, the earlier appointed vice president, who began his zealous work in Hankiss' absence.)

In his letter addressed to Jozsef Antall, the president clearly states that he understands the prime minister's difficulties in his party, but he is willing to approve any changes in radio and TV management only through constitutional procedures.

Gonczi-Antall Exchange

93CH0181B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
28 Nov 92 p 4

[Letter from President Arpad Goncz to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall; statement issued in response by the prime minister's press office: "Exchange of Letter Between Goncz and Antall"]

[Text] *On Thursday evening, the president's spokesperson provided information to journalists in connection with the continuation of negotiations on the media affair between the head of state and the head of government. On Friday morning, the president's press office forwarded to MTI Arpad Goncz's letter to Jozsef Antall that dealt with the media affair, and then, in the afternoon, the Press Office of the Prime Minister published the reply to that letter. In the following, we present the two letters in chronological order.*

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge with regret that our conciliatory talks, which lasted several days and which were initiated by you, have broken off. I am confident that our heretofore manifested mutual willingness to compromise will enable us to bridge this critical point.

I continue to consider the possibility of appointing, at your request, the new presidents of Hungarian radio and Hungarian television before the legislation of the media law if that would be supported by two-thirds of the Cultural Committee. I am ready, even immediately, to select, together with you, the persons whom you think are appropriate and whom I think are qualified, from among the persons whom we have already partially agreed upon.

The uninterrupted operation of the media could be maintained and the change of personnel could be carried out by having a responsible president handing over the job to another responsible president. In the absence of regulations regarding organization and operation which could be applied to the present situation, there is no alternative that is legally satisfactory.

The alternatives offered by you—e.g., the partially limited managerial rights of a vice president who would substitute for the president—have no legal basis and may hinder the subsequent definition of the president's responsibilities.

In closing, I would like to state that, although I take seriously the tensions in our political life, I have absolutely no right, no means and no intention of influencing the internal affairs of the MDF or any other political party.

With greetings,
Arpad Goncz

*

The following is a release by the Press Office of the Prime Minister:

On behalf of the president and without the prime minister's knowledge and without any basis, the president's spokesperson issued a statement on 26 November 1992 that the two parties' positions in the media issue have come closer to reconciliation. The prime minister immediately informed the president of this inaccurate statement.

Regretfully, the political talks came to an unsuccessful end on 27 November. A solution to the issue can only be brought about in accordance with the Constitution and the statutes that are in effect. In view of my repeated attempts, my proposals for a compromise, as well as the experiences of the past period, no political reconciliation or true results can be expected from these negotiations despite the president's indicated willingness to talk.

The statement in the president's 27 November letter of disapproval that "The partially limited managerial rights of a vice president who would substitute for the president have no legal basis and may hinder the subsequent definition of the president's responsibilities" is untrue, for the provisions of government resolution 1047/1974 (IX.18.) can serve as the legal basis for this.

The president agrees that his decision cannot be influenced by the internal affairs of a single political party and that he can act only in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes. Obviously, this was also reflected by the Constitutional Court's hitherto manifested standpoints.

Therefore, in accordance with the conditions that have been constitutionally and legally clarified and have been determined by the Constitutional Court, the prime minister awaits the president's reply to his recommendation to relieve the presidents of Hungarian radio and Hungarian television and to appoint a vice president for TV.

Katona Urges Solution

93CH0181C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
28 Nov 92 p 4

[Report by J.Z.G., including interview with Tamas Katona, political state secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister; in Budapest on 27 November 1992: "Katona Says That the Situation Is Not Constitutional"]

[Text] Tamas Katona, political state secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister, was a guest yesterday of the Gyorgy Balint School of Journalism of MUOSZ [National Association of Hungarian Journalists]. Following his presentation, he talked with KURIR and NEPSZABADSAG correspondents.

In Katona's assumption, the disagreement between the prime minister and the president regarding personal issues lessened during their talks regarding the media affair in terms of both the candidates for the presidential positions and the condition that the appointment of the acting vice presidents be followed by legislation and that the latter be followed by the permanent appointment of the presidents and vice presidents. Regarding the latter, it must be determined what rights the acting vice president will and will not have. Katona said that this is the area in which rapprochement is most likely.

Katona said that the second question is, where can those champions of masochism be found who would be, despite what has happened, willing to be president or vice president of Radio and Television. In case an agreement can be made, the frozen monies can also be released. Forcible methods could only aggravate the situation, said Katona. He did not exclude the possibility that the situation will become worse in the wake of discontinued negotiations. "Is it true that legal action against the media presidents is being urged?" we asked Katona. He said that he is unaware of any such action but if there is a reason for prosecution, then we must act regardless of extreme opinions.

Tamas Katona mentioned during his presentation that Laszlo Ribanszky's nomination for the position of president was merely a test to see how the opposition would react to an outside person who is not compromised by either side. Katona was disappointed, however, because absolutely no reaction came from the opposition.

Katona stated that they do not consider the present situation constitutional. He does not believe, however, that it came up during the negotiations that, as a last step, the government might exercise its employer's right and suspend the two presidents—if for no other reason, then probably because Arpad Goncz knows that too. In Katona's opinion, that would not be a desirable action, and both parties are aware of the limits of its application. He emphasized that the administration believes in a constitutional solution.

Deadline Expected To Pass

93CH0181D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
28 Nov 92 p 4

[MTI report]

[Text] Parliament will not be able to pass the media law by 30 November, the date specified by the Constitutional Court. For this reason, the Constitutional Court—in accordance with its decision which was made public on 8 June—will continue the process regarding the 1974

resolution by the Council of Ministers on ordering government supervision of the media, putting it on its December agenda. Andras Hollo stressed that, the Constitutional Court stated in its decision on the issue that the 1974 resolution was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court has put Parliament under an obligation to rectify this unconstitutionality and to legislate laws that would hinder monopolies in the information industry. As a condition for the constitutional operation of Radio and Television, laws must be passed so that no state organization nor any individual social group can have a significant influence on public radio and television. The Constitutional Court has set a deadline for the legislation of a new media law, and will suspend its process until then. Since Parliament will not legislate that law by the deadline, the Constitutional Court will continue its process of determining the date of voiding the unconstitutional resolution, said Dr. Andras Hollo. (MTI)

MDF Representative on Olah, Nemeth Press Buildup

93CH0156A Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 6 Nov 92 p 3

[Hungarian Democratic Forum Representative Zoltan Speidl's Column "Parliamentary Corridor"]

[Text] Sandor Olah has indeed created an impact. As we know, this Smallholder representative had called upon Interior Minister Peter Boross to make an elegant gesture and hand in his resignation for permitting the 23 October events to take place. Olah argued that Boross should do so only for the sake of making an elegant gesture, because the prime minister would not accept his resignation anyway. Everything would remain the same. Antall would remain prime minister, and Boross the interior minister.

As always, Sandor Olah himself was elegant: suit, necktie, a freshly shaven face, and a trimmed mustache. He was not rough in this instance either; far be it from him to hurt the prime minister. To the contrary, Olah wanted to create the appearance that he was protecting the prime minister, even though rumors have been floating around for quite some time that he really did not like Jozsef Antall. Therefore he experimented with a twist and thrust—I could call it a kick in the side—he intended to kick Antall by lifting his leg toward Boross. And when the kicking was over he recovered from the fatigue created by the physical movement, by eating dinner with the greatest figure of the Hungarian opposition: Jozsef Torgyan.

The charming feature in Sandor Olah's political elegance is that while aiming his thunder at the interior minister, he made reference to a great person: Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. The only thing he forgot was that we were no longer living in the days following the bloody events of Ujvidek [Novi Sad], and that thank God, Marton Zoldi Grassy and Feketealmy Czeydner had already received the punishment they deserved. And further, despite the

fact that some people have envisioned the revival of those events and persons, there is no indication to that effect.

Why did Sandor Olah decide to deliver his oratory so highly valued by the opposition? Two explanations present themselves: first, as this can also be seen from the reference to Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the predecessor who had died a martyr's death, Olah played a role only. Olah pretended to do something that would enter his name in the annals of history: Sandor Olah, who in the days of Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was only a fledgling politician, who has certainly seen the greatest of Smallholders, and whose political career could understandably not evolve during the past 40 years. So, as the small nephew of the great Bajcsy-Zsilinszky he could become a seer; he could transubstantiate himself into a lonely hero, and could be accorded at least a new paragraph in future history books.

People are gullible, people are vain. Smallholder Olah, too, is only a human being, and thus one could rank the above happenings as no more than a venial sin.

But there could also be another explanation. Sandor Olah, who so far has given proof of both his outstanding oratorical talent and flexible spine, has now bowed to the opposition so deep that his palms reached the ground way ahead of his shoes, and with a degree of flexibility that belied his age. He took a bow in order to celebrate with Torgyan thereafter. To Torgyan, who is not being invited to opposition parlors by boys of good taste because they can sense on him the smell of Mateszalka, and because hanging judge Tutsek's name is not a good letter of recommendation, but who has been regarded as one of their own for a long time, even if not all the opposition lets him talk in parliament, this is only a game.

Although it is true that Torgyan cannot be admitted to the parlors, he, too, is set against Antall. And then there is the old principle: The enemy of my enemy could also be my friend. We are well advised to watch Sandor Olah. Not only his spine is flexible, his nose, too, is sensitive. He might be chasing the flowery smell of power blown by the wind from the Left. And as we very well know, Torgyan wants to buy representatives for money nowadays, and for the promise of winning a seat in the next parliament.

Another person well worth watching is Miklos Nemeth, who lives in London these days as a banking vice president. He has removed himself from Hungarian domestic politics (almost certainly he has been removed), and now we hear that he is preparing to play another political role. A favorable image has been created for him, public opinion polls have been conducted, and he has been found to be popular. They spared him from the Hungarian mudslinging, they retained him as a well-combed, elegant man with a boyish charm, who had managed to go through these times without having as much as a speck of dust on his shoes. A man of whom

they suggest that once he opens his mouth, those who have governed since 1990 could take a long look.

Rumors have it that there is going to be a second Miklos Nemeth government someday. There will be a foreign minister called Gyula Horn, and that Bekesi will be in charge of money. The idea enjoys support and "immaculate" people like Miklos Nemeth, the son of peasants who once served as an altar boy, could, indeed, have followers.

But indications are that some people are opposed to this idea. These are socialists who jerk their heads upon hearing this. They ask: Why couldn't they become the prime minister? Matyas Szuros is said to be one of these. I do not know how much of this is true. But I know that enough is being said in the parliamentary corridor about attacks on Matyas Szuros within the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], and traces of this can also be seen in newspapers. Sometimes because he did not deny his populist roots, at other times because he has not stood up wholeheartedly in support of Arpad Goncz.

MDF Liberal Elek on Party's Prospects, Media

93CH0112A Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian
Nov 92 pp 12-15

[Interview with Istvan Elek, National Assembly representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Gyoze Matyas; place and date not given: "Patience, Fairness, Common Sense"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Matyas] As long as you mentioned that Csurka's ideals were well-suited to develop within our intellectual lives a certain sense of being threatened, let me venture to say that this trend could represent a far more serious threat to all of us, should Csurka take power. That threat would materialize in the form of an inability to preserve the country's peace, and in possible conflicts with neighboring countries.

[Elek] There is no serious threat of this kind. This way of thinking, these obsessions are not supported by either the representative faction or the members of the cabinet, they do not enjoy the kind of support that would make the threat you are talking about realistic. The only problem we have is this: What is going to happen to the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] in 1994?

[Matyas] Indeed, what is going to happen to the MDF? In one of his studies Jozsef Debrecezeni predicted that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] would receive 4 percent of the votes in the elections. His prediction is soon going to apply to the MDF, if the present trend continues.

[Elek] The MDF has a chance to win the 1994 elections if the center, and those regarded as national liberals, are able to create a clear situation, if the politics of the next year and a half evolve according to their concepts, and if the MDF follows its program and makes some rather

serious changes in style. If these things do not take place, the group called national liberals will drift away and break off as I mentioned before, the center most certainly will split into two parts because without the national liberals, an overwhelming majority of persons regarded as centrists will be unable to conduct political discourse along with Csurka's line, and at that point the MDF may be turned into a small right-wing party, it may be joined by clubs and all kinds of social organizations that have evolved, and the party may be able to represent the radical Right and run in the elections to win 10 percent of the votes, provided that circumstances evolve that way and social tensions increase.

[Matyas] Jozsef Antall will play a decisive role in the way events unfold. It is my personal view that the prime minister's so-called distancing himself from Csurka's views was not convincing enough. I am unable to accept the idea that even in the present situation he regards the national liberals and Csurka's right wing as equally acceptable negotiating partners within the MDF.

[Elek] Yes, this is a very important problem. I, too, recognize that the fundamental issue of the coming weeks is whether politicians regarded as MDF centrists are able to persuade the prime minister to take more solid, clear-cut political positions, and whether we are able to make clear that what we see is not a dispute between the national liberal and the populist-national political trends, but a question of whether the MDF is able to remain a modern, conservative party that operates according to European standards, that integrates fundamental liberal values, alternatively, whether it becomes a right-wing, radical party. A right-wing, radical party could have a place in the Hungarian parliament, but under no circumstance could it claim to represent the political center, to jointly represent the values of the nation as well as of democracy, or assert that it is the heir to the MDF that won the previous elections.

[Matyas] Very much depends on the prime minister, in all respects. After all, ruling party demonstrations are being organized for purposes which include the prime minister's very own, and most important endeavors.

[Elek] This is where we find the basic difference between us, who took part in the negotiations, and others, who demand more firm action on the streets. We claim that we are correct, we were correct from the standpoint of constitutional law, at the same time, however, we must recognize that a constitutional structure has been given, and that our powers are certainly limited also in this regard. If we run into the wall once, we must make a choice between running into the wall two or three more times on the one hand, or accepting the fact that political solutions and the opposition's concurrence are needed on the other, i.e., that we must compromise. This is why we do not agree with the idea of going to the streets and demanding things from the government it cannot do, as long as it intends to remain democratic.

[Matyas] The paradox in all this is that Hankiss' and Gombar's lack of fitness has not been proven; the fact that political action takes place under this cover-name is another matter. But the public concludes from all that is taking place that the real goal is to increase the government's influence by appointing loyal people.

[Elek] But at one point we made these people presidents based on a consensus. What we see is a natural political step taken by one side, when the confidence needed to occupy these positions has ceased. Why would it logically follow that this is none other than an intent by the government to interfere with media affairs?

[Matyas] Neither I, nor others are able to forget the events that preceded this entire case. You or Ferenc Kulin have obviously negotiated believing that you were correct from the standpoint of constitutional law, nevertheless, viewed objectively, you helped certain endeavors prevail whose contours could be seen in Imre Konya's study or in Csurka's writings. Just think of Vice President Nahlik's restrained entry insofar as influence exerted by the government is concerned.

[Elek] My argument concerning the media case—and I've written a few articles about this—was limited to the need to at least make a distinction between the two things. Let those who criticize us say that they are not supporting the initiative, because they find the government's action unacceptable, because they disagree with the government's actions from a political standpoint. But they should not present these actions as if they were immoral, as if they would not have foundation in constitutional law, as if they were illegal, etc. Because most of the dispute, most of the criticism has to do with that. [passage omitted]

[Matyas] But then, a seemingly stunning, and therefore appropriate question arises: Actually, what is the problem with Gombar and Hankiss? The recent noise we heard had to do with entirely different things—no harm would be done by clarifying the original positions.

[Elek] Based on the appointments law we placed Hankiss and Gombar in the top positions at the media without having the full system of guarantees in the framework of which such institutions and their presidents function in normal civil democracies. In this situation we interpret the media presidents' independence differently. We thought that in this transition period, while the law was being drafted, we would have to have a much better relationship with the media presidents—and this applies not only to ruling-party representatives, but also to the Committee on Culture—and that we would necessarily have to negotiate issues, that we would have to interfere with issues—a thing we would not have to do, moreover, should be prohibited from doing under normal conditions. Ever since this issue has surfaced, opposition representatives on the Committee have tried to present all our attempts to resolve these issues as ruling party attempts to interfere with the functioning of the free and independent media. We felt that the media presidents

should follow policies that would prevent two, diametrically opposed ideological, intellectual outlooks and political trends from entering the media, and from occupying two opposite positions; instead, we felt that the media should seek out opportunities for dialogue in order to bring closer to each other the opposite views which otherwise exist in society. For a number of reasons the internal functioning of the media did not evolve this way, and among others, I must also blame the two media presidents for the situation that presented itself. The two media presidents are not alone in bearing this responsibility: The media staff has also played a very serious role in all this; these people have been manipulating the political parties from the beginning, while the political parties have manipulated them. The results speak for themselves. Whether we could realistically expect to accomplish this in the absence of the entire system of guarantees is a big question, but once we recognize a fiasco we should be able to let go the media presidents who did not succeed in reconciling this matter, and to let others come in and try doing the same, in hopes of better results.

[Matyas] I think that in the present, tense situation you, the national or conservative liberals will have to cooperate more closely with the opposition, whether you want to do so, or not. One could say that at this time practice will force you to manifest the oft-mentioned "liberal minimum." With this in mind, how do you view your relationship with the liberal opposition? What differences do you recognize in terms of emphases on values and of ideology?

[Elek] The most noticeable difference is a matter of style. Perhaps we make fewer political mistakes than the opposition in balancing the principles of patience, fairness and common sense. And this also manifests itself in style. As compared to the opposition's doctrinaire and frequently prejudiced approaches, we view the religious and national values, sentiments, and self-organizing endeavors, which had been suppressed in the past but are now in the process of resurrecting, with a greater degree of tolerance and understanding. Even if the choices of value, the tones of voice and the styles in which these appear are not ours. In general, I feel that within our group there is a greater degree of receptiveness for traditions, for the historical, national, religious, community legacy. I could say that our relationship with the nation, or approach to national problems is more emotionally based.

But the difference can also be seen in regard to essential, current political issues. For example, regarding the issue that Gusztav Molnar has elucidated in the firmest of terms, arguing with the opposition's outlook. We believe that the need for national, nationality autonomy is natural, it flows from the acceptance of basic liberal values. At the same time the SZDSZ and the opposition in general appears to be afraid of such autonomy. They feel that autonomy would directly lead to territorial demands, to a political program to change the borders.

This is why the opposition does not view kindly the natural liberal response to the national issue.

[Box, p 15]

**We, the members of
the Hungarian Democratic Forum,
the founders of the**

Liberal Forum Foundation

declare in response to unsettling organizing phenomena that increasingly turn into political endeavors that

We do not believe

that national interests can be served to the detriment of political standards that evolved in Western civil systems, of parliamentary democracy and of constitutional statehood;

to the contrary:

We believe that the cause of the Hungarian people can be promoted only and exclusively by democratic means.

We do not believe

that a kind of nationalism capable of expressing itself only in the form of collective passion to counter differences is suitable to enhance peaceful transition, to the contrary:

We believe

that nationalist feelings are, above all, personal matters just like one's relationship to God, and that only the totality of the millions of shades of difference in nationalist feelings that exist in Hungarian society is capable of making our great and practical undertakings a success.

We do not believe

that excluding from the nation, and stigmatizing as ancient enemies the political forces that oppose us is permissible in a parliamentary democracy, we do not believe that in today's Hungary the mythical forces of Good and Evil are engaged in a life and death struggle,

to the contrary:

We believe that the competing interests are fair to a smaller or a greater degree, and that various natural intellectual and moral qualities compete with each other.

We do not believe

that one should be permitted to fuel political passions based on the difficulties that necessarily accompany the system change, and due to dissatisfaction generated by injustices implicit in the nature of market economies, to the contrary:

We believe

that passions based on offenses and fears must be neutralized to the maximum extent in the course of political

discourse, because only that way is there a chance to remedy or to dispel such offenses and fears.

In due regard to recent events we find it necessary to go beyond the original scope of the foundation, and to call upon all people who accept the above political precepts and intents, and who feel a need for more activity in public life, to establish

National Liberal Circles

We ask these people to support the Foundation and to take steps to advance in a more organized fashion the linkage of liberal democracy and of national values.

The nation needs active citizens and active democrats today!

Tibor Balazsi, Jozsef Debreczeni, Istvan Elek, Imre Furmann, and Ferenc Kulin

Liberal Forum Foundation account number: Postabank and Savings Union No. 219

Flag Dedication: 'Remembrance Without Hatred'

93CH0147A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 16 Nov 92 p 4

[Report by Adrienn Demeter on speech by Erno Raffay, political state secretary in the Ministry of Defense, in Kunszentmarton on 14 November 1992: "National Flag Dedication—Remembrance Without Hatred"]

[Text] "Our national flag symbolizes Hungarian unity in spirit and soul, Erno Raffay stated in his dedication speech in Kunszentmarton, where the town's second national flag was dedicated and consecrated on Saturday morning as part of the St. Martin's Day program. The first one was erected in September 1935 but was removed after the war when no one was allowed to talk about Trianon, one of our nation's greatest tragedies.

What this flag now symbolizes is that Hungarians may begin to live again as a nation at the end of the millennium. Following Budapest's example, the erection of national flags in Hungarian towns and cities began during the 1920's. The reason for that was, Erno Raffay reminded the audience, that a large part of the country came under foreign occupation after World War I. Government policy between the two world wars tried to create Hungarian unity. Now the erection of the national flag means something else: a remembrance of the partitioning of the Hungarian nation, a remembrance of the fact that this nation of 15 million live in eight countries, but this remembrance without hatred does not mean that we are "fascists and nationalists." We do not hate other nations. We should not allow this miracle, the collapse of the world empire called communism and the chance for a new beginning for our nation, to vanish. We must distance ourselves from extremes and hatred, said Raffay in closing.

Hunger-Striking MP on Growing 'Social Crisis'

93CH0141B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 14 Nov 92 p 72

[Article by Csaba Ilkei, independent parliamentary representative: "Notes of a Hunger Striker"]

[Text] The wounds of poverty are being torn open. The ripple effect of an economic and social crisis can be felt: Two million people are living at or a little above poverty level. The gross national product is decreasing, state industry is ruined, agriculture has been demolished, the budget deficit is growing at an alarming rate, national wealth is at an ebb, and the number of the unemployed can reach 1,000,000 next year. The middle class, which could have been the basis of a modern bourgeoisie had the election promises been kept, is being decimated by a new "selection of the unfittest," and is on the down slope. The ideologized government is becoming more and more detached from life and reality, and is by now unable to conceal disastrous manifestations of failure and dissatisfaction, but yet it wants to stay in power at all cost.

Creative free spirit is on the retreat: The criteria for success are once again loyalty, alignment, and trustworthiness. They are the forces which drive the block of voters behind the government coalition. Party loyalty and faction discipline are stronger than the will of the voters. And although the conscience of some people is awakening, independent thought is dangerous: "Individualists" are sent before the ethical committee where political discussions are settled by disciplinary action. After two years, the impoverished, the ones threatened in their livelihood, turned their backs to politics in disgust and test it by their daily worries of making ends meet. They do not vote in special elections; they hate programs interwoven with selfish party interests; they hate the new aristocracy and can no longer pity it for its grave heritage, but instead blame it for the time it squandered to the detriment of the people, for its helplessness, for its confusion, for its complacency. Jozsef Antall overestimated the spiritual reserves of this tired nation. Empty pathos does not help; complicated rhetoric is being squeezed into frozen air. Conceit, vanity, and the lack of self-criticism drove away those who applauded yesterday; the may-poles decked with ribbons dried up, and the tradition-preserving bands march in low spirits.

Who knows when the historical chance will return which the government coalition passed up in May 1990? Tensions are intensifying, and social catastrophes are imminent. It will be enough for an insolent, premature bill to pass through the rambling voting machine, and those living below the poverty level will have no place left to retreat to. Their hunger will become unbearable if basic articles of consumption and basic services necessary for subsistence which have been tax-exempt so far will become 8 percent (in reality more than that) more expensive.

Because several 100,000 people can no longer pay utility bills, as it is; their electricity is being turned off; they have no heat for the winter; they are unable to pay the installments compounded by punitive interests to the OTP [National Savings Bank]. Cries of pain from the wrecks without protection of interests, from people swept to the periphery, and from the humiliated reached a house in Bicske after 22 October. No one paid attention to them, no one spoke to them, only their votes were expected.

My fellow hunger strikers living on 4,000- to 5,000-forint monthly net income also wrote a letter. To the finance minister: "... He tragically missed his role. His well-known social insensitivity is coupled with the indifferent characteristics of cynicism and ruthlessness. There is no hope for changing his failed monetary policy. He is unfit to develop a new concept based on the real circumstances of society, and to conduct a dialogue with the groups of people concerned in the matter."

Today 33 people in 10 communities are on a hunger strike so that there would be no more hunger next year. After the 10th day the body is beginning to break down the most valuable proteins in the vital organs; among them, the brain is most susceptible to damage.

I am writing this on the 15th day. I lost 12 kg. Julika had to be taken to the hospital, Vali had to stop, and Valencsik is bothered a lot by his ulcer. But hundreds of people call every day. If we fall, they will take our places tomorrow. They are determined and cannot be dissuaded. Yes, this nation always woke up in the last minute, and rose to its feet on its own. Its will to live drove it on, letting bad and worse governments be forgotten.

On Monday, the discussion of a bill unfit to be discussed will continue without me. According to the latest news, a general strike is being prepared. We here in Bicske think that a hunger strike locked into a room is more bearable for the country than a hunger protest in the streets tomorrow. Still, we are worried: Will the government miscalculate again? This time its chances of survival?

Keleti on Procuring Russian Military Equipment

93CH0179A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 28 Nov 92 p 73

[Article by Gyorgy Keleti, Hungarian Socialist Party representative in the National Assembly and former Defense Ministry spokesman: "Importing Weapons"]

[Text] For regular readers of MAGYAR HONVED—viewed as the weekly newspaper of the Ministry of Defense—Hungary's opportunity to procure \$800 million worth of military technology came as no surprise in the aftermath of Jozsef Antall's negotiations with Boris Yeltsin. A news report to this effect has already been published by that newspaper in late summer, signaling a Russian offer to make partial payment for Soviet trade obligations. True, Russian arms traders in Moscow were

not overly enthusiastic about receiving a delegation of the Hungarian military staff at that time. The reason: Not even in Moscow is business done the old way anymore. Intentions expressed by politicians no longer suffice, one has to put hard currency on the table and only then is it possible to reach specific agreements. Arms dealers are not overly interested in President Yeltsin himself making promises, from their standpoint receiving money is of the essence, and in this case the money represents no small amount. (One cannot tell, of course, whether deliveries would be made from military warehouses.)

The sum of \$800 million is no small amount. Based on the official median exchange rate of the Hungarian National Bank, \$800 million amounts to about 66.3 billion forints, an amount that falls only a little bit short of Hungary's 1993 defense budget if parliament accepts the government's proposal. For this reason it is understandable that the mere possibility of delivering armaments makes one wonder: Would it not be appropriate under the present circumstances to reduce the amount of defense expenditures presently included in the budget? It is even more appropriate to raise this question if we consider that representatives do not have accurate information about details of Hungary's arms procurement, even though parliament is able to control the Army primarily through the budget. Even the executives at the ministry appear to be uncertain in this regard, because the government has not yet discussed a long-term development concept for national defense. And then, where is the related National Assembly resolution, one that is indispensable, because the money—in this instance an authorization for the use of funds—would have to be appropriated by the National Assembly, after all.

No one argues about the need to modernize the military technology of the Hungarian Honved forces, and to refurbish and maintain existing equipment. This need is most urgent from the standpoint of air defenses, and that is also the most costly need to be satisfied. Most certainly, the ministry's plan to spend the \$800 million promised by the Russians primarily on the purchase of air defense equipment, as well as on component parts, spare parts and repair materials, is related to this need. But what are the specifics of this matter? It appears likely that the Hungarian military leadership is going to ask for locators, equipment needed to set up locators as a system, air defense rockets, as well as data processing, evaluation, and storage equipment. And further, it is likely that the list to be taken to Moscow is also going to include necessary gear and component parts needed for the continued operation of existing airplanes, as well as of combat and transport helicopters.

Two big questions need to be answered, assuming that the Russian Government is indeed going to allocate the necessary funds. Do Russian arms dealers have the equipment Hungary needs, and if so, how much do these cost, or, to be more exact, for how much they would be willing to sell them to us? Since no competitive bidding is involved in this transaction, and since a detailed

agreement concerning deliveries is still pending, one cannot rule out the possibility that the Russians are not going to have enough of the equipment asked for, that they are going to offer something else and something more expensive instead, or that they are going to quote a higher price than planned by Hungarian officials, from the outset.

Additional questions also present themselves, of course. If we receive gear and other component parts for MiG-21 fighter planes, who is going to install those, where, and for how much? If the Honved forces receive new air defense rockets and locators that are more advanced than those we now have, where are those rockets and locators going to be installed, and what resources is the state going to use to fund the related necessary investments? How and where could personnel be trained to operate the new equipment? Are the Hungarian Honved forces prepared to receive and store 66.3 billion forints worth of military technological equipment, spare parts and repair materials at all? And is this all consistent with Bernd Wiltz German defense state secretary's negotiations in Hungary a few days ago, as a result of which Hungary is going to receive spare parts from the GDR army stock?

If all this is true, we will slowly reach a point where we have enough spare parts. Only the parliament and the public have yet to be informed. But we must not wait too long before we provide such information and before we procure things. The Defense Ministry loses credibility by not informing parliament and the public; the defense capability of the country suffers as a result of delaying military procurement.

Impact of U.S.-EC Trade War on Hungary Feared

93CH0142A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 14 Nov 92 p 26

[Unattributed article: "Hungarian Anxiety"]

[Text] Although the association agreement signed by Hungary and the European Community adequately regulates the liberalization of trade between the two parties, a possible trade war could have a strong impact on Hungarian exports, as well, as Peter Gottfried, director of the department of trade and economy at the Hungarian mission to the EC, stated.

Namely, the association agreement—or rather its chapter on trade, which has already taken effect provisionally—is directly or indirectly connected to the multilateral system of the GATT treaties in several areas, as the counselor of the Hungarian EC mission pointed out. As an example he mentioned that in the trade of textile products, the timetable of breaking down quantitative limits partially depends on international regulations to be stipulated within GATT. At the same time, among the most important groups of articles, the group of agricultural products is the only one in which the treaty allows a free hand to institute possible new restrictive measures in the future. This in itself makes Hungary interested in

a move by the EC towards liberalization in the GATT treaties. Not to speak of the fact that all relaxing measures which the "big two" (the EC and the United States) are to negotiate within GATT will automatically become benefits attainable and enjoyable by every country that is a full member of the GATT system, such as Hungary. The present discussion between the big ones is disadvantageous because Hungary is to start new negotiations with the EC in the near future about a possible acceleration and an extension of the range of concessions they have already promised each other, Peter Gottfried said.

Finally, in a worst-case scenario, it is also not an insignificant point that if the table in Uruguay is going to be turned, a fierce subsidy war can break out between the exporting powers, and on the periphery of that fight, accidentally as it were, Hungarian articles unable to keep abreast in that area would be completely driven out of third markets dominated by "the big ones."

Minister on Hungarian-Greek Trade Developments

93CH0142B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 16 Nov 92 p 7

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, Hungarian minister of industry and trade, by J.P. in Budapest on 14 November 1992: "Ivan Szabo on His Negotiations in Greece; Drivers Must Be Convinced"]

[Text] Minister of Industry and Trade Ivan Szabo was able to describe a short but stimulating program to journalists at the Ferihegy airport after his return from a one-day trip to Greece on Saturday. The minister attended the conference of the European Union of Medium and Small Enterprises [EMSU] and conducted negotiations on the development of Hungarian-Greek industrial and trade relations.

The conference in Athens, much larger than the previous forum in Hungary, was organized as a follow-up to the third EMSU conference held in Budapest last summer; this time, the number of participants reached 1,000. Ivan Szabo gave a lecture entitled "Small and Medium Enterprises and the Hungarian State; On the Way From Socialism to a Market Economy." The participants agreed that in a market economy, small and medium enterprises represent one of the areas with the best prospects, and they have a great role in the solution of employment problems. In their political statement the participants declared, among other things, that the problem of ethnic minorities must be solved in Europe as soon as possible in order to promote the development of enterprises.

They Want To Learn Privatization

The minister told journalists that based on his bilateral negotiations, he sees a possibility for the sale of Hungarian buses in Greece. Public transportation in Athens consists largely of buses made by Ikarus, and it has become necessary to modernize the fleet. However, in

order to be successful, the management of Ikarus in Hungary will probably have to change its business policies radically. Namely, the Greeks privatized city transportation in a fairly peculiar way: Every bus is in the possession of two drivers. This means that in the purchase of buses the drivers will have the final say. Of course the deal will be financed by the transportation company, but it is the drivers themselves who must be convinced of the advantages of Ikarus buses. For this reason, the minister will suggest that one or two new Ikarus sample buses with environmentally friendly engines be put at the disposal of Athens bus drivers. In this way, one might possibly expect orders for several 100 buses.

Concerning long-term cooperation, one might anticipate mainly railway construction and the delivery of related equipment. About half of the Greek railroad is narrow-gauge and does not correspond to any European standard. For this reason, the country can be expected to start a 15- to 20-year railway improvement program. Tourism also affords good possibilities. "It gives special emphasis to our cooperation," the minister of industry said, "that in spite of a membership in the EC, the share of state property in Greece is still 65 percent. Thus, rigorous privatization will be necessary, and it is not impossible that we will outstrip them in this respect. They do not deny it in Greece that they would like to learn from us how to unbuild state structures."

"Tied-in" Yes

Ivan Szabo asked his negotiating partners that Greece ratify the agreement on Hungary's joining the EC as soon as possible. His urgings were answered with good will and understanding, but he was made to understand through informal channels that Greece imagines the ratification in the form of a "tie-in": They expect Hungary to support their position in connection with Macedonia.

When we asked whether Greek capital can be expected to participate in Hungarian privatization in any form, the minister pointed out a strange contradiction. Even though Greece is a member of the EC, exporting capital is not permitted, just as in Hungary. But there is a further contradiction. From a Hungarian point of view, an incredible amount of capital is pouring into the country: Guest workers transfer yearly \$3 billion to Greek accounts, while the normative assistance from the EC, which does not have to be paid back, amounts to \$4 billion a year. Still, a lack of capital can be felt everywhere. Industry makes heavy losses, and expenditures for defense take up huge amounts. For this reason, they currently have no money to invest; at the most, in time, they will be able to contribute to small enterprises.

Turkish Connection

Ivan Szabo also said that he held unofficial talks with his Turkish colleague who repeated his earlier official invitation. The minister himself would consider a series of Hungarian-Turkish negotiations on the improvement of

relations useful, because the economic development in Turkey in the past 10-12 years will permit the country to become an economic power. This relationship would enable Hungary to appear on the Middle-Eastern market through a possible Turkish mediation or as part of a Hungarian-Turkish cooperation.

Budget Sales Tax Revenues Revised

93CH0178A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
26 Nov 92 pp 1, 6

[Article by (DURST): "Five Billion Forints From Local Governments?"]

[Text] The ET [Interest Mediation Council] agreement reached over the weekend means a 34-billion-forint reduction on the revenue side of the budget. The changing of the proposed AFA [General Sales Tax] rates from 8 and 25 percent to 0, 6, and 25 percent reduces revenues by 19 billion forints. (Of this amount, 14.5 billion forints represent the reduction by 2 percentage points, a 3-billion-forint reduction is caused by exempting pharmaceuticals from sales taxes, and a 1.5-forint reduction results from making household electrical energy nontaxable.) An additional 7-billion-forint decrease in revenues is caused by a 200 forint per month employee tax benefit; and another 10-billion-forint reduction flows from wage increases granted to public employees. (Two billion forints of the latter amount will be returned to the budget in the form of higher personal income taxes paid.)

The Finance Ministry has already prepared a proposal on how to obtain the needed supplemental revenues, we learned from Finance Ministry Deputy State Secretary Gyorgy Naszvadi. Fourteen billion forints could be derived from reduced amounts allocated to individual budget chapters and to some of the state funds, while the remaining 20 billion forints would be "nipped" from privatization revenues. Thus the Finance Ministry would withhold, in the average, a few hundred million forints from segregated funds appropriated to the Ministry of Public Welfare, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and would withhold 2 billion forints from the Defense Ministry and 5.5 billion forints from the Ministry of the Interior. (According to information we received, only 0.5 billion forints would be taken away from the Interior Ministry, and the remaining 5 billion forints would we withheld from local governments. The proposal calls for a 2.5 -billion-forint reduction in both the local government reserve and the designated purpose funds. Some experts believe that this solution presents a lesser disadvantage to these organizations: local governments have money according to late October statistics, their total deposits amount to 80 billion forints.)

From among the state funds the Finance Ministry plans to curtail primarily the appropriations to the NGKM

[Ministry of External Economic Relations], they intend to withdraw 1 billion forints from the investment incentive fund, among others.

Despite all the rearrangements, the country can hope to have a budget sooner or later, according to Naszvadi. The only question is to what extent the representatives want to rearrange the budget. No doubt, proposals to this effect exist, according to the deputy state secretary. But the opportunity to regroup resources is much smaller if one observes the agreement reached by the ET.

Budget Committee's Vice Chairman Interviewed

93CH0157B Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 6 Nov 92 p 10

[Interview with Hungarian Democratic Forum Representative Pal Becker, vice chairman of the Committee on the Budget, by Bela Valko; place and date not given: "The Opposition: Double Dealing Double Rated?"—play on words, reference to dual rate sales tax]

[Text] *While opposition representatives clamor everywhere that adoption of the government's legislative proposal to introduce a dual general sales tax [AFA] rate would be tantamount to skinning people alive, the same gentlemen joyfully rub their hands and pray that the largest coalition party not change its mind in this regard, National Assembly Committee on the Budget, Taxation and Finance Vice Chairman Pal Becker said in discussing the 1993 budget.*

[Valko] Mr. Vice Chairman! Many people recognize you as a politician most firmly opposed to introducing the dual rate AFA.

[Becker] That has never been the case. The truth is that in the preparatory stages of this law—in July, if I recall correctly—I told the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] national board that submitting this law to the National Assembly and having it adopted would be tantamount to the MDF committing suicide. We should have taken this action in December 1990, or at the end of 1991 at the latest, and not now, in the fall of 1992, when elections are scheduled within less than two years. I would like to stress, however, that my opposition to this type of tax was based on political considerations. After seeing the economic data for the first six months of this year, however, it became clear to me that rejection of this law would threaten the state household with collapse.

[Valko] What is the situation with the so-called social welfare payments ["social compensation"] so firmly advocated by the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]?

[Becker] Based on a resolution passed at the MDF faction meeting in Balatonkenese, a team composed of six persons is dealing with the economy as a whole these days, and within that, with the budget and the dual rate AFA. Its purpose is to develop various decision-making alternatives. I am a member of that team.

[Valko] What alternatives could there be?

[Becker] Direct welfare payments. In other words, a needy person seeking assistance today can count on being rejected because the money goes through several levels of administration, or because local governments are reluctant to make support payments.

[Valko] What do you have in mind?

[Becker] Look, granting support funds would be a constant source of tension at the local level. It is yet another matter that there is no one except the local governments who can pinpoint the truly needy in a given setting.

[Valko] And what do you think of the Christian Democratic People's Party's [KDNP] proposal, notably the exemption of ten basic food products from under the 8 percent tax rate?

[Becker] I do not regard this method as acceptable, first and foremost because the present statistical system is capable of tracking the prices of product groups only, and not of individual products. But also because, according to reliable estimates, this method of compensation would cost an additional 35-40 billion forints to the budget, and that is an awful lot of money. On top of all this, the more prosperous stratum would also benefit from this subsidy. And one more thing: In two or three months, the prices of these products would "catch up" with those of other food products subject to the 8 percent tax.

[Valko] It seems that parliamentary debate over the dual rate AFA came at the most opportune time from the standpoint of the opposition.

[Becker] Yes, I think that some opposition politicians began to fantasize about how to furnish the finance minister's office when they heard about this thing. But the proposed action would "fix up" the budget that suffers from severe shortages at this time. Despite this, the opposition is definitely not going to vote for the legislative proposal if compensation of the needy falls short by as little as one forint of the amount collected from the population through the dual rate AFA.

[Valko] What do you, Representative Becker, think of cutting the expenditure side of the defense budget?

[Becker] In this respect I hold a truly opposite view of what the Government wants to do; during debate I was first to introduce an amendment to cut military expenditures by about 5.5 billion forints.

[Valko] This does not sound as overly convincing in the present international situation.

[Becker] All I can say is that Hungary simply must not be brought into a situation in which it uses military force to resolve its conflicts.

[Valko] Irrespective of this, many regarded your viewpoint as inappropriate.

[Becker] No denying, I got what I deserved on the parliamentary corridor from my fellow representatives in the faction.

[Valko] According to Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa the budget deficit was also caused by a greatly deteriorated payment discipline on part of taxpayers.

[Becker] The inclination to pay taxes has also been bad last year as well as the year before last—one could hardly speak of a radical change. In any event, we are talking about a huge amount, the amount involved is 500 billion forints according to some estimates, this is the sum of concealed income, and even if we figure on the basis of only a 30 percent tax rate, the related revenue shortfall amounts to 150 billion forints. The 1993 Hungarian budget would present no problem if that money were here on the table today. But despite this, I do not see the laxity in paying taxes as a truly big problem, the real big problem is the decline in the GDP. The reason: There were only a few profitable enterprises in 1992, financial institutions, too, have been in bad shape, and we cannot count on serious amounts of tax revenues in 1993 either. The third factor is the enforcement of the amortization and the accounting law, which took a lot of money away even though it fundamentally enhanced economic transformation. Instead of the previous 20 year amortization terms, investments can now be amortized in the course of six years, and even though only artificial profits were created under the old system, the revenues appeared in the budget as real revenues. And there is one more thing that's very important. The business philosophy of newly established corporations is entirely different from that of the old, large firms, in which managers' premiums were tied to profitability criteria. Today's entrepreneur is not interested in showing profits, because he must pay taxes after profits. The opposite is true, in many cases entrepreneurs do not even pursue actual business activities, they maintain corporations only in order to write off car purchases as business expenses, among other things.

[Valko] The opposition also explains the budget deficit with the clumsiness of privatization.

[Becker] I think that we can appropriately assess the speed of privatization only by taking into consideration the available purchasing power. Assets offered for sale depreciate if little interest is shown by those who have capital. And insofar as the utilization of privatization revenues is concerned, they are not going to increase the state budget next year, but will finance purposes that had been financed by the state budget before.

[Valko] Is Hungary going to have a budget on time?

[Becker] I trust we will. This is another reason why it is regrettable that it took 21 days for the State Accounting Office [ASZ] to write its opinion about the legislative proposal this year, as compared to five days last year.

[Valko] Do you think that this was done intentionally?

[Becker] God forbid! Far be it from me to accuse the ASZ of obstructing the process. Nothing like that is behind the delay, I am convinced. In any event, however, the fact that parliament was able to place this very important piece of legislation on its agenda later than planned, is unpleasant. That one week or two weeks delay will shorten our time when it comes to final reconciliation. Incidentally, this year we can expect to hear an entirely different kind of budget debate than last year.

[Valko] And how about the dual rate AFA?

[Becker] As I mentioned before, there is no budget if the National Assembly fails to accept this new type of taxation; at that point the entire budget must be rewritten. We are preoccupied with the details of an appropriate welfare payment system at present: I believe that both the coalition parties and the Finance Ministry manifest an appropriate degree of openness in this regard.

[Valko] It seems that the Smallholders and Christian Democrats have a different view of this....

[Becker] It should be natural that their view is different. It would be unnatural for us not to be able to negotiate and to reach agreements. I am optimistic insofar as the final results are concerned.

[Valko] This flows from your own stature?

[Becker] Both of our coalitions partners are aware of the kind of responsibility they hold, and with the consequences of a possible government crisis. I am convinced that all affected parties are seeking a solution, not the things they do not agree on, but things in which progress can be made.

[Valko] So be it.

Amendments to Social Security Laws Discussed

93CH0096A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 31 Oct 92 pp 107-108

[Article by Patricia Molnar: "Social Security: Crippled Financing"]

[Text] *Rising retirement age for women; slower raising of pensions than what is prescribed by law; trimmed sick pay; stricter requirements to qualify for maternity benefits and widows' pensions respectively; and additional contributions by employers. That sums up the widely opposed package of amendments that the cabinet will be considering, foreseeably this week.*

Promulgated in March of this year, the statute guaranteeing preservation of the relative value of pensions seems ephemeral: according to a draft bill prepared by the Ministry of Social Welfare, pensions next year would be adjusted not to average net earnings, but to the rise in

the average income of the economically active population, which includes also the unemployed. Thus, instead of the 16-percent rise in pensions announced with great fanfare, only a 12.3-percent rise would be possible in 1993, and 4.2 percentage points of that rise are the carryover effect of raising pensions in September 1992. Actually, therefore, only 8.1 percent more funds would be available for pensions in 1993 as compared with this year.

That is merely one of the proposed changes in social security benefits. At a conference held recently, Mrs. Laszlo Szeremi, the spokesperson for the employers on the social-policy committee of the Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (ET), summed up her misgivings regarding the latest package of bills to amend social security laws as follows: "During the past 10 months about 30 statutory regulations have been enacted that directly affect social security contributions and benefits. The present system does not offer any guarantee to either employers or employees that would enable them to plan at least 6 months ahead." Gyula Pulay, deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Social Welfare, explains the reasons for the proposed changes: "For the social security system we had planned originally a zero net balance for 1992, instead of which we can now expect a deficit between 30 and 40 billion forints. This deficit is caused not by overspending, but by a decline in revenue from social security contributions." He added that the lack of funds is also the reason behind the further tightening of regulations planned for 1993.

The fact is that, if the present conditions were maintained, the social security system's deficit would already be between 70 and 80 billion forints. The deficit can be reduced by collecting more revenue and through cuts in expenditure. Due to the public opposition that could be expected, it would be unrealistic to raise further the already high rates of the employers' and employees' social security contributions assessed on various earnings, because these rates jointly now amount to 54 percent. A significant proportion of the players in the economy are already unable to pay their social security contributions; what they owe at present can be estimated at about 76 billion forints, most of which is uncollectible.

Because its own deficit is becoming ever greater, the national budget is unable to bail out the social security system. Therefore the government is proposing that the National Assembly order the social security system to issue long-term bonds. According to the government's scheme, the state would guarantee the redemption of the bonds and would reimburse the interest paid on them, but the social security system itself would have to assume the redemption of the bonds as they mature after 10 years. "According to opinions solicited in banking circles, bonds issued by the social security system would be just about as attractive as 70-year-old brides," commented Jozsef Botos, the head of the Social Security National Main Directorate (OTF). In his opinion, the state ought to be the one that issues the bonds.

The opinions of interested parties are likewise divided on the draft bill of the Ministry of Social Welfare that calls for collecting social security contributions also on payments in kind, or on their redemption in cash, in the future. The Ministry of Industry and Trade opposes this draft bill—allegedly it would generate 5.0 billion forints of additional revenue—primarily because of the mining enterprises' shaky financial situation. Incidentally, only employers would be affected directly. Indirectly, however, employees would be affected as well. After all, for every 100 forints the firms spent for such purposes (protective clothing, plant cafeterias or meal tickets), they would have to pay a social security contribution of 44 forints. Therefore the firms would abolish payments in kind or curtail them, argued Mrs. Laszlo Szeremi against the proposed measure.

There has been debate, and there probably will be one in the cabinet as well, on raising the retirement age. Because of the continuing rise in unemployment, the Ministry of Labor does not regard the time ripe for this at present. It argues that, if the retirement age were raised, either the next generation of graduates would be unable to find work, or women nearing retirement age would have to be paid pensions as early retirees. Whatever solution is adopted, the Solidarity Fund's expenditure would increase. A higher retirement age would apply only to women for the time being, but by 2005 the retirement age would be 62 years for both sexes. Two alternative proposals for raising the retirement age are being presented to the government.

As of 1 January 1993, the retirement age for women would be 58 in principle, according to the proposal of the Ministry of Social Welfare. Women would still be able to retire at age 55, just as now, but they would forfeit a third of any possible pension increases until they had reached the new retirement age. In the opinion of the social security pension fund's board of supervision, however, the retirement age ought to be raised as of 1 January 1993 only for those who did not have 20 years of service, which is the minimum length-of-service requirement introduced a decade ago. The board recommends that, in the first round, the retirement age for women be raised to 56 as of 1 January 1994. Every other year thereafter, the retirement age would be raised by a year. The board would use disincentives to discourage early retirement and incentives to reward working beyond retirement age, by respectively deducting and adding 5 percent for each year.

The bills drafted at the Ministry of Social Welfare contain only one element that broadens benefits. The gist of it is that henceforth also employees suffering from other diseases besides tuberculosis would be entitled to claim sick pay for a maximum of two years. But employees suffering longer bouts of illness would be affected adversely by the change that henceforth the rate of sick pay would not increase with the duration of the illness. At present, during the first 30 days of illness, an employee with two years of continuous employment is able to claim sick pay equal to 75 percent of the average

earnings; that increases to 80 percent on the 31st day of illness, and to 85 percent on the 91st day. Abolition of these 5-percentage-point jumps is being planned for 1993. Eligibility rules for maternity benefits would also be stricter. The amounts of the benefits would be linked to the earnings on the basis on which the social security contributions were assessed during the six months preceding childbirth. It is argued that the present rules provide opportunity for abuse, in that high earnings for even a single day—fictitious employment, in other words—are enough to secure a fairly good income by claiming child-care benefits over a period of two years.

Stricter rules are being planned also on the minimum length of service needed to claim disability pensions (uniformly 10 years at present). According to a draft bill, persons who became disabled before age 45 would continue to qualify for disability pensions if they had at least 10 years of service on their record. But henceforth persons becoming disabled before the age of 54 would need to have at least 15 years of service to qualify, while persons over 54 would need at least 20 years.

Senior managers of the OTF believe that, for a number of years after 2000, not even the annual yields—estimated at 30 billion forints a year—of the 300 billion forints in assets that are to be transferred to the OTF will be enough to extricate the social security system from its financial difficulties.

Hospital Budget Cuts Portend 'Catastrophe'

93CH0132A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 20 Oct 92 pp 8-9

[Interview with physicians Dr. Istvan Mikola, Dr. Adrienn Ferencz, and Dr. Andras Veer by Tibor Hollauer; place and date not given: "Before Hospitals Crumble; Withdrawals, Servitude; Kupa Nyet-Millions"]

[Text] *One need not be a hospital patient; it's enough to visit one of the average public hospitals, or to just look at a hospital building, to understand that the situation in this regard is below criticism—and we apologize to the exceptions. It is below criticism, despite the efforts of physicians, nurses, and other health care workers, and for this reason twice as much, several times as much criticism is due. Health care institutions recently received a baffling circular: Their fourth quarter budgets will be cut by millions of forints. What are the consequences? Dr. Istvan Mikola, the physician-director of Szent Laszlo Hospital, Dr. Adrienn Ferencz, a department chief at the same hospital, and Dr. Andras Veer, the chief physician at the National Institute for Psychiatry and Nervous Diseases, expressed their views to Tibor Hollauer.*

[Hollauer] What do you think of our health care situation? Some claim that keeping up with science is most important; others regard the backwardness of our hospitals as almost desperate....

[Mikola] Allowing peak medical technology to enter Hungary is very important. The present situation in which children's and adults' bone marrow transplants are being performed abroad at a very high cost, and are funded from public donations—begging people to give, collections—and through foundation support, is intolerable. We opened the country's first bone marrow transplant unit for children at the Laszlo Hospital in an attempt to remedy this adverse situation. Because we, too, have the professionals, the knowledge, the gray matter needed to perform this procedure at the quality level seen in France or England.

It is therefore necessary to permit these very costly, very sophisticated medical technologies to enter Hungary. On the other hand, spending for such purposes in a sense conserves misery. Thus we find at the same time both peak technology and misery in hospitals, and in health care institutions in general. I have in mind the fixed assets of hospitals that were built many decades ago: the crumbling buildings, the 12, 16, 20 patient wards we find in some places, the toilets and washrooms at the end of corridors—in general, the extremely low comfort level. Meanwhile, patient contributions to Social Security in Hungary are the highest in the world.

[Hollauer] "Hello!"

[Female patient] "Good day! I am 84 years old."

[Hollauer] "How long have you been here?"

[Female patient] "For a long time. Almost five months now...."

[Hollauer] "Where do you live, where do you reside otherwise?"

[Female patient] "Where? What shall I say? I have no apartment. I am registered at my daughter's place. My daughter is coming to visit today. I know nothing, she does not tell me anything. I have already asked her to take me home, but she says that she leaves her place early in the morning and returns home late at night. She asks: What am I going to do all day long?"

[Hollauer] Who comes to this hospital? What are the criteria for the length of stay?

[Ferencz] In the summer, most elderly people are referred to the hospital for diarrhea. This is done either because they really have diarrhea, or because the family is taking a vacation, or because there is no one to provide for them at home. The flu season begins in the fall and the situation is practically the same as in the summer. People who can't heat their homes, or if there is no one to provide food to an elderly person, they, too, are admitted. Unfortunately, in such instances, they must

occupy active patient beds for longer periods of time. At present, we have eight healthy patients like this in the department.

[Mikola] The social burden placed on health care is increasing. One out of every four or five beds is taken by people who do not require medical care, instead they need welfare provisions; these are people without homes who have nowhere to go. Some people have been in this department for months; a place where the daily cost per hospital bed amounts to 4,000-5,000 forints. Accordingly, this is the world's most expensive welfare system. We are counting on at least an improvement in the budget situation. Last November parliament has made a decision concerning the so-called profile cleansing issue. This means that the state must remove social welfare funds from Social Security, funds that don't belong there. Hospitals are meant to heal people, and not to resolve social problems.

The Categorical Statesman

[Hollauer] How will the institution function if drastic withdrawals continue?

[Veer] Mihaly Kupa has announced tomorrow's watchword: "nyet." What could one say to such a categorical statement by a statesman?

[Hollauer] He obviously must have been forced by the circumstances. The budget deficit must not increase further—Mihaly Kupa was supposedly told in the United States....

[Veer] I am sorry, but I must say that this is Mihaly Kupa's problem. The previous year's budget was not planned this way either. Supposedly, this is caused by professional problems, or some events must have occurred that multiplied the expenditures. Incidentally, the opposition has predicted all this in the course of parliamentary debate. At that point they made parliament to adopt the budget in a matter of moments. I think we see the consequences of that today. We have great difficulty in managing the Institute based on its existing budget; the present withdrawal has an expressly tragic effect on us. But other institutions also find themselves in the same situation.

[Hollauer] How did they accomplish the withdrawal and what's the justification?

[Veer] In late September we received a circular from the Ministry of Public Welfare: We were told that they would withdraw 2.5 million forints beginning in October, i.e., fourth quarter funds. This decision could not be appealed. I know that the Ministry of Public Welfare was also forced to do this because the Finance Ministry wanted to withdraw 1.5 billion forints, and it took a lengthy bargaining effort by our Ministry to reduce this amount to 850 million forints. Accordingly, I believe that the Ministry of Public Welfare has represented health care interests rather well. In the final analysis, however, from the standpoint of the institutions, all this represents a significant cut. I have been working in

the health care field for 30 years, not once have they withdrawn budgeted funds in the fourth quarter.

The Forewinds of Catastrophes

[Hollauer] Has Laszlo Hospital prepared its the 1993 budget?

[Mikola] It's not finished. A legislative proposal for the 1993 Social Security budget has been submitted to parliament on 30 September, but we sadly note that certain automatic increases were not included in that proposal. I am unable to accept this situation at a time when the health care price index is 181 percent, when the inflation rate has been about 30 percent for years, and when hospitals have already used up their last reserves—it will be very difficult to stay on our feet next year.

[Hollauer] What is meant by a crumbling health care system? How does it crumble?

[Veer] It is well known that most bridge collapses that cause mass fatalities occur in India and in Bangladesh. The obvious reason is that little money is being spent on checking the condition of bridges and on making repairs. I think a similar process has begun in Hungary. In health care, too, we are witnessing hard-to-explain phenomena like the dysentery epidemic along the Tisza River—two people have already died as far as I know. In Tatabanya two people died as a result of an uncertain, still unclarified medical examination procedure; sepsis occurs in other surgical departments. Although there have been precedents of this sort, these phenomena are unusual in Hungarian health care practice. Hungary had a good public health system even before the war.

I now envision the collapse of the already established system. Due to a lack of funds, patients in dilapidated buildings will be suffering from problems caused by lack of hygiene. Yes, I believe that unfortunately, we will have to experience phenomena like this. Thus, the all-out effort made by doctors and nurses is not even going to be particularly newsworthy. Patient care can still be maintained more or less, but as a result of financial policies that do not distinguish between one purpose and another—the health care policy followed by the government—I sense the forewinds of great catastrophe.

New Law Reduces State's Access to Personal Data

93CH0141A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 14 Nov 92 pp 16-17

[Unattributed article: "New Address Registration Law"]

[Text] In the future, a visit abroad which exceeds three months will have to be reported to the authorities; the personal number will continue to be used in a restricted scope; citizens can forbid the use of their data for business purposes—these were the new elements of the law on personal data and addresses enacted last week. According to the law which conforms to the "data protection constitution" (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 7 November 1992)

enacted at the end of October, when someone announces the fact of staying abroad (which can be done at Hungarian embassies and consulates), he does not have to name the exact location. According to the Ministry of Interior, this is merely to avoid superfluous paperwork and correspondence. The personal number, which has been renamed personal identification symbol, can only be used by the judiciary, the military administration, and certain parts of public administration (among the latter, for instance, it can be used by the tax authority, but not by the construction authority). The new identification number—which is

expected to be introduced in 1996 together with the identification card—will not be a “talking number,” i.e., one will not be able to find out just by looking at it when its owner was born, or whether he is a Hungarian citizen. In the future, citizens can prevent the disclosure of their personal data and addresses for business purposes (for instance, for market research or advertising campaigns). This can be done at the mayoral offices, at the offices of the regional prefects, and at the population registry center, or as it is newly called, the Office for the Registration of Personal Data and Addresses.

UD Deputy Chairman Frasyński Views Party

93EP0075A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
6 Nov 92 p 3

[Interview with Władysław Frasyński, deputy chairman of Democratic Union, by Małgorzata Subotic; place and date not given: "Men After 30"]

[Text] [Subotic] Are we dealing with the "political comeback" [preceding expression in English] of Władysław Frasyński? Following the unity congress of the Democratic Union (UD) in the spring of 1991, publicity about you ceased, even though you became the party's deputy chairman, but, in the past 15 or so weeks, your name has been increasingly mentioned. Recently, you also were elected vice chairman of the Parliamentary Caucus of UD Deputies. Was your previous disappearance from the news due to, as some people put it, "Frasyński fell in love"? Are you not in love anymore?

[Frasyński] I am always in love, but the reasons for my political disappearance were more prosaic than romantic love. In Poland, the political scene is in practice limited to Warsaw, thus impoverishing it. No one, including Solidarity, has created a mechanism for the advancement of new men—and by new men I mean chiefly those from the provinces. Such individuals have no chance to appear on the Polish national scene if they decide to remain where they are and represent the interests of local communities.

[Subotic] Is this characteristic of Poland alone?

[Frasyński] To a large extent, yes, although it seems that, all over the world, people are grumbling about the preferences accorded to those living in national capitals—with the difference that, elsewhere in the world, the administrative divisions of countries are different. Regions are the places from which politicians emerge. But, in our country, it is Napoleonic careers that predominate.

[Subotic] Napoleonic careers?

[Frasyński] A person alights from a bus and may at once become prime minister or minister of state. It turns out that individuals hold unusually important posts without much if anything known about their backgrounds.

[Subotic] Who then is the Napoleon in Poland and "anoints" politicians?

[Frasyński] We have plenty of Napoleons. If you thought I would say Lech Wałęsa, you were wrong.

[Subotic] Who else, for example?

[Frasyński] For example, Deputy Prime Minister Paweł Łączkowski of the Party of Christian Democrats. If we are to build a healthy political and economic life, politicians must have some background. They must have a history of accomplishments, proof of their expertise in something. If, in addition, a deputy prime minister is a person who wears six hats, that just does not make sense, and it causes the public to be hostile to politicians.

Office Politicians

[Subotic] What do you propose?

[Frasyński] A new administrative division of this country, the introduction of *powiats* [counties] and regions. This matter has deeper consequences. As long as within the regions we do not divide the fruits of our labor, there will be neither a dynamic economic reform nor a sensible set of measures to counter unemployment.

[Subotic] Then you view formal, administrative measures as a remedy for Poland's problems?

[Frasyński] They are not formal measures. The administrative structure of this state, which is a relic of the previous system, causes the nation's capital to be the decisionmaking center as regards all issues. It is in Warsaw that decisions are made on the unemployed in Kłodz, Suwałki, or anywhere else. It is here that decisions are made to fund the health service, education, and housing construction. Yet it would be better if these decisions were to be decentralized and made by the directly concerned local governments. A zloty spent in a local community is worth more than that disbursed from the central government.

[Subotic] All the same, I still do not understand why you disappeared from the political scene for a while.

[Frasyński] I wanted to avoid the misfortune of becoming a party "apparatchik," dependent solely on the party's or someone else's coffers. Thus, I had to find a way to make a living. Together with four associates, I founded a transportation enterprise, a very time-consuming occupation.

[Subotic] But you came back to the political scene.

[Frasyński] Now I have become a Sejm deputy and, in addition to *per diem*, I have other privileges, such as paid overnight stays in Warsaw and the possibility of traveling all over the country at no cost to myself. Previously, I had to take care of those expenses from my own pocket. In this country, political activists are overlooked until they face the Jupiters of the Warsaw scene. This is a result of the persistence of a mechanism operating in Poland for more than 40 years; unless one is a Varsovian, one is a nobody. And a newcomer from the provinces who has political ambitions but lacks the Warsaw background readily becomes an office politician, by which I mean he meets in various offices with various personages who either offer or do not offer him advancement.

[Subotic] Did anyone hinder you?

[Frasyński] So far as I am concerned, no, because my name is Władysław Frasyński.

[Subotic] You became a Sejm deputy more than a year ago. But you faced "the light of the Jupiters" fairly recently. To what do you attribute it—to the formation

of the Hanna Suchocka government or to the departure of Aleksander Hall from the UD?

[Frasyniuk] To neither. There might be a third reason—namely, since Tadeusz Mazowiecki became a United Nations observer, the duty of guiding the UD was shifted to me. But I think the real reason was different: A couple of times, the positions I took differed from those taken by the government. In Poland, the press rewards defiant politicians, best of all if they defy their own parties. Consider, for example, the case of Aleksander Hal, who a year and half ago decided to abandon the UD, and, as a result, his name was headlined in the newspapers.

[Subotic] So you want to take over not only Hall's position but also his role?

[Frasyniuk] I am the opposite of Hall. My temperament and values are totally different.

[Subotic] What are your values?

[Frasyniuk] Hall never regarded the UD as his own party; to him it was merely a stepping-stone to further advancement. Cynically speaking, the UD was a more efficient voting booth. I was opposed to glossing over sensitive issues—for example, those concerning church-state relations.

[Subotic] But Hall was not?

[Frasyniuk] He certainly shunned any such discussion.

[Subotic] Why?

[Frasyniuk] Perhaps he feared that his views would clash with those of the majority.

[Subotic] So you are suggesting that the majority would support your position?

[Frasyniuk] Were it otherwise, I would resign from the UD.

A Turbocharged Locomotive

[Subotic] But let us discuss the Suchocka government again. What besides Deputy Prime Minister Laczkowski do you not like about it?

[Frasyniuk] The point is not that I do not like Deputy Prime Minister Laczkowski. I also do not like a couple of other ministers, and not because they represent particular political parties or that their careers are quite Napoleonic. I sympathize with Hanna Suchocka and with myself. Hers is a government of coalition partners with highly differentiated views and ideologies; it is a very uneven government. Hanna Suchocka is a "turbocharged locomotive" in that government, meaning that it is she who pulls it and causes it to enjoy a very good reputation.

[Subotic] Is it true that Ministers Rokita and Syryjczyk are exerting a dominant influence on Hanna Suchocka?

[Frasyniuk] For years I was told that the working class and "you yourself Wladek are being manipulated by certain intellectuals," such as Bronislaw Geremek—meaning that fools were being guided by wise men. That is an unusually unfair suggestion. It is simply unlikely for a prime minister, responsible for the entire government, to be someone else's puppet.

[Subotic] Haven't such instances occurred in history?

[Frasyniuk] Tadeusz Syryjczyk is a very special person and a UD stalwart. Jan Rokita is indeed working hard to deserve the opinion that he is masterminding not just Mrs. Prime Minister but also half of Europe. But I know Hanna Suchocka well enough to refuse to believe that she might be a passive tool. She has the right background and qualities for her post, and it is she who masterminds the government's decisions.

[Subotic] You also dislike the director of the Office of the Council of Ministers, Jan Maria Rokita, do you not?

[Frasyniuk] Our political temperament are similar, and, if we do not like something, we say so.

[Subotic] You are said to criticize certain government measures.

[Frasyniuk] I fear that the Cabinet is insufficiently explicit or decisive on economic matters and that there is no clear concept of changes. I consider it a misunderstanding to saddle the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy with the entire responsibility for economic restructuring. I know this for certain, and I think [Minister of Labor and Social Policy] Jacek Kuron does, too. It would be great if Kuron were joined by someone like Balcerowicz. Such a resolute pair is greatly needed, the more so considering that any day now the president is to sign the so-called Small Constitution, vesting in the government the power to issue decrees, a power the government must have inasmuch as it is responsible for the economy. I am not sure whether the existing team of economic decisionmakers is sufficiently cohesive to be ready to make responsible decisions.

[Subotic] Why these doubts?

[Frasyniuk] When I read government documents, I have the impression that the government would like to share responsibility with the trade unions and such institutions as the banks, which are not prepared to become the principal instrument for the recovery of state enterprises.

[Subotic] How come you, a trade union activist who speak of yourself as having been raised by "the heavy-industry working class," believe that sharing responsibility with the trade unions is bad?

[Frasyniuk] The public is fed up with incessant negotiations with the trade unions; it wants decisions.

[Subotic] What else don't you like?

[Frasyniuk] Prime Minister Suchocka is treating some ministries, such as the education one, too lightly. This and certain other ministries should not be headed by representatives of political parties with particular ideologies; they should be headed by pragmatic individuals.

[Subotic] Like those from the UD, for example?

They Are Equally Maimed

[Frasyniuk] Or the Liberals.

[Subotic] Don't you feel bad that the Liberals reacted better than the UD and were ahead of your party in publicly taking a clear stand on the political neutrality of the government and on issues like religion and abortion?

[Frasyniuk] I do not feel that my party was remiss in reacting. We are grateful to the Liberals. Had we been the first to take a stand, we would have been immediately condemned from all of the church pulpits. My club associate Barbara Labuda met with such a fate for making a brief comment—she was chastised by Primate Glemp.

[Subotic] What do you intend to do then?

[Frasyniuk] The UD must take a position on these issues. Until now, this has not been possible because several or a dozen or so individuals would resign from my party. The more so considering that this is not just a matter of discussion of values. Discussion of legislation, of the new Constitution is beginning. I am for a legal separation of church and state.

[Subotic] But more than 90 percent of Poles declare themselves to be Roman Catholics.

[Frasyniuk] There still remain that 10 percent. Religion should be a private affair. A priest is not God's representative on earth. The Lord is everywhere, and this does not have to be enshrined in law. We all feel lost now and look for a place of our own. For 40 years we were maimed. This also means the Roman Catholic Church because the Lord dispensed those maimings equitably among priests and ordinary men.

[Subotic] The declaration of the KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress] will thus force the UD to take an unequivocal stand.

[Frasyniuk] No, it will not have to because the UD is not the kind of party that would try to compete with the KLD on these issues.

[Subotic] But the race has probably already been won.

[Frasyniuk] We shall see.

[Subotic] Soon now the fate of the antiabortion law will finally be decided.

[Frasyniuk] Yes, and I consider that law very critically as a repressive one.

[Subotic] But, should the UD take such a position, that would divide the governing coalition and cause it to collapse.

[Subotic] Perhaps, but should we abandon our convictions? That is a price that cannot be paid. In my case, that would annul everything I have been doing since 1980.

A Wedding Is Not Unlikely

[Subotic] Do you expect any major political reshuffling in the near future—for example, the formation of a large center-right bloc, with the participation of the Liberals?

[Frasyniuk] No, I do not because, at present, most parties are trying to improve their relations with the Roman Catholic Church rather than win over more voters, the reason being that the church is the most effective way of "recruiting" voters. All of the rightist parties want to be "Christian" ones. It takes courage nowadays to advocate "neutrality of world outlook." I think that, during the next electoral campaign, the priests will again "recite" from the church pulpits the names of the candidates to whom votes should be given, and those who should not be voted for.

[Subotic] You are skeptical about the possibility of forming a center-right bloc, but that does not change the fact that the Little Coalition (the UD, the KLD, and the PPG [Polish Economic Program]) is about to expire.

[Frasyniuk] For the time being, theirs are kind of like extramarital relations—now up, now down.

[Subotic] But it is said that the KLD does not want to be treated like a younger and dominated brother.

[Frasyniuk] The Liberals seem to have a kind of psychological complex. It is not in my nature to dominate anyone.

[Subotic] So there is a chance, isn't there?

[Frasyniuk] Yes, like a deep feeling that takes long to mature. We are all men over 30—even the youngest of us, Donald Tusk. But men of that age make mature decisions. Hasty decisions are made before one is 30.

[Subotic] So you do not preclude a wedding?

[Frasyniuk] I do not, except that both parties must become mature enough for it.

[Subotic] And when do you want to become chairman of the UD? During the scheduled spring congress?

[Frasyniuk] The chairman is Tadeusz Mazowiecki. If a need for change arises, the new leader will emerge from a political consensus within the UD, and he should be well known long before the congress. This cannot be something fortuitous. But the pertinent discussion within the UD has not yet begun.

[Subotic] But Mazowiecki likes you, doesn't he?

[Frasyniuk] Yes, I have been earning his liking since 1980 [the rise of Solidarity], and not just since 1991, when the UD was established.

Politicians on Suchocka Government's Chances

93EP0075B Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 43, 25 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Jerzy Slawomir Mac: "Baked Alaska: The Suchocka Administration Chills Some but Is Too Warm Toward Others, Yet Poles No Longer Have the Strength or the Money for Another Change of Government"]

[Text] More than one-half of Poles believe that Hanna Suchocka is the most fit of the four Solidarity heads of government so far. This would predict for Ms. Prime Minister a long and happy life were the chairperson of the Council of Ministers popularly elected. But, unfortunately, it was the Sejm, in its present fragmented composition, so obvious to everyone, that appointed her.

Unlike the voters, those who called the Suchocka government into being—namely, the deputies—hardly believe it will last any longer than did its predecessors. Of the 238 members of parliament polled early in October by Promedia, only one-fourth thought that the present government would last longer than a year, and barely 7 percent declared that it would last until the end of the term of the current Sejm. Nearly as many (26 percent) deputies estimated the lifespan of Suchocka's Cabinet at half a year, and 12 percent claimed that its days are numbered.

The views of different political parties on the chances of Suchocka's Cabinet are very interesting. The most optimistic views were expressed by the PL (Peasant Accord) deputies, although that party is lukewarm about its own presence in the governing coalition (as many as two-thirds of the PL deputies thought the government would last for two or three years). The main parties in the coalition, the UD (Democratic Union) and the KLD (Liberal-Democratic Congress), showed greater skepticism on generally estimating the lifespan of their government at one year. But their most important allies, the Liberals (KLD or Liberal-Democratic Congress) prophesied a speedy collapse for the Suchocka government. Of the 24 KLD deputies polled, as many as 17 declared that it would not last beyond six months.

Liberals of Little Faith

KLD deputies showed less confidence in the chances of the current Cabinet than did opposition politicians from the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) and the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance). And yet it is also their, the Liberals', cabinet, in which they hold three very important economic posts—those of the ministers of privatization, foreign economic cooperation, and relations with the EEC. Could it be then that the KLD, which desires to be seen as infallible on economic issues, just as the ZChN

(Christian-National Union) wants to be thought as infallible in the domains of education and law, itself does not believe in the political strength and social popularity of its economic vision?

Or could it be that this lack of faith on the part of Liberals in the permanence of this government is motivated by purely personal considerations? The economic track is dominated by Deputy Prime Minister Henryk Goryszewski, a ZChN man, whose views—because they can hardly said to be concepts—diverge from the economic doctrine of the Liberals. Suffice it to recall Goryszewski's hostile comments on the Maastricht treaty, confirmed by a declaration of the ZChN press spokesman, in the event anyone doubts whether the deputy prime minister meant what he said. In these circumstances, the KLD is quite justified in perceiving no chance for the success of its mission in the government, and, hence, no chance for the permanence of the entire Cabinet. A departure of the KLD (like that of any other party) from the fragile coalition would mean collapse of the government. This was shown by recent votes in the Sejm.

It may also be that the rank-and-file KLD deputies polled by Promedia resent the ministers of state representing their party, who accepted their appointments at the price of betraying the Liberal ethos and allying themselves with the populists from the ZChN and the PL, and this accounts for these poll findings. The growing schism within the KLD between the conservative-liberal faction drifting toward Center Accord and Hall's grouping, on the one hand, and the pro-UD faction, which rejects the possibility of an alliance with Center Accord, on the other, makes such an assumption likely.

It also is possible that the Liberals lack a backbone and political imagination. This lack made itself felt already during the election of Sejm and Senate bodies, when the KLD, again bribed with offers of appointive posts, voted in a bloc with its present-day opponents, the KPN and the PSL, beating the UD candidates for speakers and vice speakers of the Sejm and the Senate. Could it be that the KLD, while publicly rejecting the possibility of an early election, has been secretly pushing for it by praying for the fall of the Suchocka government, which could bring it about?

What (Who) After Suchocka?

When asked what he would do if the Cabinet of "the Polish Mrs. Thatcher" were to fall, President Lech Walesa answered in his usual style that he already had two solutions prepared. As can readily be guessed, the first would be a presidential government. The second or "next trump up the sleeve" would be the same as the appointment to the prime ministership of Waldemar Pawlak in June and Hanna Suchocka in July—or the dissolution of the parliament.

CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] polls indicate that, if the 5-percent threshold were introduced in the

election announced today, only four parties would remain eligible: the UD, the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], the PSL, and the KPN. And only they (plus the German minority) would be represented in the future Sejm. The Liberals would be out.

Should this prediction come true, the possibility of forming a cohesive government with a clear program and without a conflict of interests—in short, a government that would finally bring Poland into Europe—would be eleven smaller than it has been so far because it is difficult to assume that, in the future Sejm, the UD would reach a qualified majority: To govern, it would again have to enter into a rotten compromise with one of the present-day opposition parties. It is not unlikely that, in view of this, another schism could occur within the UD, thereby enhancing the chances of the postcommunist Left to return to power.

This depressing prospect may become the strongest mortar binding the current coalition and making it last longer than might be indicated by political arithmetic. The specter of the loss of power by the post-Solidarity camp may once again blur the differences in platforms—often imaginary and reduced to purely personal differences—among the various splinters of that camp, due to the “war at the top.” Paradoxically, even the incessant division and subdivision of the “party of the ethos” into diverse factions, wings, fragments, and new parliamentary caucuses can serve to strengthen the progovernment political base. The fact that the break-away of Aleksander Hall’s conservative faction from the UD deprived that party of its seniority in the Sejm is, of course, unpleasant because this has turned the caucus of the Left leftist deputies into numerically the largest in the Sejm. But only seven deputies have left the UD with Hall, and the Polish Convention Party established by Hall, which has absorbed the cogoverning Party of Christian Democrats headed by Deputy Prime Minister Pawel Laczowski, has altogether 30 deputies. If only in view of the persona of Laczowski, that is at least a nonoppositionist grouping.

Likewise, the divisions emerging within Center Accord (Urbanski’s faction) and the Labor Union (the discord between Malachowski and Bugaj) follow the criterion of attitude toward the governing coalition. Sooner or later, wings desiring to support that coalition will arise within these caucuses of deputies. Further on in the offing, such a division is also possible within the PSL: The irrational oppositionist attitude of this numerically largest oppositionist party, with its particular voting bloc [peasants], is already beginning to pain many of its leading politicians, not excluding its chairman, Pawlak, who, during his 33 days as prime minister, already tasted the delights of power.

In Fragility There Is Strength

Someone has compared the present fragile coalition, always balancing on the brink of ability to govern, to an extremely exotic and rarely served dessert—Baked

Alaska. In theory, when placed in an oven, it should immediately begin to melt, but when covered with the right kind of dough and skillfully treated at a high temperature, it turns into a culinary phenomenon—a core of ice cream inside a hot surrounding layer.

The government of Hanna Suchocka is such a political phenomenon. In theory, it should not have been formed at all, or it should long ago have melted in political squabbles, but it survives and keeps getting better, as it were. The hand of the Belweder chef, who in the beginning had burned many dishes but, as time goes on, is managing to cook increasingly sophisticated dishes, is probably not insignificant here. Incidentally, it is interesting how zealously the media have glossed over one of the best nuanced moves of Lech Walesa during his Presidency. On the day on which the Russian chief archivist, Rudolf Pikhoya, was to hand to the president two briefcases with Katyn documents, Walesa invited Czeslaw Milosz to breakfast at nine and asked him to be present when receiving the emissary from Moscow.

It looks as though the ordinary Pole, who gives better chances for survival to the current government than would a deputy asked at random, displays a better political imagination. It is not unlikely also that, in choosing Suchocka as the best of the post-Solidarity prime ministers so far, despite the absence of any spectacular success accomplished by her to date, the ordinary Pole simply does not want yet another change of government and the attendant maelstrom of new personnel appointments. A sixth change of government within barely little more than three years would mentally and financially exhaust his strength. That is because, in addition to everything else, every such change is very costly to the budget and, hence, also to the taxpayers.

One of the rights of persons holding executive posts in the government is to continue receiving their pay, along with a cost-of-living raise after the first three months, for six months after their recall (as well as to be protected by bodyguards and provided with a BOR [Secret Service]-chauffeured car, and so forth, for eligible individuals). As a result, the salaries due a prime minister (totaling about 17 million zlotys monthly) are at present being collected by three individuals, and the same applies to salaries of the director of the Office of the Council of Ministers (totaling 14.5 million zlotys monthly), while the doubled salaries of ministers and deputy ministers of state, directors of central offices, general directors, and voivodes and deputy voivodes, who are replaced by every new prime minister, are counted in the hundreds. In the event of an early parliamentary election, there will also be doubled salaries for members of the presidiums of the Sejm and Senate as well as for deputies. It seems that no one so far has calculated the extent to which frequent personnel shifts in the government have been contributing and continue to contribute to the growing annual budget deficit.

For this reason, too, we cannot afford yet another new prime minister, another new government, and an early-election Sejm. They all should somehow come to an agreement and gratify that majority of the voters who claim that Suchocka is OK and those 7 percent of deputies who predict that her government will last until the end of its term of office.

Review of Military Reforms Enumerated

93EP0077A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
6-8 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Lt. Col. Tadeusz Mitek: "The Status of Military Reforms," under the rubric "Views, Positions, Opinions: We Invite Discussion"]

[Excerpt] Let us begin by recalling the truism that, for at least a year so far, the Polish Army has been ranked foremost among the state and public institutions trusted by the public. Recent sociological studies show that this leading position of the military has become even stronger. This may by now be a hackneyed truth, but it merits certain reflections.

For it is surprising to consider how it happened that the military, despite its strong ties to the past system of society, and, despite its image (at least in slogans) as the armed sword of its structures and ideology, has regained and is maintaining its authority among the Polish public. What changes have been made in the military following the June 1989 free parliamentary elections and following the change in the leadership of the government and the Ministry of National Defense to have made this fact possible?

* * *

We Shall Be One With the Nation

Undoubtedly, of basic importance was that the military, the career soldiers, had no intention of exercising the role of that armed sword guarding a system of society rejected by the people. It has accepted the change in the system of society, taken part in it, and reflected this credibly within its ranks and outwardly.

The military did not become an obstacle to building the civic democracy, nor did it become the reactionary bugbear and grizzly that it had been touted to be. At that historic moment, it became one with the nation. In this connection, it turned out to be the most stable structure, the backbone of the state on which the latter can lean during the always difficult period of transition.

As the buzzword puts it nowadays, the Polish Army, now deprived of the adjective "People's," has become historically, morally, and, in terms of its traditions, returned to the nation. We are not going to analyze here the extent to which this slogan has by now come true, and the extent to which it was true in the past as well. Instead, let us

consider more closely the trend of the real changes that have taken place in various aspects of the functioning of the military.

It is also worth considering in which domains the reforms of the military are incomplete or even barely commenced because there would be nothing worse for the military itself (and for the military reporter) than falling into the rut of the former propaganda of its perfection and successes.

The Prohibition Against Political Involvement

Let us begin with the political-moral aspect—that is, the aspect of the military as an institution of a democratic state. In this domain, the cardinal need and objective was depoliticizing the military and purging it of the Communist Party. First of all, the party and political structures within the military had to be eliminated, along with the entire corps of party-political instructors and officers.

Consider that, at the beginning of 1989, the penetration of the military by the Communist Party was reflected in the following figures on party membership: officers, 92 percent; warrant officers, 66 percent; career noncommissioned officers, 40 percent.

And the figures on party membership according to rank were: divisional and regimental commanders, 100 percent; battalion commanders, 100 percent; and company and platoon commanders, 80 percent.

The party's structure within the military consisted of seven party committees at the OW/RSZ [Military District/Branch of the Armed Forces] level, about 70 committees at the tactical-unit level, 250 committees at the regimental level, and approximately 5,000 committees of basic party organizations.

Within the military, there were approximately 490 salaried party posts. In addition, nearly every officer served at one time or another in some nonsalaried, elected party post. Furthermore, membership in the party was a yardstick of community trust and acceptance by colleagues.

This entire structure disappeared basically without any major problem. Its elimination was accepted in its entirety and with relief by an overwhelming majority of military personnel. The party's penetration of the military thus turned out to be mere formalism, due to its subordination to the political decision makers.

There exist no apprehensions of the restoration of any party structure in the military, under no ideological marque whatsoever. That is because the law now prohibits military personnel from belonging to political parties.

The next step was to eliminate the "apparatus." The Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army and its counterparts at lower command levels ceased to exist, as did

other subordinate institutions of a political nature. Uniformed party activists and employees of the "ideological front" were the first to depart from the military.

The entire political corps was disbanded and replaced with the military educational service subordinated to the Education Department of the Polish Army. The political corps had a strength of 7,839, of whom 5,702 were officers, 603 warrant officers, and 1,534 career noncommissioned officers. In the newly established military educational service, the number of officer positions alone was reduced from 5,702 to 2,192.

What matters is that the nature of that service changed totally. It no longer exercises an indoctrinating role, and its objectives relate to broadly conceived education inside the barracks and to humanizing the life of the military.

They Are Gone Along With Their Slogans

Not only with regard to that educational service but also for the military as a whole, the normative documents, manuals of rules, and all legislation regulating the course of military service were revised so as to eliminate any traces of politics or ideology.

The notorious circumstantial propaganda slogans that were to define the political "right thinking" of the military disappeared from the walls of the barracks, from lounges, and from exercise squares. Thus, also, the entire branch of ideological utilitarian rhetoric withered away. Becoming skilled at that rhetoric often used to be a source of personal advancement.

Still Overlooked

But it would be premature to say that this domain of military life has been completely consigned to oblivion. The liquidation of party organizations, which, in addition to their political purposes, exercised certain social, monitoring, consolidating, and social-service roles, left behind it a certain vacuum in the military community, a vacuum that cannot yet always be filled by the newly instituted officer meetings and the like.

The newly appointed "ombudsmen" are still looking for a niche for themselves in military units and institutions. Their authority as representatives of the rank and file has not yet become consolidated. As spokesmen for the rights and interests of the soldiers, or as reflectors of the opinions of their communities, they are still overlooked or even ignored—and sometimes powerless in the face of bossy commanding officers because it is easier to rule by fiat.

The educational officers also are exploring proper ways of exercising their duties, especially considering the hasty and simplified views of their purpose, which still burden them with the odium of the former party-political apparat. Thus, many of them do not know what

they should be doing in military units or why, while many unit commanders do not know what to do with them.

In the military, the officer-humanist is still an undefined phenomenon.

There exist many doubts as to the service and career prospects of the officers assigned to the military educational service. Their complete integration with the reformed structures of the military is yet to be determined.

Out of Respect for the Individual and Traditions

The humanization of military service is nevertheless becoming a real prospect because, while it is difficult to introduce at once by decree or order it into interpersonal relations, it can undoubtedly be facilitated by such a formal-legal decision as, say, the introduction of a permanent pass for personnel in basic military service—and that has been done. That is also why psychologists and sociologists are being invited to the barracks.

Major revisions were incorporated in the Law on the General Duty of Military Service. Consider that basic military service was shortened to 18 months. Military study programs at civilian higher educational institutions were eliminated, and the military training of university graduates has been shortened to five months after graduation. In addition, legal possibilities to perform alternate civilian service by reason of religious or moral belief were created.

The idea of the so-called Regiment of the Year 2000, as once described in POLSKA ZBROJNA, was conceived with the intent of meeting the needs of young soldiers and their personality traits, and fully respecting their civil rights. Basically, this idea is that, among other things, in his off-duty hours, the soldier's individual rights are fully respected, and he is free to dispose of his leisure time as he sees fit.

From the standpoint of broader personal rights and moral justification of military service, there is the basically much more extensive issue of the complete restoration of freedom of religion within the military, as most prominently reflected in the establishment of the Field Chaplaincy of the Polish Army, which is headed by a field bishop. This portentous decision restores a Polish military tradition and abolishes the barrier that used to exist in questions of religion between the secularized military and the society, and the spiritual values professed by the latter.

This issue is, however, linked to some apprehensions that freedom of religion might now be regimented from the opposite direction, so to speak, because it happens that commanders display excessive zeal in ordering religious practices as if they were military orders akin to marching orders, which certainly does not promote a genuine spiritual life.

Inasmuch as we are speaking of traditions, it is worth noting that a definite turnabout has taken place in the military as regards honoring the heritage of ancient Polish military feats of arms. The motifs of national patriotism from which the military had been isolated during the postwar period were restored. This is reflected in educational activities, in the restoration of historic names to many military units, and in the abandonment of political criteria when selecting patrons.

On the initiative of the military, the Sejm is considering suitable drafts of laws on the inheritance of traditions, on military insignia, and—that being so important to the military—on the military oath. The newly introduced version of the oath totally lacks any traces of the language that, until recently, had provided critics with the ammunition for making the argument, so unfair to the patriotism of the career military, that the Polish Army remains a mere Polish-language formation of an alien superpower and an alien ideology.

Emigre Polish war veterans who nowadays meet so often and so cordially with Polish soldiers no doubt feel that, in returning after so many years to a free fatherland, they are honored and welcomed as dear guests by the Polish military.

The National Defense Doctrine and Military Potential

From the domain of tradition and general values, let us now pass on to the reality of the military as the armed force of the state. What major changes have taken place in that reality?

Well, what is happening now could be described as the building of a totally new model of the Polish Army, one subordinated to a new national defense doctrine and military doctrine. This is a complex operation or, rather, process because we are departing the tight structures of the Warsaw Pact, and it is a costly one, too. It has to continue; its time frame extends until the 21st century, and here hasty or precipitate actions are not indicated, although it seems that certain solutions could be accelerated.

Under the adopted assumptions of the Polish security policy, Poland should, following the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, have its own fully sovereign and integral military potential and national defense system.

The principles presented by the president of the Republic of Poland proclaim: "We are resolved to defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to oppose any aggression. The basic element of the defense system is the armed forces, which, in peacetime, are maintained in a state of mobilizational readiness, serving, as the need arises, to immediately undertake combat tasks and deploy for combat operations.

"In the event of a local conflict on our territory, we shall immediately initiate defensive and aggressive actions in order to halt and crush the enemy. This goal should be attained by Poland independently, without involving assistance from other countries.

"In the event of total war, the strategy followed by the Polish armed forces will be to present, as long as possible, organized resistance in order to inflict maximal losses on the aggressor, demonstrate the will to resist, and gain time for the response of other countries and international institutions."

The restructuring of the armed forces is subordinated to the above guiding concept. Speaking most generally, it consists chiefly of a gradual redeployment of operational troops so as to strengthen the country's eastern border. The pace of this operation is dictated chiefly by its huge cost. Under this plan, the fourth military district—Krakow—has already been established.

Changes have also been introduced in the country's air defense system by merging the air force and air defense into a single entity—Air Force and Air Defense Troops. Tactical units have been reorganized and mobilizational objectives revised. The General Staff of the Polish Army is being transformed from a dozen or so institutions and departments into an integrated command body directing the armed forces.

In the model of the military we are constructing, mechanized units will remain the core of the land forces. At the same time, in accordance with the needs of rapid response, troop mobility should be enhanced by means of new kinds of armaments, chiefly assault helicopters, of which we may own 130 under the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] disarmament treaty, whereas, at present, we have only 30. These troops should be ready to immediately undertake actions as directed, to a varying extent and in any direction.

Reductions and Restrictions

Until now, restructuring has consisted chiefly of reducing what is superfluous (or at times too hastily regarded as superfluous) and what we absolutely had to reduce. In the latter case, the determining criterion was the ceilings placed on various categories of armaments, as binding on us under the CFE Treaty, which has been the subject of specific articles in POLSKA ZBROJNA, or the need to rationalize or conserve.

Basic figures: Troop size was reduced from more than 450,000 to approximately 210,000.

Many changes ensued from the need to discard from the military any ballast burdening it as a structure and an institution. Thus, many units and posts providing services to or manufacturing goods for the military were eliminated. Many barracks and other military facilities were transferred to local governments, although, in some cases, this unfortunately led to their devastation, owing to neglect and the inability to utilize them properly. In addition, substantial quantities of military equipment were transferred for the needs of the national economy.

The policy of cutbacks was also applied to career military personnel, with the underlying objective of rejuvenating the military. Radical cuts in the size of the career military took place. For example, 2,013 colonels were discharged in 1990, and 1,072 in 1991. The numbers of the discharged lieutenant colonels were, correspondingly, 1,279 and 2,830.

Currently, 3,476 colonels are serving in our armed forces; that is one-half the number that existed two years ago. We have 9,160 lieutenant colonels—less than 65 percent of what we had two years ago. As regards generals, they now number 416, which is not even 25 percent of their previous number, and, in this respect, we have fewer generals in proportion to the size of our troops than any other European country.

It is anticipated that rapid personnel changes will continue; to be sure, they will be consonant with practical needs and principles (age, seniority, education). The heads of the Ministry of National Defense claim that any new appointments, at present, are optimal, and that advancement will be decided by expertise, professional and moral predispositions, and preparedness for exercising a new post under the new conditions dictated by the needs of the modern Army.

Let us also add that the system for training the career military is being extensively modified. Military training is getting transformed. Certain military schools are being or will be either shut down or combined. The long-expected training of Polish officers at Western institutions of higher education and training centers has commenced. Here the language barrier has proved important.

It must also be admitted, however, that the restructuring, which the career military associates chiefly with reductions in their numbers, has been a source of quite a few personal tragedies and feelings of injustice. Many of those thousands of rified career soldiers did not leave the Army voluntarily. Undoubtedly, they included valuable persons, individuals deeply devoted to the military and their country. Many of them have found themselves in a difficult material situation, as well as in a moral and emotional vacuum.

According to the Rules of Democracy

But let us again consider the institutional changes in the armed forces, as related to integrating the military with the system of the democratic state being created.

Thus, the Constitution has been amended to define the status of the president of the Republic of Poland as the commander in chief of the armed forces. The principle of isolating the civilian departments of the Ministry of National Defense from its purely military departments has been adopted. Accordingly, Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz announced during a briefing of the commanders of the Polish Army (on 22 October) that he has signed the following executive order:

"The Ministry of National Defense is being transformed from a central agency for the command and administration of the armed forces into a political-administrative office for directing national defense and national preparedness, and the General Staff of the Polish Army is, jointly with the ministry's central institutions, being transformed into a central body for the command of the armed forces."

Thus, the military will be directed by the minister of national defense but commanded by the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

This decision is of fundamental importance to the future shape of the Ministry of National Defense and to reforming the entire structure of the Polish Army.

A new role is being exercised by the National Security Council, the heir to the quondam Committee for National Defense, along with the Security Bureau and the secretary of state for national security attached to the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland.

Not without importance to this picture are the totally new qualitatively—and, of course, in orientation—international contacts of the Polish Army. We are regulating in a completely new manner, on the principle of bilateral agreements, military relations with our old neighbors as well as with the new neighbors arisen from the collapse of the former Soviet system. A stable military order, on which we are now basing our national security, is being created around our borders.

The agreements on international military cooperation that have been or are being concluded comprise plans and projects relating to the Vysehrad Group [Polish-Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak Triangle], as well as military agreements with the armies of other countries—for example, the bilateral agreements being prepared with the FRG, Belgium, Russia, Ukraine, and Canada.

These steps are bringing us gradually closer to complete integration with the European security system. Poland is intensifying its political actions on the international arena and solidifying its purely military contacts—among other things, it maintains a permanent representative at NATO Headquarters—which unlock increasingly realistic prospects for joining the military structures of the North Atlantic Defense Organization. This would mean obtaining political and geomilitary guarantees of the security of the Third Republic.

The reform efforts being undertaken by the Polish Army are also intended to make it a fully "compatible" and credible partner of the modern armies of the democratic Western countries.

A Partial Picture

What we said above outlines extensively but also in an abridged form the scale of the changes occurring in the Polish military in the past three years, without drawing a complete picture. In particular, despite the opening of

the barracks, the inner life of the Army remains relatively inaccessible to outside observers and follows more complicated rules than those shown here.

There still are many reasons warranting feelings of anxiety and frustration among the military, and that not just because of the present-day realities and the elimination of many privileges previously granted by custom to the military as a professional group. The mood of the military is also influenced by its traditional mentality, the past treatment of people in uniform, and the existing inconsistencies in the legislation and rules governing military service.

Likewise, the overall course of reform processes is not completely smooth. The exclusion of the Army from the political games as recently as several months ago was something quite opposed to the activities of the individuals in charge of the Ministry of National Defense for more than half a year. The biased attitude of politicians toward the problems of the military had at that time halted its restructuring for a while.

The plans for reforming the armed force and the entire national defense system are adversely affected by the budgetary problems of the state. The Army is in a continuing retreat owing to financial considerations, which dictate cutbacks in material standards, social services, and barracks amenities, not to mention the scarcity of supply and modern combat equipment. There is hardly any need to expand on this subject.

Then, also, there are the anxieties and vexations relating to the not yet completely surmounted negative attitude of certain political groupings toward the military. Political steps that totally ignore the specific nature of the military and, more broadly speaking, the defense needs of our country, are still being taken. One example is the extremistically worded drafts of lustration laws [that is, laws identifying and penalizing former communists and their agents], whose literal enforcement would bring about the disbanding of the career military and the self-disarming of Poland.

These anxieties also affect the picture of the Polish Army and the prospect of changes in it. [passage omitted]

Ethnic Hungarian Leader Szots on Budapest TV

93BA0267A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
12 Nov 92 pp 2183-2184

[Interview with Geza Szots, political vice chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by NAP TV reporters Janos Betlen and Henrik Havas; broadcast on the week of 2 Nov 1992, place not given: "We Must Be Open"]

[Text] [Havas] I am asking Geza Szots, political vice chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ]: Was the fusillade directed at the RMDSZ after the Kolozsvar [Cluj] declaration foreseeable?

[Szots] It was foreseeable. Altogether, we live under a permanent fusillade, and so nothing special happened after the declaration that we were not prepared for, or were not used to. Even certain elements of it were foreseeable. I was curious to see, for instance, how the constant paranoid reference to being directed by Budapest will be brought to bear on this matter. They came up with a very simple solution, because Gyula Horn [former Hungarian foreign minister] was visiting in Transylvania in those days, specifically in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] and Szekelyudvarhely [Odorheiu Secuiesc], at the invitation of local RMDSZ politicians who are known to be characteristically and decidedly opposed to self-determination. He was in Marosvasarhely and Szekelyudvarhely, but I did not meet him. What appeared in the Romanian press after the delegate assembly of the RMDSZ accepted this document on internal self-determination, which is considered by everyone to be very significant? What appeared was that Gyula Horn arrived in Transylvania, met Bishop Laszlo Tokes and Geza Szots, and this is what lies behind this declaration. This is merely an anecdote.

[Betlen] Are there really significant elements among the Hungarians of Transylvania who do not want any kind of self-determination or is it only that they don't consider it smart to bring it up now?

[Szots] They don't consider it timely to bring it up now, and they don't think it is possible to attain it.

[Betlen] And you, of course, think it is possible to attain it. But when do you think it will be possible?

[Szots] I think that in politics strategy, the concept, is more important than tactical criteria. Let me give you an example. Sandor Hodi—one of the leaders of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, and the major creator of the autonomy concept accepted by the Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians—related the following: When this very determined and far-reaching draft of an autonomy concept was completed, the Hungarian leaders of Vojvodina got together and said it was questionable whether the proposal was appropriate at that time. There was shooting going on! There was a civil war! Was that the time to bring this up? Wasn't it suicidal to

do so? He said, we are not going to speculate on whether the time is right or not. We will publish it now. We will take the responsibility. This is how it happened and this is why I am telling you the story. Sandor Hodi said that the reaction of Milosevic and company to the proposal was a relief of all things. Namely, that now we know exactly what they want, and this is all they want. In other words, they don't want to secede from Serbia. About this, people can talk. I offered this as an analogy. It is possible there there will be, there were, and there are people who say that this moment is not suitable. Others—and it seems to me that now they are in the majority—say that in our opinion, we shouldn't worry about when we say something, but rather what we say.

[Havas] Is Romanian reality, the Romanian economic, industrial, and cultural crisis and the level of development an adequate and necessary milieu for such demands?

[Szots] I think that the demands themselves also shape reality. In other words, if we can draw clear lines in connection with a desired status, i.e., what kinds of rights we want for the Hungarian community inside Romania, then we also do the democratization and pluralization processes in Romania a service.

[Betlen] Thus, you don't want to secede....

[Szots] Not in the sense that this community proposes territorial separation. It means, however, that it wishes to govern its own institutions, its cultural, educational, religious, and all other institutions, on its own.

[Havas] This is also a kind of secession. Secession from a system of national, cultural, and other institutions, which the Romanian people wish to keep unified.

[Szots] Obviously, it formulates the demand of a very determined independence from the supercentralized Romanian structure of institutions directed by Bucharest.

[Havas] Can the two coexist? For instance, is a very democratic, very liberal, real Hungarian educational structure realistic within a centralized state-run press and educational system?

[Szots] Obviously not; but the demands formulated by us help the entire Romanian society to become more democratic. Precisely through the idea that a Hungarian educational autonomy is possible, they might even conceive of the possibility of a Romanian educational autonomy.

[Havas] Are you not afraid that modernization and liberalization will be labeled Hungarian, and the whole process will be reversed? That everything modern, liberal, European—thus, whatever the RMDSZ proclaims—is considered Hungarian at the same time?

[Szots] Obviously, the Romanian public is irritated by certain statements. But this cannot be a reason for the

RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Romania not to accept the European ideal, pluralism, and the basic values of democracy. If we succeed in making Romanian society understand that a road on which the first step is the banning of a school with a different language can only just so far. This point is a cul-de-sac, where it is not only forbidden to speak a different language, but also to say anything different from what the power wants. Thus, the attempt at homogenization—ethnic cleansing was called homogenization in Romania since Ceausescu, even in official documents—set the goal of the establishment of a monolithic society, of a phalanstery in which one is allowed to say and think exclusively in one language, and only one thing.

[Betlen] Adam Katona, RMDSZ leader from Szekelyfold [area of Transylvania including Covasna county, Harghita county, and the Southern part of Mures county], proposed that the RMDSZ come out in support of Hungarian autonomy in Szekelyfold. This idea was rejected by the Union at the time. Do you think that their standpoint has changed as witnessed by this current proposal, which puts great emphasis on autonomy without exactly saying whether they think of territorial autonomy, for instance in Szekelyfold?

[Szots] It was not the Union that rejected it last year, but rather persons with a dominant role within the Union at the time. It was not a unanimous rejection. In Romania the word autonomy has a desperate ring to the Romanian party because the only thing this society, which has been supplied with incredibly little and erroneous information knows about autonomy, is that it means a territory, an enclave, where the sovereignty of the Romanian State ends, where it is forbidden to speak Romanian, where Romanians are persecuted, where they are removed in forceful and shrewd ways, and where a small Hungary is proclaimed within the great Romania. This idea has been so deeply rooted in public opinion that it seemed expedient for certain reasons not to emphasize territorial autonomy, but rather principles of self-government, which characterize a modern Europe altogether. It is possible that this statement is not completely clear to people in Hungary. I think that in Transylvania—and in Romania altogether—one can form a much more exact picture about the spirit of the statement, because it contains references, for instance, to Gyulafehervar [Alba Iulia], with which many people here are not familiar, but everyone in Romania knows that this is a reference to the resolutions of the great public assembly on 1 December 1918 in Gyulafehervar, which very clearly declare that the will of those present provides complete freedom of self-government to the people living in Romania.

[Betlen] Still, I think that this statement can be interpreted in various ways. Laszlo Tokes, honorary president of RMDSZ, said at a press conference in Bucharest that it seemed that so far we were doomed to play the role of an eternal opposition. If I recall, he said that up to now we were within the Romanian political structure, and now we are withdrawing a little, and claim that we

will take care of our own affairs. This is not exactly the same as various self-governments.

[Szots] Obviously there is a gap in communication here, because it is not my place to interpret the words by Bishop Tokes. But based on everything that he has said, done, and represented up to now, I am sure that he could not have said anything which would point to isolation, to staying aloof. For instance, at the same national delegate assembly we discussed the location of the next conference. Several people suggested Szekelyudvarhely [Odorheiu Secuiesc]. On the other hand, Laszlo Tokes argued that the conference must be organized in Brasov, if it cannot be held in Temesvar [Timisoara] for organizational reasons. He argued that Szekelyudvarhely signals to the Romanians that we are closing ourselves in our own citadel, while Brasov—a multiethnic, multicultural area, a symbolic city where the Romanian mayor was elected, among others, by the votes of Hungarians—signals that we must be open, and we must continually demonstrate our readiness for a dialogue.

[Betlen] Could one recommend that Romanians receive self-governments within the self-governments with a Hungarian majority?

[Szots] Obviously one could do that, too. However, in Romania even the concept of a municipality is unknown. It is not called self-government, and it is not called municipality. It is called local administration, i.e., local self-administration, which is a link in the chain coming from the capital. It is determined in Bucharest how many deputy mayors a municipality can have, and recently a decree was issued that the self-administrations can only establish links with other self-governments outside Romania, whether in Hungary, West Europe, or any other self-government in the world, with the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This shows that the ideal of the state in Romania today remains the ideal of this incredibly centralized power.

[Havas] Together with this decree, another decree was born: The word Transylvania cannot be used in official documents. After World War II, native Sudeten-Germans were deported; a part of Hungarians from Transylvania, as well as from Felvidek ["Upper Country"—northern Hungary until 1920, now Slovakia] were deported; the entire population of East-Prussia was deported; now, ethnic cleansing is under way in Yugoslavia. I asked a scholar of international law what the world has to say about all of this. He said the world condemns it. Did the world do anything? No; after a while it will accept the status quo. This is why I ask whether it is not a practical solution for the Romanians to be so rigid? After all, time will play into their hands, anyway.

[Szots] I don't know. I am not convinced at all.

[Havas] They set themselves apart from world history.

[Szots] And that proves them right?

[Havas] What I ask is, is this the way they think? That we can do whatever we want?

[Szots] It is very difficult to use the third person plural. Because Romanian society which is, as I said, manipulated, misinformed, and underinformed, is beginning to awaken to a certain extent. After two years, the results of the elections were substantially different. This shows that a shift has occurred.

[Betlen] On the other hand, Laszlo Tokes argued that the election results were disappointing and certain illusions must be given up. What were these illusions?

[Szots] Some people entertained the illusion that these two years altered Romanian society, and that it would come to realizations and make decisions, which a society with a mature and deep-seated political culture and political traditions would make. However, this was impossible. I did not envision anything like this because there is no independent mass communication in the country. As long as there is no independent television, and as long as the press is at the mercy of the price of paper, the price of printing, and the conditions of distribution, there will be no breakthrough in the naturalization of Romanian society.

[Havas] Can the threat be fulfilled that the RMDSZ will be outlawed?

[Szots] This presupposes a turn that is highly unlikely. In my opinion, the political forces closest to the government have realized that they cannot allow themselves to outlaw one of the most significant political parties in the country without a loss of prestige and credibility.

[Havas] Would they have to modify a law on political parties?

[Szots] They would have to modify the constitution. And here I would like to reiterate that in Transylvania the RMDSZ is the most significant party; it cannot be ruled out that this is the very reason, or one of the reasons, why one is not allowed to talk about Transylvania. Thus, one can of course outlaw such a party with one stroke of the pen, but there would be consequences....

[Betlen] What kind of consequences?

[Szots] I think the country would lose the last vestiges of its credibility.

[Betlen] Politics are important. Party politics are important. It is important how Hungarian senators and MP's stand their own in Romanian legislature and the Romanian Upper House, but I think it is even more important that market economy, that privatization should gain ground in the economy, in everyday life. Can the Hungarians in Transylvania make use of these huge possibilities?

[Szots] The Hungarians in Romania have more or less exhausted the political means at their disposal. It is conceivable that the fight by political means can be made

10 or 15 percent more efficient. But in the present political conditions we cannot hope for a quantitative breakthrough. We must create an economy, which is able to support our own cultural and political institutions.

[Betlen] Do the existing conflicts within the RMDSZ between, say, the radicals and the moderates, correspond—completely or in part—to the positions of political parties in Hungary?

[Szots] No, not in the least. Within the RMDSZ the most divergent options and choices of values must coexist because we actually constitute a society. This is a society of 2,000,000 people, and it is impossible for 2,000,000 people to think alike. The important point, due to our minority existence, is that this community wants one thing, but in ideology and in numerous other questions, the people think very differently. But this is only natural.

[Betlen] There are undoubtedly liberals and nationalists there, too. Is there such an animosity between them as here in Hungary?

[Szots] No. On the contrary, I must say that the main frontline is between a part of the RMDSZ—or rather, of the politicized elite—which subscribes to the idea of unity (according to others, to a high ground of Bolshevik ideology). They are opposed by those who belong to various factions which include Christian democrats as well as liberals. Thus, here, those who demand pluralism are opposed not to each other, but to those who would like to see the RMDSZ as a monolithic structure.

[Betlen] I read in your book that irrespective of the official time, you set your watch by the astronomical time at home because this is the only way you can be sure of yourself. What time is it now in Kolozsvár?

[Szots] This discourse is about the time in Kolozsvár; this is "Kolozsvár time."

[Betlen] This is a mechanism without visible hands. Is this what you mean?

[Szots] No. This is a broken, destroyed watch.

[Betlen] Do you really think that it is over? Are we worse off than before?

[Szots] In Kolozsvár, we are worse off.

[Betlen] Worse than three years ago?

[Szots] This is what I talked about at the session of the European Council in early summer, that the forces which came into the exclusive possession of the power monopoly in Kolozsvár are completely irresponsible. Therefore, although right now we do have Hungarian schools and a free Hungarian press, and I could go on on about what we have now that we did not have then, in view of the base instincts kindled in the masses, the situation of Hungarians in Kolozsvár is more dangerous.

This is not true in general for Hungarians in Transylvania. One must separate Kolozsvár from what is happening in Transylvania in general.

Permanent Commissions of Chamber of Deputies List

93P20060A Bucharest *MONITORUL OFICIAL*
in Romanian 16 Nov 92 pp 1-10

["Text" of Decision No. 59 of the Chamber of Deputies Approving the Membership of the Permanent Commissions of the Chamber of Deputies]

[Text] On the basis of Article 31, Paragraph 2 of the Regulation on the Chamber of Deputies, the Chamber of Deputies has decided the following:

Sole article—The membership of the permanent commissions of the Chamber of Deputies is approved in accordance with attachments 1-14, which are an integral part of the present decision.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, Adrian Nastase
Bucharest, 5 November 1992
Decision No. 59

Attachment No. 1 Parliament of Romania—Chamber of Deputies Members of the Commission for Economic Policy, Reform, and Privatization

1. Alexandru Albu—Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] parliamentary group
2. Mircea, Pavlu—FDSN
3. Florin Serac—FDSN
4. Petre Posea—FDSN
5. Dan Gogoncea—FDSN
6. Valentin Soroceanu—FDSN
7. Ton Hariga—FDSN
8. Mircea Silvas—FDSN
9. Viorel Munteanu—FDSN
10. Daniel Frunzescu—FDSN
11. Laurentiu Veber—FDSN
12. Marin Jugravu—FDSN
13. Ilie Nica—FDSN
14. Mircea Ciumara—National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT- cd] and Romanian Ecologist Party [PER] parliamentary group
15. Liviu Neculai Marcu—PNT-cd and PER
16. Ioan Muresan—PNT-cd and PER
17. Gheorghe Cristea—PNT-cd and PER
18. Vasile Bran—National Salvation Front [FSN] parliamentary group
19. Dumitru Calance—FSN
20. Aristide Nelu Dragomir—FSN
21. Dumitru Moinescu—FSN
22. Corneliu Constantin Ruse—FSN
23. Bujor-Bogdan Teodoriu—FSN
24. Craciun Floruta—Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] parliamentary group
25. Miron Chichisan—PUNR
26. Nicolae Bud—PUNR

27. Eugen Crisan—PUNR
28. Akos Birtalan—Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] parliamentary group
29. Ladislau Borbely—UDMR
30. Francisc Pecs—UDMR
31. Corneliu-Dan Vrabie—Romania Mare Party [PRM] parliamentary group
32. Laurentiu Priceputu—liberal parliamentary group
33. Vasile Mandroviceanu—Civic Alliance Party [PAC] parliamentary group
34. Varujan Vosganian—national minorities' parliamentary group
35. Mihail Paraluta—socialist parliamentary group
36. Constantin Avramescu—Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSDR] social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 2 Members of the Commission for the Budget, Finances, and Banking

1. Constantin Teculescu—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Gheorghe Ana—FDSN
3. Iulian Nistor—FDSN
4. Constantin Mardare—FDSN
5. Ion Dumitrescu—FDSN
6. Neculai Grigoras—FDSN
7. Octav Pintilie—FDSN
8. Gheorghe Boboc—FDSN
9. Vasile Pop—PNT-cd and PER
10. Ion Hui—PNT-cd and PER
11. Florian Bercea—FSN
12. Teodor Luputiu—FSN
13. Petre Partal—FSN
14. Ioan Bogdan—PUNR
15. Vasile Ionescu—PUNR
16. Iuliu Vida—UDMR
17. Eugen Matis—UDMR
18. Marcel Moldoveanu—PRM
19. Sorin Pantis—liberal parliamentary group
20. Ioan Ghise—PAC
21. Constantin Rotaru—socialist parliamentary group

Attachment No. 3 Members of Commission for Industries and Services

1. Ovidiu Musetescu—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Ion Bivolaru—FDSN
3. Constantin Enache—FDSN
4. Petrica Petre—FDSN
5. Mihail Iusut—FDSN
6. Vasile Cristea—FDSN
7. Ioan Catarig—FDSN
8. Mircea Chiostec—FDSN
9. Ion Diaconescu—PNT-cd and PER
10. Barbu Pitigoi—PNT-cd and PER
11. Viorel Pavel—PNT-cd and PER
12. Traian Basescu—FSN
13. Alexandru Dumitru Radu—FSN
14. Gheorghe Dobre—PUNR
15. Vasile Ene—PUNR

17. Istvan Antal—UDMR
18. Ion Hortopan—PRM
19. Raymond Luca—liberal parliamentary group
20. Dumitru Dragut—socialist parliamentary group

Attachment No. 4
Members of Commission for Agriculture,
Silviculture, the Food Industry
and Special Services

1. Petre Banita—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Dumitru Braneanu—FDSN
3. Trifu Chirila—FDSN
4. Anatolie Costin—FDSN
5. Vlad Vladimir Galin-Corini—FDSN
6. Nicolai Lazar—FDSN
7. Corneliu Monoranu—FDSN
8. Aurelian Popescu—FDSN
9. Mihai Olteanu—FDSN
10. Gheorghe Roman—FDSN
11. Gheorghe Zgondea—FDSN
12. Vasile Voicu—FDSN
13. George Stanescu—PNT-cd and PER
14. Sergiu Rizescu—PNT-cd and PER
15. Paul Alecu—PNT-cd and PER
16. Alexandru Simionovici—PNT-cd and PER
17. Valentin Argesanu—PNT-cd and PER
18. Constantin Berechet—FSN
19. Mihai Chiriach—FSN
20. Ion Gurau—FSN
21. Bogdan Nicolae Niculescu Duvaz—FSN
22. Petre Steolea—PUNR
23. Valeriu Tabara—PUNR
24. Nicolae Octavian Daramus—PUNR
25. Barna Elek—UDMR
26. Dan Cristian Popovici—PRM
27. Iohan-Peter Babias—national minorities' parliamentary group
28. Grigore Raban—socialist parliamentary group
29. Dumitru Ifrim—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 5
Members of the Commission for
Human Rights, Religion, and
National Minority Issues

1. Toader Clocotici—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Ioan Costin—FDSN
3. Adrian Duta—FDSN
4. Teodor Jurca—FDSN
5. Gheorghe Marcu—FDSN
6. Eugen Nicolicea—FDSN
7. Mihai Teodorescu—FDSN
8. Otto Weber—PNT-cd and PER
9. Petru Dugulescu—PNT-cd and PER
10. Gavril Dejeu—PNT-cd and PER
11. Ion Dinu—PNT-cd and PER
12. Vasile Nistor—FSN
13. Ioan Adrian Vilau—FSN
14. Aurel Dragomir—PUNR
15. Emil Roman—PUNR
16. Imre Andras—UDMR

17. Laszlo Zsigmond—UDMR
18. Gheorghe Tokay—UDMR
19. Toader Constantinescu—PRM
20. Ioan Dobrescu—liberal parliamentary group
21. Serban Radulescu Zoner—PAC
22. Dorel Coc—PAC
23. Eberhard-Wolfgang Wittstock—national minorities' parliamentary group
24. Feuzia Rusid—national minorities' parliamentary group
25. Carol Matei Ivanciov—national minorities' parliamentary group
26. Fanica Danila—socialist parliamentary group

Attachment No. 6
Members of Commission for Public Administration,
Territorial Planning, and Ecology

1. Viorica Afrasinei—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Radu-Liviu Bara—FDSN
3. Alexandru Casapu—FDSN
4. Neculai Chivu—FDSN
5. Nicolae Filip—FDSN
6. Sabin Ghilea—FDSN
7. Ilie Gatan—FDSN
8. Tudor Manolescu—FDSN
9. Mihail Panait—FDSN
10. Viorel Pop—FDSN
11. Cornel Sturza Popovici—PNT-cd and PER
12. Cornel Protopopescu—PNT-cd and PER
13. Mircea Munteanu—PNT-cd and PER
14. Constantin Arhire—FSN
15. Emil Cojocariu—FSN
16. Doru-Viorel Ursu—FSN
17. Coriolan Bucur—PUNR
18. Gheorghe Branzei—PUNR
19. Lazar Madaras—UDMR
20. Attila Varga—UDMR
21. Anghel Stanciu—PRM
22. Dinu Patriciu—liberal parliamentary group
23. Octavian Bot—PAC
24. Petru Suhov—national minorities' parliamentary group
25. Marin Lungu—socialist parliamentary group
26. Ioan Sorin Marinescu—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 7
Members of Commission for
Labor and Social Protection

1. Matei-Agathon Dan—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Dumitru Buzatu—FDSN
3. Sorin Diaconescu—FDSN
4. Ion Lazia—FDSN
5. Ion Neagu—FDSN
6. Vasile Nitu—FDSN
7. Mihail Nica—PNT-cd and PER
8. Radu Livezeanu—PNT-cd and PER
9. Dragos Enache—FSN
10. Maria Paula Ivanescu—FSN
11. Corneliu Balan—PUNR

12. Karoly Kerkes—UDMR
13. Smaranda Ionescu—PRM
14. Theodora Bertzi—liberal parliamentary group
15. Alexandru Athanasiu—PAC
16. Mihail Viziru—socialist parliamentary group
17. Mircea Popescu—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 8
Members of Commission for
Health and the Family

1. Gheorghe Cautis—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Anisoara Cojocaru—FDSN
3. Constantin Constantin—FDSN
4. Ion Ionescu—FDSN
5. Ilie Nicola—FDSN
6. Florian Udrea—FDSN
7. Remus Constantin Opris—PNT-cd and PER
8. Ion Berciu—PNT-cd and PER
9. Emilian Bratu—PNT-cd and PER
10. Bogdan Marinescu—FSN
12. Alexandru Ota—FSN
12. Cristian Radulescu—FSN
13. Vasile Popolinca—PUNR
14. Francisc Baranyi—UDMR
15. Ioan Marinescu—PRM
16. Horia Pascu—liberal parliamentary group
17. Romulus Ioan Joca—PAC parliamentary group
18. Anton Nicolau—national minorities' parliamentary group
19. Gheorghe Fiton—socialist parliamentary group
20. Smaranda Dobrescu—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group
21. Doru Mihai Dobrescu—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 9
Members of Commission for
Education and Science

1. Romulus Dabu—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Marin Diaconescu—FDSN
3. Mihail Golu—FDSN
4. Nicolae Mischie—FDSN
5. Gheorghe Salajean—FDSN
6. Alexandru Toba—FDSN
7. Petre Turlea—FDSN
8. Costel Paunescu—PNT-cd and PER
9. Ion Cornita—PNT-cd and PER
10. Emil Boros—FSN
11. Alexandru Brezniceanu—FSN
12. Gheorghe Tarna—FSN
13. Mircea Cretu—PUNR
14. Ioan Sonea—PUNR
15. Ioan Pop—PUNR
16. Petru Ioan—PUNR
17. Ference Asztalos—UDMR
18. Arpad-Francisc Marton—UDMR
19. Ioan Nemeth—UDMR
20. Ludovic Rakoczy—UDMR
21. Viorel Burlacu—PRM

22. Mihnea Tudor Ionita—liberal parliamentary group
23. George Crin Laurentiu Antonescu—PAC
24. Tasin Gemil—national minorities' parliamentary group
25. Emeric Feric—national minorities' parliamentary group
26. Tudor Mohora—socialist parliamentary group
27. Ioan Strachinaru—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 10
Members of Commission for Culture,
the Arts, and the Media

1. Ovidiu Bibire Genaru—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Floarea Calota-Lupu—FDSN
3. Mircea Ichim—FDSN
4. Agatha Martha (Nicolau) Iliescu—FDSN
5. Ioan Maier—FDSN
6. Petre Salcudeanu—FDSN
7. Dionisie Vitcu—FDSN
8. Gabriel Tepelea—PNT-cd and PER
9. Mircea Ioan Popa—PNT-cd and PER
10. Mihail Bucur—PNT-cd and PER
11. Mihaita Postolache—FSN
12. Alexandru Sassu—FSN
13. Lazar Ladariu—PUNR
14. Benedek Nagy—UDMR
15. Eugen Barbu—PRM
16. Constantin Gheorghe—PRM
17. Constantin Dragomir—liberal parliamentary group
18. Calin Anastasiu—PAC
19. Stefan Tcaciuc—national minorities' parliamentary group
20. Slavomir Gvozdenovici—national minorities' parliamentary group
21. Dumitru Balaet—socialist parliamentary group

Attachment No. 11
Members of the Juridical, Discipline,
and Immunity Commission

1. Marian Dumitru—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Catalin Iamandi—FDSN
3. Ilie Lascu—FDSN
4. Nicolae Rosca—FDSN
5. Cazimir Stefan—FDSN
6. Aurel Stirbu—FDSN
7. Petru Tanasie—FDSN
8. Rasvan Dobrescu—PNT-cd and PER
9. Emil Popescu—PNT-cd and PER
10. Vasile Lupu—PNT-cd and PER
11. Adrian Severin—FSN
12. George Iulian Stancov—FSN
13. Adrian Videanu—FSN
14. Ovidiu Iosif—PUNR
15. Stefan Sinko—UDMR
16. Ervin Zoltan Szekely—UDMR
17. Ioan Muresan—PRM
18. Gheorghe Gorun—PAC
19. Emil Livius Nicolae Putin—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 12
Members of Commission for Defense,
Public Order, and National Security

1. Severin Baci—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Constantin Ivanovici—FDSN
3. Anton Manguirea—FDSN
4. Vasile Munteanu—FDSN
5. Cameliu Ovidiu Petrescu—FDSN
6. Gheorghe Popa—FDSN
7. Nicolae Serdin—FDSN
8. Francisc Toba—FDSN
9. Constantin Ionescu—PNT-cd and PER
10. Valentin Vasilescu—PNT-cd and PER
11. Nicolae Alecsandrescu—PNT-cd and PER
12. Nicolae Alexandru—FSN
13. Victor Babiuc—FSN
14. Corneliu Dorin Gavaliugov—FSN
15. Vasile Suta—PUNR
16. Vasile Matei—PUNR
17. Alfred Mazalik—UDMR
18. Szilagyi Zoltan—UDMR
19. Ioan Tanasa—PRM
20. Horiaa Mircea Rusu—liberal parliamentary group
21. Petru Litiu—PAC
22. Gheorghe Raducanu—national minorities' parliamentary group
23. Constantin Hoara—socialist parliamentary group
24. Nestor Calin—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 13
Members of the Foreign Policy Commission

1. Florica Dumitrescu—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Constantin Ghita—FDSN
3. Cristian Ionescu—FDSN
4. Mircea Leonte—FDSN
5. Miron Manescu—FDSN
6. Dumitru Pislaru—FDSN
7. Daniela Popa—FDSN
8. Ivanciu Nicolae Valeanu—FDSN
9. Gavril Tudor Dunca—PNT-cd and PER
10. Lari Leonida Iorga—PNT-cd and PER
11. Florian-Ion Angelo—PNT-cd and PER
12. Victor Bostinaru—FSN
13. Petre Roman—FSN
14. Ioan Timis—FSN
15. Horia Pop—PUNR
16. Petru Burca—PUNR
17. Costica Ciurtin—PUNR
18. Emeric Dumitru Borbely—UDMR
19. Zsolt Szilagyi—UDMR
20. Iuliu Ioan Furo—PRM
21. Niculae Cervenii—liberal parliamentary group
22. Dan Trepcea—liberal parliamentary group
23. Stelian Tanase—PAC
24. Vasile Popovici—PAC
25. Valentin Iuliano—national minorities' parliamentary group
26. Nicolae Draghica—socialist parliamentary group
27. Sergiu Cunescu—PSDR social-democratic parliamentary group

Attachment No. 14
Members of Commission for
Investigating Abuses and Corruption
and for Petitions

1. Nicolae Bateanu—FDSN parliamentary group
2. Ioan Dumitrescu—FDSN
3. Mihai Lita—FDSN
4. Victor Penescu—FDSN
5. Mircea Porojan—FDSN
6. Vasile Nicolae Constantin Ionescu Galbeni—PNT-cd and PER
7. Gheorghe Comanescu—PNT-cd and PER
8. Ioan Victor Pica—PNT-cd and PER
9. Rada Istrate—FSN
10. Viorel Lixandroi—FSN
11. Cornel Brahas (Ionel Vitu) [as published]—PUNR
12. Csaba Albert Takacs—UDMR
13. Ioan Hristu—PRM
14. Teodor Vintilescu—liberal parliamentary group
15. Simion Silviu Somicu—socialist parliamentary group

Amended Membership of Chamber Commissions

*93P20060B Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL
in Romanian 16 Nov 92 p 11*

[Text of Decision Amending the Composition of Some Permanent Commissions of the Chamber of Deputies]

[Text] The Chamber of Deputies has decided:

Sole article—The composition of some permanent commissions of the Chamber of Deputies, approved by Decision No. 59 of 5 November 1992, is amended as follows:

1. Deputy Victor Babiuc, from the National Salvation Front [FSN] parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Defense, Public Order, and National Security to the Commission for Investigating Abuses and Corruption and for Petitions;
2. Deputy Rada Istrate, from the FSN parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Investigating Abuses and Corruption and for Petitions to the Commission for Culture, the Arts, and the Media;
3. Deputy Mihaita Postolache, from the FSN parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Culture, the Arts, and the Media to the Commission for Foreign Policy;
4. Deputy Petre Roman, from the FSN parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Foreign Policy to the Commission for Defense, Public Order, and National Security;
5. Deputy Mircea Ciumara, from the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Economic

Policy, Reform, and Privatization to the Commission for Public Administration, Territorial Arrangement and Ecology;

6. Deputy Benedek Nagy, from the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Culture, the Arts, and the Media to the Commission for Education and Science;

7. Deputy Arpad-Francisc Marton, from the UDMR parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Education and Science to the Commission for Culture, the Arts, and the Media;

8. Deputy Ioan Dobrescu, from the liberal parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Human Rights, Religion, and National Minorities to the Commission for Juridical Matters, Discipline, and Immunities;

9. Deputy Horia Radu Pascu, from the liberal parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Health and the Family to the Commission for Human Rights, Religion, and National Minorities

10. Deputy Mihail Paraluta, from the socialist parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Economic Policy, Reform, and Privatization to the Commission for Industries and Services;

11. Deputy Simion Silviu Somicu, from the socialist parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Investigating Abuses and Corruption and for Petitions to the Commission for Economic Policy, Reform, and Privatization;

12. Deputy Dumitru Balaet, from the socialist parliamentary group, will move from the Commission for Culture, the Arts, and the Media to the Commission for Investigating Abuses and Corruption and for Petitions.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, Adrian Nastase
Bucharest, 9 November 1992
Decision No. 60

Catholics, Orthodox Hold 'Unprecedented' Dialogue
93P20058A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian
4 Dec 92 pp 1, 2

[Exclusive interview with His Excellency Ioan Robu, Roman Catholic archbishop of Romania, by Stelian Ionescu; place and date not given: "Let Us Continue the Fraternal Dialogue in a Spirit of Truth and Love"]

[Text] Not long ago, an ecumenical meeting was held in Prato, Italy that was unprecedented because of the composition of the Romanian delegation. The delegation consisted of Orthodox and Catholics from both the Latin and the Eastern rites. The discussions had as a theme "The Social Doctrine of the Church," treating a number of ideas related to human rights, education and culture, economic organization, the Church's mission of evangelization, as well as other aspects of current

interest. The meeting was organized under the patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the mother of unity. Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Greek Catholic Uniate clergymen had an opportunity to meet with each other after 44 years of separation of the sister churches brought about by communism. So far, the impressions of the members of the Orthodox delegation, headed by His Most High Holiness Pimen, archbishop of Suceava and Radauti, have been made known. In order to learn what the Romanian Catholic Church in our country thought about this event, we requested an interview with His Excellency Dr. Ioan Robu, Roman Catholic Archbishop. He responded very kindly to our request.

[Ionescu] Your Excellency, who was the initiator of the ecumenical meeting in Prato?

[Robu] The initiator was the bishop of Prato, Monsignor Gastone Simoni, and the idea was strongly seconded by Mrs. Livia Draghici, in light of the existence of some delicate problems in relations among the religious denominations in our country. Thus, the study of such an important pontifical document of the Church as the encyclical *Centesimus annus* ["The 100th Year"] provided an opportunity for resuming a fraternal and fruitful dialogue aimed at unity between Catholics of both rites and Orthodox, especially since, recently, the ecumenical dialogue seems to have reached an impasse.

[Ionescu] In what way could the encyclical *Centesimus annus* serve as a unifying element?

[Robu] By its immense relevance. The Church, which is "an expert in the problems of man," is trying to be alongside man, the whole man, redeemed by Christ, helping him to organize life in society according to the principles of the Gospel and stressing the values of democracy as a manifestation, in the political sphere, of the fact that men are brothers, sons of the same heavenly Father.

[Ionescu] In this sense, how do you think the Prato talks went, in general, and what is your opinion about the results of the meeting?

[Robu] For several days, the theme of the discussion was the importance of the year 1989 for the world and for the Church and then we discussed the material in Chapter IV of the encyclical and the theological bases of the social doctrine of the Church. The culmination was the audience with the Holy Father. The most important thing was not so much the study but the fact that the participants from different religious traditions studied alongside each other. This was the most impressive element, both for the three groups of participants—Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Roman Catholic—and for the Italian hosts. Actually, no common prayer had been included on the schedule but it took form in the course of the talks, as the result of an internal need. At first, it was timid but, finally, in Rome, the Catholic delegation

celebrated the liturgy at the tomb of the Holy Apostle Paul while the others chanted, according to their practice. Then all of us sang: "God is with us." On another day, in Florence, His Most High Holiness Pimen celebrated the liturgy in the Orthodox Church and His Most High Holiness Gherasim celebrated the liturgy in the church of the cloister of Saint Catherine of Ricci, assisted by the chanting of all of us. I consider these moments to be a real communion for all. The reception of all participants by the Holy Father was impressive. His words call all to prayer and to receptiveness to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit so that the fraternal dialogue can be continued in the spirit of truth and love.

Upcoming PAC Congress To Decide Party's Future

93BA0298A Bucharest "22" in Romanian
26 Nov-2 Dec 92 pp 5-6

[Interview with Nicolae Manolescu, president of the Civic Alliance Party, by Rodica Palade; place and date not given: "I Reproach Those in the Civic Alliance Who Failed To Join Us in the Civic Alliance Party for Wanting To Conduct the Party's Policy"]

[Text] [Palade] Let us begin with the elections. In our offices at the paper we almost had a civil war over the nomination of the Democratic Convention's candidate for the presidency. Had the Convention designated you, do you think the result would have been different? How different?

[Manolescu] Maybe you should not ask me this question. What I mean to say, is that I find it very difficult to answer such a question. Even if I tried to be objective, I could still be suspected of partiality. To tell you the truth, I do not know whether the result would have been different. I expect that given how I was perceived by the electorate compared to Emil Constantinescu, the fact that I represented a party with its own electorate, and several other similar arguments, the difference between Ilescu and me would have been rather small. But given that the FDSN [National Salvation Democratic Front] obtained 28 percent and Ilescu 62 percent, I have the impression that any Convention candidate would have lost.

[Palade] In an interview, AC [Civic Alliance] President Ana Blandiana, said that the creation of the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] was a dilettante's error. What is your opinion?

[Manolescu] In the same interview, Blandiana says that she agreed to PAC's creation, which is true, even if she did not participate in the Sibiu meeting of April 1991. But at two previous meetings of the AC leadership in Bucharest, Blandiana was among those who supported the idea of PAC's creation. Why she changed her mind in the meantime, and now calls us dilettantes, I do not know. Or maybe she considers herself one of the dilettantes, which would be a display of objectivity for which I would admire her. In the same interview, Blandiana speaks of the 100,000 members of the former AC who

eventually vanished into nothingness. The AC never had 100,000 members. I think that Blandiana, or whoever interviewed her, added at least one zero. I might say that PAC was created in the most democratic manner possible; all the chapters of the former AC up to that time were consulted—once in Sibiu and the second time in Bucharest. And we voted. At the Alliance Congress that gave rise to PAC, 39 of the 40 chapters in the country were present and only one was against the creation of the party, with the rest in favor of it. Therefore it was not just me, Stelian Tanase, and others like us who found ourselves creating from thin air a party that had no support. There was pressure from within the AC, which we probably sensed more quickly than others, and to which were responding. PAC is no one's invention; it arose at one point from the AC as a need that at the time seemed real to us.

[Palade] What relations do you have with the AC?

[Manolescu] In the same interview, Blandiana says that no relationship exists any more, because the current PAC leadership presumably violated I do not know what protocols that we created as we were leaving, and as such no longer maintain ties to the AC. It is true that at first, when we wrote PAC's statutes, there were some provisions that linked the PAC and the AC with ties closer than were acceptable for a political organization, albeit an independent one, such as the PAC. At the time, it was being said that we must be linked very closely with AC to the extent to which we accepted the nomination, and that we therefore had the moral obligation to respect certain things. As an aside, I should mention that many of us, those who left to join the PAC, are founding members of the AC and belonged to its old leadership. I find it a little curious to see that we are considered as a sort of "foreign body," that we have adopted a nomination, a program, and characteristics of an association that is supposed to have been formed by others. Not at all! We were all there at the first, or nearly the first moment. So if this is what we're talking about, Blandiana's rights to the AC are also my rights, and the rights of Tanase, Sora, and many others. So much for that. How can a party's national committee remain burdened with the participation of AC representatives, representatives of the association from which it issued? Can one imagine that a party will formulate its strategy, its party tactics, constantly mindful of the suggestions of those who, with no coercion, have remained in the former organization? Who prevented Blandiana from joining the party? Or Gabriel Andreescu, for that matter?

There are those who did not want this party, or wanted it but did not join. How was it possible for a party to endlessly continue to pursue the policies of the alliance from which it came, through a sort of control—which, by the way, I imagine is what Blandiana wanted—from AC's structures on the party's structures? This was practically impossible. As a result, and little by little, the PAC has detached itself from the AC. Beyond all this, what I reproach Blandiana and others is that not having

had the decisiveness to come with us to form the party at the start, they now want to determine the party's policy. AC has other aims, another purpose, and Blandiana acknowledges it herself when in the same interview she speaks of "returning to the civic role of the AC." Let them return to the civic role.

[Palade] What is the current situation in the CD [Democratic Convention], and what will be PAC's position toward Coposu's proposal that Emil Constantinescu be made CD president?

[Manolescu] The announced Convention meeting will finally be held during the week in which the interview will appear. There have been many speculations. It has been said that the meeting was postponed I do not know how many times because we could not agree about an acting president. The truth is that we did not meet primarily because we did not have the time. Nearly everyone in the Convention's executive offices is in Parliament. We postponed the meeting many times because during the week we are in Parliament, and at the end of the week we travel through the country. It is very difficult to find a good day. With regard to Constantinescu, I have said and I repeat: we have nothing against Constantinescu being president of the Convention, we have nothing against him as a person. The problem was one of principle: There is a convention protocol that clearly requires that the president, by rotation, must be the leader of one of the parties.

[Palade] But Constantinescu now has a very large political capital, millions of votes for the presidency.

[Manolescu] That is the Convention's capital, not his personally. If I had been the candidate instead, or Ratiu, or someone else, we would have had first of all the votes of the Convention and a bloc of personal votes, whose size and kind is different from candidate to candidate. I have in mind a specific bloc of personal votes, and my bloc was not the same as Constantinescu's. I am not speaking of size in this case, but of type of electorate. In any case, we all started out with the Convention's votes. Let us not delude ourselves that if I had remained the CD's presidential candidate I would have had four million votes for Manolescu. Not at all. Of those, three and one-half million would have probably been for the Convention, and 500,000 from my fans. I am not Michael Jackson, and neither is Constantinescu, to claim millions of personal fans.

[Palade] The parliamentary opposition is being criticized for not having adopted any position with respect to Adrian Paunescu's election to the leadership of the Senate Cultural Commission.

[Manolescu] These parliamentary commissions—among which the cultural one in the Senate is now led by the National Party [as published], which means by Adrian Paunescu—are not formed ad lib, nor even voted by Parliament; they are apportioned by percentage. In other words, each party in Parliament has a right to one or more commission presidency or vice-presidency

depending on the number of its members in Parliament. According to this percentage, the National Party therefore has the right to lead one commission, just like we were entitled to one for the PAC. The question then becomes which commission goes to which party. The PAC preferred the agricultural commission because we have a very good specialist in this area, Ioan Paun Otiman, and because we felt that given the present stage of legislation, our point of view could be more important to current agricultural legislation. So culture had to go to someone else. And since the FDSN preferred the National Defense Commission, and the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] the Local Administration Commission, the Cultural Commission fell to the National Party. In a way, it was an inevitable result.

[Palade] But is this not disturbing?

[Manolescu] No. Rather, symbolically speaking, this seems to me merely disagreeable. But in fact it is not very important, because first of all parliamentary commissions do not make any important decisions, and secondly because we will let those in the National Party—who pound their chests whenever they speak of traditions, or of the importance of maintaining national monuments, or of the need to improve our cultural heritage—we will let them show us how they can manage under a so-called free market economy in which culture will not get more than 0.35 percent from the present budget, which is what it also got from the Stolojan government. Let us see how they resolve their ideological problem under such precarious conditions. At least for some of us, there was a touch of sadism when we in a way, yielded them the Cultural Commission.

[Palade] You did the same thing in the formation of the government. There is criticism that the opposition is indifferent to the country's needs, turning down the idea of a government of technocrats.

[Manolescu] That is not true. We negotiated with the FDSN. There were only two possibilities: a national union government, or one formed from the organizations elected to Parliament.

[Palade] There was also the possibility of a government of technocrats.

[Manolescu] This alternative was dropped from the start because it became clear that all post-electoral options would be political and a government of technocrats could do nothing more than implement political decisions. Who would be in a position to make political decisions if the government was a government of technocrats? Right now, reform is a political and not a technical problem. In turn, it was not possible to form a government of national unity because of very great differences among the parties elected to Parliament, with regard to both people and programs. There was only one solution left, namely, for the government to be formed by one of the parties elected to Parliament, and the party with the greatest number of votes is FDSN. It is therefore natural for FDSN to be the first one to be called to form

the government. Should this government have fallen in Parliament several days ago, it would have been CD's turn to form the government, but for the time being FDSN tried and succeeded to do it. It was not a question of giving up; all we could do was discuss it with them. And we discussed for hours and days on end to get them to agree at least that the government program should be negotiated. In other words, a program that would make sure that reform will move forward and in the right direction. We did not even get that, and the negotiations failed. But that does not mean that we did not want to govern. It means that we rejected the concept of a government of national unity; that we let the party with the greatest number of votes form the government; and that we fought as hard as we could so that this government would not be put together poorly and have a poor program. We did not achieve even this, because at the end the FDSN aligned itself with the Left and forced the government through Parliament.

[Palade] So there no assurance that reform will be continued under the present governing program?

[Manolescu] I do not think reform depends on the program. That is what causes me to be optimistic. If we go strictly by the program, the answer is no: There is no room for continuing the reform in this program, only for nearly stopping reform. But fortunately, I think that reality will ultimately convince Vacaroiu and company to continue reform, otherwise they risk being removed from power by popular dissatisfaction, by large social convulsions. The problem right now is not even the rate of reform, or how fast it can be achieved; the problem right now is that if we do not have reform we are sunk.

[Palade] Why did no one from the opposition support Stolojan when he presented his report and was attacked by the National Party?

[Manolescu] Stolojan was not personally attacked by anyone; the Stolojan report was attacked on several points that were indeed vulnerable. The most decisive attack was against the first government, of Petre Roman; the proof is that the Senate voted to invite Roman to participate in the Senate's work when these criticisms were raised. In our opinion, the Stolojan report was itself rather incomplete. There isn't much good to say about the Stolojan government. Beyond assuring a transition, let us even say a lull, between the Roman and the Vacaroiu governments, without such problems as the miners' riots, the Stolojan government did not do much; it did not involve itself in fundamental social and economic problems. Aside from two or three blunders such as centralization and the confiscation of hard currency in the fall of 1991, or the unreasonable hikes in the price of gasoline—which are with us once again, as we know—the Stolojan government did not delve into any of the fundamental problem of the Romanian economy. There is no way that we can defend the report. On the contrary, we should be criticizing it as well, and this has in fact already taken place through representatives of the various parliamentary groups, but in a more

moderate language than that used by others, and in any case with information more correct than Paunescu's—who did not make any major contribution in the Senate beyond demagoguery. It was easy for Stolojan to respond in the matter of Romania's debts in underdeveloped nations; someone misinformed Adrian Paunescu.

[Palade] The PAC has had meetings with business people here and abroad. Yet it is known that their morals are somewhat doubtful. Have you had any discussions in this respect?

[Manolescu] Several days ago, Iliescu said that he has become convinced that not all Romanian businessmen are of doubtful morals. I have the impression that we still carry the prejudice that anyone who has made money must be dishonest. I think it is a Marxist prejudice that wealth is stolen to begin with. Of course, dishonest businessmen do exist, and there also exists legislation that allows large financial or other types of speculations. But we start with the idea that at this time, businessmen are the most daring segment of the economy and that from among them will come the nucleus of Romania's future middle class, without which no capitalism can exist. And if we do not create capitalism, we might as well return to socialism.

[Palade] The PAC now encompasses several trends: liberal, social-democratic... Do you feel somewhat isolated in the party? What is going to happen? There is a rumor that the PAC will unite with the liberals.

[Manolescu] Our congress will meet at the beginning of next year, probably in March-April. Until then, we propose to clarify two things. One concerns organization: We will reorganize all of our branches because they are not all doing well and because our original statutes were written in haste, without the benefit of experience and without ourselves knowing where we would end up. The other will be an attempt to clarify doctrinal issues. Only two trends currently exist in PAC. One trend, which is the strongest, is toward liberalism, which means that the PAC will be a party of liberal orientation (of a liberal orientation generally speaking, and not necessarily a liberal party of the PNL [National Liberal Party] or PNL-AT [National Liberal Party-Young Wing] type, but rather one of liberal orientation). The other trend leans toward Christian-democracy (in other words, it has a Christian-democratic orientation). As for the social-democratic orientation, it does not exist in the PAC, or has not manifested itself so far to my knowledge. These options are not purely subjective nor do they express my wishes or those of anyone else in the PAC leadership. These options have emerged, one way or another, from the people with whom we work. In Bucharest for instance, the liberal orientation is weaker than in the provinces, and especially so in the case of some Transylvania cities. This is also happening because at the present time, no party—either historical or new—has truly identified the electoral segment it represents. But I believe that by the time the congress meets we will have to adopt a label—and I am not fond of labels—we will

have to very clearly identify the segment of the population that we want to represent best, and we will have to end the illusion that we will penetrate everywhere, at all socio-professional strata—in the country as well as in the city, among the young as well as the old, among the educated as well as the uneducated—and that we will be a party of the masses. No. We will have to identify our segment of the population and build our party as a function of it. But again, this does not depend on my wishes. I can now say that I prefer one of the orientations, but if at the congress, based on the programs we will present and on a very painstaking analysis of the condition of Romanian society at that point, the final option is for another orientation, I will have to submit to that option—even if it is not mine—or tender my resignation. In any case, these things do not happen as a result of some people's wishes or desires. In a way, they happen on their own, through the cooperation of very many factors that constitute a party. It is an interesting dynamic. I have visited many chapters in the country at different times, when our local committees succeeded each other, replaced one another as a function of the needs of the moment: some were leaving, some were coming in, some could no longer survive and were replaced by more active ones, and so on. And I have been very often surprised to see how much the PAC had changed at that moment from what it was a year or a year and a half ago when it came into existence. It has moved forward due to inertia, just like any other party with a political organization, and not due to my wishes or those of the central leadership. Things move as they do in society, in nature, as a function of specific inertias.

[Palade] The leadership will therefore adapt itself to what happens within the party?

[Manolescu] As in any process of this type there is a small margin of control. The party's current leadership has a primary obligation to not allow chaos, to not allow movements so spontaneous and so uncontrollable that the party will change into its opposite, for instance. Those leaders who will not adapt will leave, and in any case, many new people will be elected at the congress, who will come from that segment of the population that the PAC will truly represent beginning in March or April 1993.

[Palade] When it entered Parliament, the PAC declared that it would support the press.

[Manolescu] Although not addressed to the government, our first interpellation so to speak, the first statement we made to Parliament, was that we wanted the press to have free access to all Parliament proceedings, to be able to speak to members of Parliament under civilized conditions rather than on the run, in corridors, or I do not know where, and to have access to the Senate library and the Chamber library, to all documents, so that it can inform and ask knowledgeable questions or challenge us when we respond. We also asked that any kind of discrimination against television or radio stations be ended; all television or radio stations must be admitted to Parliament.

[Palade] You said that no one prevented Andreescu from joining the PAC. But there was a private discussion at the Alliance Congress in the summer of '91 during which you asked Andreescu to relinquish his place on the PAC Directorial Committee to which he had been proposed by Blandiana, because otherwise you and Tanase would resign. There were several witnesses to that discussion, among them Radu Filipescu and Emil Constantinescu. At the same time, a decision was proposed and nearly automatically passed that those who belong to the AC Directorial Committee should not belong to the PAC Directorial Committee, specifically in order to prevent Andreescu's election and AC's eventual control of the PAC. However, the decision remained valid only in Bucharest; in the provinces, AC and PAC branches are much closer.

[Manolescu] I wanted to say something else, namely that Andreescu did not want PAC's formation. Unlike Blandiana, he was against the creation of a party from the former AC. In Sibiu, in April 1991, he led the "conservative" group (Iuga, Manucu), in other words those who wanted to keep the AC in its older, nonpartisan form. Then, at the August Congress, Blandiana unexpectedly nominated him from the floor as a candidate for the PAC's National Committee! We asked that nominations come from the branches, to encourage democracy at all levels and give all views the broadest possible exposure. We were against Blandiana's nomination because I did not think it was right for a man who did not believe in the need for a party and who fought for months on end to prevent its formation, to become a member of that party's leadership. I respect Andreescu's choice, but it was not a matter of his choice, but of the inconsistency in his accepting a candidacy as member of the leadership of a party (he had not relinquished his nomination) in which he did not believe, which he did not want, for which he saw no need. That was all. The suggestion that AC leadership members should not belong to PAC leadership as well, was not aimed at Andreescu, but at a general situation: The new party had to be organized rapidly and operate efficiently, it needed all the working strength of its leaders. Their presence in two leaderships at the same time would have created problems for many of us who were already experiencing a chronic time shortage.

Cunescu on Opposition, Governing Parties, Monarchy
93BA0284A Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
17 Nov 92 pp 12-13

[Interview with Sergiu Cunescu, president of the Romanian Social Democratic Party, by Liviu Valenas; place and date not given: "The Romania Mare Party Is the Party of Communist Fascists"]

[Text] [Valenas] Mr. Sergiu Cunescu, do you think the PSDR's [Romanian Social Democratic Party] leap from two parliamentary seats in 1990 to 11 now is due to a gain in your party's strength, or was the PSDR "pulled" by the Democratic Convention?

[Cunescu] We expected to succeed to an even greater extent.... There is only one explanation for this success, namely the gain in our party's strength, which we in fact expected.... Our present members of Parliament come from the very counties where our strength was recognized in the Democratic Convention. But I must also acknowledge that we received a bonus from the electorate because we belonged to the Democratic Convention, but a bonus that was received by all the parties making up the Convention.

[Valenas] And so I understand that the PSDR has grown appreciably of late. But aside from the results of the 27 September elections, what signs from the field have you seen concerning the PSDR's growing influence among the workers, for example?

[Cunescu] We do not wait for those signs, we go after them! But I cannot say that gain is due to the workers alone. As a Social Democratic party, our party addresses itself to the entire nation! Both workers and intellectuals voted for us.

[Valenas] The PSDR immediately formed a parliamentary group of its own. The same thing was done by the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] and, jointly, by the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], the PNL-AT [National Liberal Party-Young Wing], and the PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention]. Won't this ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Democratic Convention?

[Cunescu] The Democratic Convention stipulated from the very start that the parties making up the Convention can retain their ideological and doctrinal identities and their strategies entirely, though there are certain guidelines that they have in common and will remain in common. Therefore, no party gives up its personality in the structure of the Democratic Convention. It was normal for the parties to form their own parliamentary groups, and then it is in the interest of the Democratic Convention for several such parliamentary groups to exist, and each group has the right to delegate speakers to the rostrum, to serve on committees, etc.... In other words, instead of the Convention alliance's having just one speaker, we will have the right to four of them....

[Valenas] But if, theoretically of course, the PSDR did not have exactly 10 deputies (the minimum number for a parliamentary group of your own) and it had, let us say, only nine, with whom you would have formed a joint parliamentary group?

[Cunescu] I tell you sincerely that I have not asked myself that question because we thought we would have at least 12 deputies....

[Valenas] But nevertheless if you had asked yourself that question?

[Cunescu] Normally you form an alliance with the party or parties with which you have the oldest ties. It is clear

to anyone that the party with which we have and have had the oldest ties is the PNT-cd. Therefore, we were able to form an alliance with them, to whom we are bound by collaboration for nearly a century. But it would also have been possible for us to form a Social Democratic group through other deputies who would have joined us in order to make up the minimum number of 10. But those are speculations now because we have 10 deputies ourselves.

[Valenas] In the spring of this year the PNL [National Liberal Party] finally withdrew after trying to break up the unity of the Democratic Convention. Do you think now that, absurdly enough, the PAC took up the PNL's role?

[Cunescu] I think matters are more accurately described otherwise.... But it is possible that there is a trend such as you mentioned.... Moreover, there are two factions of the PNL in the Democratic Convention, namely the PNL-AT and the PNL-CD. We hope those two factions will be united soon, and negotiations for that purpose have already begun. We hope this nucleus in Parliament, together with other liberals in the country who are outside of Parliament, will reconstruct a true PNL. As for the PAC, it is well-known that it still has no precise place on the present political spectrum and has not yet defined its ideology clearly. I have "obtained" various opinions from PAC activists, some of whom were liberals, others Social Democrats, others Christian Democrats and others purely and simply monarchists.... Accordingly, that party still has no precise identity, and a party with no identity is a party with no future. I think the PAC has to take one of the positions on the political spectrum, and it is possible that it will head for liberalism, if it has any clear idea in mind.

[Valenas] But not for Radu Campeanu's position, which was neither "liberalism" nor "national liberalism" but opportunism?

[Cunescu] Yes, you are right about the position and the "strategy" that Mr. Campeanu had, a position that can be considered, without being too far off, opportunism.... But let us leave Mr. Campeanu aside now because it is not a question of him but of the PAC. A party needs a conviction in order to do any political thinking. To be sure politics also requires momentary interests, and in that respect the political scene is vast.... But the main thing in politics is to see the true interest and not the momentary one.

[Valenas] I am asking you a question with a "historical" flavor. You said that the members of the PAC who are intellectuals (there is no point in evading it now) have various ideas, Social Democratic, liberal or Christian Democratic. Then why didn't those in the PAC in December 1989 head for one of the three historical

parties, especially since they had all three options (liberalism, Social Democracy and Christian Democracy) available to them? Or to be more blunt, what need was there of another party when we could strengthen one of the three traditional parties?

[Cunescu] I can reply to you that I have been asking that question for about two years.... And so far I have not received any precise answer...

[Valenas] I will ask you another question, which follows from the preceding, namely how is the PAC more "modern" than the PSDR, for example?

[Cunescu] A modern party is one that knows how to follow the course of history and to foresee the course of history, and the "historical" parties in Romania have evolved steadily and have known how to adjust to the progress of history. A modern party is a party in the spirit of the time.... To be in the spirit of the time means to understand the social, political, and economic conditions of the society in which it lives, in this case the Romanian ones. This evolution is not ambition but thought, understanding, and adjustment, while a party of the moment may have very good intentions but it must be guided toward thought and a clear idea. I think the PAC is on that path and is seeking an identity for itself.

[Valenas] The Domestic Convention was "summoned" at one time to answer whether or not it was in favor of a monarchy. It is clear that a large part of the Democratic Convention favors the monarchy, but there are also component forces that are republican. Your party was cited as an example. Is the PSDR a "republican" party?

[Cunescu] I must give you a somewhat more subtle answer. The social democratic parties evolved from the republican idea, which was expressed back at the end of the last century. But matters evolved further over time. In the countries where there was some social democratic "pressure" (either in the government or in the opposition) constitutional monarchies evolved too. Those constitutional monarchies are actually some "parliamentary monarchies," in which their importance is neutralized by a parliament, and the monarchies have been preserved in those countries. Therefore, they were not monarchies enthroned by social democracy but monarchies that continued under social democracy. The same thing happened in the evolution of social democracy. It is true of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Spain. It is accordingly a situation that resulted partly from the growth of social democracy and partly from the evolution of monarchy. But Social Democracy is still essentially republican. The PSDR is republican by virtue of its program, and so I have militated in Parliament for a parliamentary republic. In the end I voted against the Constitution only because it was about a semipresidential republic, not a parliamentary republic.... But I must make an important qualification: This option is not, however, an end in itself! The main thing is that we have a parliamentary state and not a presidential one, in which the power would belong to Parliament alone. And

let us not forget a historical fact: Under the monarchy our party was in Parliament, while under the misery of the communist republic we were in prisons.... Therefore, it is not the title of the form of state that counts but its nature....

[Valenas] After the December 1989 revolution, many forces were entitled "Social Democratic." At first the FSN [National Salvation Front] and now the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front] were entitled Social Democratic, and more recently even Ion Iliescu said that he is "social democratic...." But who is actually Social Democratic in Romania?

[Cunescu] I will remind you that we even had parties entitled "Social-Democratic" were voted out of Parliament by the electorate and disappeared so fast that we no longer hear of them—such the "Social-Democratic" parties of Messrs. Nica and Cornescu (BARICADA comment). We, the PSDR, are the only true Social Democratic Party and in fact are the only party recognized as such by the Socialist International. But now other parties have appeared that are opportunistic and have a leftist orientation and are seeking a political role. One of these is the FDSN, which is however the continuer of the Communist Party, and that is the only position it can rightly claim.... Of course the FDSN would like to change its image and use populist methods of confusion in order to appear to be what it is not. Those in the FDSN have nothing in common with us or with Social Democracy! These opportunistic parties were described very well at the last congress of the Socialist International. They appeared in Eastern Europe like mushrooms after a rain, some of them actually intolerant, populist and nationalist, trying, in the guise of social democracy, to mask their communist past. But social democracy is not something one merely talk about, it must be proved by deeds! We have stated repeatedly that if we have a social democratic movement in Romania other than ours, and I certainly do not mean the FDSN, then we will consider that movement beneficial and we will be able to establish ties of collaboration with it.

[Valenas] There is much confusion as to the political coloring of many parties represented in Parliament. Specifically, in what part of the political spectrum would you place parties like the FDSN, the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], the PRM [Romania Mare Party] and the PSM [Socialist Workers Party]?

[Cunescu] The FDSN is unquestionably a continuer of the PCR [Romanian Communist Party]! The PSM is the same. In fact both parties are headed by two leading figures of the former PCR. There can be no doubt about those two parties. By now they are trying to appear as "reformist," but as in other East European countries they were not reformist but merely beneficiaries of a revolution that they stole.... The PUNR and the Romania Mare party, which have xenophobic, antisemitic, and nationalist manifestations, are also maintained by personnel of the former PCR.

[Valenas] Are the PUNR and the Romania Mare party also on the extreme right?

[Cunescu] I did not mean the PUNR. As for the Romania Mare party, I say they are communist fascists! It is an intolerant organization instigating violence in our society and supported by communists. In history the extremes have been reached at a given point.

[Valenas] To get back to the FDSN and the PSM, where do you place them, on the left or on the extreme left?

[Cunescu] They are on the extreme left, but they can no longer appear to be on the extreme left. Bolshevism has collapsed, and they are trying to salvage what still can be salvaged.

[Valenas] Let us finally go back to an urgent subject, namely the formation of the new government. President Iliescu has made "desperate" efforts to get the opposition to take part in the government....

[Cunescu] I have said and I am saying that the party that won the elections, not an absolute majority but a relative one, has an obligation to the voters to form the government. It must assume the responsibility of that success. I think that is normal. And the FDSN has favorable conditions because the head of that party, Ion Iliescu, was elected president of the country. The opposition, and accordingly we too, will not interfere in any way with the formation of this government but we will be a strong, watchful opposition and will oppose any tendency toward leftism or toward an authoritarian system.

[Valenas] Do you think we are heading for early elections?

[Cunescu] Such elections are not desirable. They would discourage the electorate. It is better that the electorate evolve in time, be more mature, and realize the importance of their vote when they see, for example, how those who have won the relative majority behave now and how they keep their promises.

[Valenas] But if we are not heading for early elections, isn't there a risk that we will have a government of the left or extreme left in Romania for four years?

[Cunescu] I do not think we will have a government of the left! If the FDSN finally forms this government, then it will have to head for the political center. But we will probably have other governments too in this period.

[Valenas] And so you do not rule out a minority government composed of the Democratic Convention and the FSN, with the UDMR's parliamentary support?

[Cunescu] No, I do not rule out such a government! If the FDSN fails, which seems to be expected, they will probably appeal to us, the opposition.

[Valenas] Thank you!

Military, Interior Ministry Promotions, Retirements 93P20054A

[Editorial Report] Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian on 18 November on page 1 publishes Presidential Decree No. 207 announcing that, effective 24 October 1992, the following colonels in the Ministry of National Defense were promoted to the rank of major general: Eugen Manolache Badalan, Gheorghe Gheorghe Bucse, Ionel Gheorghe Giorgi, Constantin Ioan Harpaila, Constantin Gheorghe Nicolescu, Victor Vasile Patevschi, Constantin Alexandru Stanciugelu, Ion-Dan Ion Zaharia.

On page 2 of the same issue, this same source publishes Decree No. 208 reporting that the following retired colonels in the Ministry of National Defense were promoted to the rank of retired major general, effective 24 October: Alecsandru Constantin Gogorici, Gheorghe Dumitru Gunta, Matei Alexandru Obogeanu, Constantin Florea Stanciu, Vasile Leon Ujeniuc, and Mihail Gheorghe Perju, also effective 24 October.

On page 2 of the same issue, this source also carries Decree No. 209 stating that Major General Eugeniu-Victor Constantin Smirnov of the Ministry of National Defense is transferred to the reserves and that Major Generals Toma Petre Anton, Alexandru Marin Ivanescu, Nicolae Nastase Matei, and Neculai Ion Rizea, also of the Ministry of National Defense, are transferred directly to retirement status, effective 5 November.

On page 3 of the same issue, this source publishes Decree No. 210 reporting that Ministry of Interior Major General Florica Nicolae Dobre is transferred directly to retirement status as of 1 November.

MONITORUL OFICIAL on 19 November on page 3 publishes Decree No. 216 stating that the following colonels in the Ministry of Interior have been promoted to the rank of major general: Nicolae Florea Chiaptanaru, Adrian Constantin Nenu, and Ion-Eugen Zamfir Sandu.

On page 4 of the same issue, this source publishes Decree No. 217 reporting that Ministry of Interior colonels Ion I. Angheliescu and Dumitru C. Ceacanica have been promoted to the rank of major general, posthumously.

MONITORUL OFICIAL on 12 October on page 2 publishes Decree No. 201, stating that retired Colonel Mircea Herescu, of the Ministry of Interior, is promoted to the rank of retired major general.

MONITORUL OFICIAL on 16 October on page 1 carries Decree No. 203 promoting Colonel Ion Mihai Patras, formerly on active duty at the Ministry of Interior, to the rank of major general, posthumously.

Tourists Plagued by Criminals From CIS*93BA0273A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
19 Nov 92 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Petre Popa and Nicolae Mulitaru: "Rackets Come From the East"]

[Text] About 100 criminal attacks and extortions have been committed on Romanian territory by Mafia gangster-type groups originating in countries of the former USSR. Thus far Romanian police have arrested up to 68 groups composed of from four to 12 armed individuals. The bandits in general are young people instructed in special combat units or former combatants in operations in Afghanistan. Romanian police are on alert.

Over the last summer season the Constanta police received more complaints. Individuals armed to the teeth blocked the highways in less populated areas and attacked buses coming from countries of the former Soviet Union, demanding that the tourists turn over all their cash. Other reports came from tourists from the former Soviet Union staying in big hotels on the coast. They complained to the Romanian police that other conationals had contacted them, demanding large sums of money to guarantee their protection during their sojourn on our coast. Those who did not accept were first threatened, then beaten and robbed by their so-called protectors.

Similar events were noted during the same period in towns close to the border in the eastern and western parts of the country. Another case was noted in the southern part of the country, in Alexandria. During the summer and fall of this year, the police have registered a total of about 100 attacks committed by Mafia-type groups from the CIS. Police have arrested and investigated 68 groups of criminals, most of them with arms and ammunition on their person.

In Russia they are known simply as "rackets," apparently, a borrowed name. Rackets appeared, as we know, earlier in the United States. Mafia groups there demanded large "dues" from store owners and some companies within their zone of influence for protection from possible malefactors. Those who did not agree to these demands were put out of business. Their buildings were burned, their cars and homes were blown up, and some were even physically annihilated.

That model was adopted by homeless individuals from countries of the former Soviet Union. Soviet gangster groups were formed by young men, by athletes, and by men who had been discharged from military service in special combat units or who had participated in military operations in Afghanistan. Such criminal structures, composed of from four to 12 individuals armed with explosives, knives, guns, and automatic pistols, have committed murders in the course of pillage, robbery, blackmail, rape and kidnapping, on the territory of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the former East Germany.

Generally these criminals followed tourist buses from the CIS along the highways, which they blocked at strategic points, demanding of the passengers—this has also happened in Romania—sums of money and valuables, saying that they would thereby assure the protection of their travel further on. They referred to hypothetical groups of malefactors, with the exact address of crooks in our country. "Over the years," Lieutenant Colonel Petre Albu, deputy chief of the Judicial office of the IGP [expansion unknown] explained to us, "until the appearance of Mafia groups from the CIS, no such gangster attacks ever occurred in our country. Accordingly, this entire year the only actions of this type and the only complaints by foreign tourists have pointed exclusively to gangster-type criminal groups that have come into our country following the opening of the border with the Republic of Moldova. And that is the reason why I have put together a command to prevent and thwart this type of especially dangerous activity."

One of the largest groups, made up of 12 crooks (among whom was an 18 year old youth) led by a Moldovan national named Ion Marin, was captured while working the highways of Suceava county. The bandits had used three cars to block five buses full of tourists from the CIS, demanding and receiving from them 137,136 rubles, \$511, DM100, and 403,430 lei.

In order to arrest another group, composed of four crooks led by Ghenadi Alexeevic Tabanskik, the police of Arad country set up a roadblock of all the highways in the area. The gangsters did not obey the order to stop at the check point, opening fire on the policemen with a Makarov pistol. In the end, after a chase "like in the movies," the bandits were captured. From a search of their residence it turned out that they were responsible for six armed robberies committed on Romanian territory against foreign nationals. For this purpose the crooks used lots of forged passports and automobile registration cards and license plates. Investigations are continuing in cooperation with the Office of Criminal Police of the Republic of Moldova, since those arrested have been implicated in the commission of other serious crimes in this country.

Millions, consisting of property and money (in lei and foreign currency) were, likewise, demanded and received by a group of eight crooks led by Vadim Veliaminovic Sliantin, 32, of Tiraspol. They were active during the summer season up until the middle of September along the coast. Equipped with cars, weapons, and ammunition, the gangsters from Tiraspol stopped all their conationals who were headed to Bulgaria. Those who did not willingly submit were beaten and robbed. By setting a lot of traps, the Constanta police succeeded in capturing the eight of them in the act while they were operating against some tourists—Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans—in a place called "Popasul Crisimea" in the vicinity of Constanta.

For a time, after the forceful actions of the Romanian police and after the arrest of the most dangerous groups

of crooks, it seemed that the gangsters had lost their nerve and left for other parts of the continent. Their presence was noted, in fact, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, even though the tourist routes are less crowded, the gangsters have reappeared in our country. Lacking foreign tourists, they now attack anyone setting out on the road. Thus at the beginning of November the presence of a new group of gangsters was reported in Valea Prahova. A young working girl from Ploiesti was attacked at night by three people as she returned from work. They demanded all of the money and valuables that she had on her person. Trying to cry out for help, the girl was beaten and had her handbag stolen, which contained personal objects and 7,600 lei. Reacting promptly, the Prahova police in fact caught the crooks the next day. They are Igor Belous, 21; Pavel Vistotchi, 31; and Victor Mitrofan, 19. Once under arrest they also confessed to other robberies committed on Romanian territory and in the Republic of Moldova. Recently another band of gangsters attacked two cars registered in Kishinev in Vaslui county. The bandits attacked the occupants of the automobiles, robbing them of the objects and money they were carrying. Two other cars from Kishinev, driven by Christuga Marcu and Ion Bezanghiu were stopped and robbed by a group of gangsters right in the central market of Piatra Neamt. One of the armed robbers jumped out in a whirlwind from a Lada E-5220-MB automobile and rushed toward the two tourists yelling: "Put the money on the hood and get your hands up! The mafia has arrived!" Out of fear, the two Moldovans from Kishinev gave them everything they asked for.

Unfortunately gangster groups are not the only organized international criminal groups that have also made an

appearance in Romania. There are real fears that a branch of the Chinese mafia is operating in Bucharest and other large cities. Until now it has chosen its victims only from the ranks of Asiatic citizens. There have also been reports of Mafia-type gangs composed of Turkish and Arab citizens. These seem to have divided up areas of influence, also for "defending" their conationals from possible bandit attacks by hypothetical Romanian crooks, demanding large sums of money from those whom they, supposedly, would be protecting.

Confronted for the first time with such particularly grave offenses, with organized crime activity, the Romanian police is organizing itself on the fly. To this end they have increased their contacts with the police of neighboring countries, of Western Europe, and of Canada and the United States. There is close cooperation with Interpol. Romanian officers have been sent for specialized training while foreign police have come here to share their experience in the battle against terrorism, the Mafia, and organized crime. In addition to all these efforts, in order to eliminate this criminal phenomenon—which lately has become a serious and alarming threat—we need to beef up the Romanian police with both manpower and superior equipment. But more than that, the police must find in the country's legislation an ally of hope, both for its own protection and for the prevention, detection, and punishment of criminal gangs. The current laws are too lenient for the gravity of the acts committed. Sentenced to prison after having murdered and stolen millions, any foreign lawbraker can pay a ridiculous bail of 70 cents for each day of his sentence, after which he is free.

Macedonian Press Report on Camps in Bosnia

93BA0165A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 31 Oct 92 p 16

[Article by Mirche Tomovski: "Traumatic Bosnia 'A Gathering Center'"]

[Text] *One of the camps for Muslims in the so-called "Serbian Republic" is located in the vicinity of Bijeljina, in the village of Batkovic. Although the authorities call them "gathering centers for the protection of the people," in their own specific way they are suitably paradigmatic of the tragedy of the ordinary person from Bosnia and Hercegovina.*

According to the analyses of the Forum for Ethnic Relations, the mutual ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that the Serbs, the Muslims, and the Croats, among all the actors in this dirty business, are conducting is carried out with the formation of camps for "the protection" of the people. The commissions for military crimes will have more than enough work to confirm the consequences of the aroused *Homo balcanicus* in this area on the threshold of the 20th century.

The minister of foreign affairs of the Sudan, a member of the UN group that Mazovjetcki conducted through Bosnia and Hercegovina, could not be "surprised" at the Bosnian events, at the war, and the camps in which on the one hand Muslims, and on the other the Serbs, are collected in order to "be protected." The "state of shock" of the African, a minister from a country that we remember for its internal severe bloody conflicts, creates a bitterness in which a person with torment finds traces of life in common. The greatest injury without doubt is the camps, in which yesterday's comrades, friends, and relatives play the role of some as guards and watchmen and others as prisoners and inhabitants. The tragedy becomes even worse when the ordinary people, as prisoners, praise the camp regime, and the guards do not complain about the camp inmates! Actually, both the former and the latter have accepted the roles in this theater of horror with the explanation: "Well, it is war...."

Nine hundred Muslims are "located" in the Batkovic Camp in order to be "protected" from the war. Exclusively men, boys, and even children from Brčko and the surrounding districts already have spent four months in unfree freedom from the cruel battles between the Muslims and Serbs in two enormous sheds of the former agricultural commune. From Bijeljina to Batkovic it is 10 km. Ten km from one world to another. Clustered on both sides of the asphalt road there are houses, empty yards, overgrown gardens, empty meadows, and few passersby, which is a normal appearance in such an environment. The war and the front of about 20 miles from here are "filtering" onto the people and the surroundings. Equipment flows in "slow motion" to the camp, as if the movement of the automobile wants to throw itself into another "parallel" world. The guard

controls seem to want to not be remembered, seem to want to show that they do not belong to that "world behind the curtain."

From further off the barbed wire begins to scrape the horizon. Camp headquarters, at one time one of the outlying commune buildings, is located between two sheds. Here there are: the rooms of the camp commandant together with a clinic, guards, a kitchen....

"You may freely examine everything that interests you. You can even speak with the people. You can even photograph what you want except for THE WIRES. And don't say CAMP, this is a GATHERING CENTER! You will see the people, themselves, will tell you how it is for them here. They are happy that they are not at the front. They are alive and healthy! You write and they will tell you that it is good for them here; no one mistreats them. No one has been killed here! Look, I eat the same food; we all eat from the same kettle! What camp?! Look, the gate is always open," reports Vasiljevic, a lieutenant colonel on the verge of retirement. They said that the last 10 days they constantly have had visitors, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Red Cross, UNOPROFOR, Mazovjetcki's group.... Everyone was told the same thing, that this is not a camp but a gathering center....

"But, the barbed wire?"

"Well, it is necessary to fence off the place with something. It is war...."

In the Other World

Entering the "gathering center" through the half-opened gates of barbed wire is depressing. It is hard to pass into the camp circle. Spontaneously, at the same time the question of getting out arises! As much as they try to explain the "freedom" of the "gathering center," the camp atmosphere is thicker and more influential—a person would not want to be inside behind the concrete pillars that precisely divide the area with barbed wire. This is "another world." The reality is experienced in a certain way with drying of clothes (which are not feared, and in which there is nothing to fear!) on the "boundary" between the two worlds and the sharp aroma of ammonia that spreads through the area. A long dining room tent is spread before the large concrete shed, at one time a warehouse for turnips, grain, and corn. The people gather spontaneously, since anything that comes is an event that breaks the group monotony or the solitude in "one's own world." It is known that many camp inhabitants from the concentration camps have protected themselves in this way with introspection and have survived the camp hopelessness! The manners already are well-known from the films: the hands in the pockets, the inquisitive looks, the lowered faces....

If the large massive iron door is not opened it is dark in the shed. The majority of the group kneel around the television, but others immediately gather around the

visitor. They want to listen more than speak in the conversation. The guards offer to leave. "Ask them what you want freely!"

Enes Dedakovic, from Brezovo Pole near Brčko, asked about Skopje, about Kisela Boda where his friends the Gogovs live. "What can I say. Here it is good. We work a little, we have three meals, no one mistreats us. It's possible to get in contact through the Red Cross and by telephone. I don't know what will finally happen. The leaders are guilty for all this. We civilians have no connection with weapons. We are not for war. We never had any problem with Serbs. We lived together in Brezovo Pole; there were a lot of mixed marriages. I don't know who set us at odds so that now we are incapable of recognizing each other. As if we are not the same people! Here there are our acquaintances, friends, and even in-laws among the guards...."

Ekrem Kukic likewise is from Brezovo Pole. "I've been here with my colleagues ever since they gathered us. I do not know the reason. Supposedly in order to protect us. I wasn't making war. How will this end? If common sense doesn't prevail...."

"The reason is human thoughtlessness," added Esad Muhtarevic from Brčko. However, it will be necessary to live together again. How can you live by yourself? We will mingle again. No one anywhere is 'pure'! This man has security, he will save his head, but the wire.... Let the world look through its barbs and squares."

Husein Hajrovic commented sharply: "The politicians are conducting this war. Write that down. In the meantime the people suffer. This war is dirty because the people are involved in it. Who knows how long this will last; bad blood has fallen. I would like to go home," he finishes nervously, and, pushing his way through the group, leaves the shed.

The Defeated Victors

Nedzat Arifovic has his own idea about ethnic cleansing: "It is no solution to be 'clean.' If this had to happen, what had to disappear? Now Cosic and Tudjman and Izetbegovic explain this as 'peaceful resettlement.' It did not mean it was necessary to kill us. However, I think that again we will live together. I do not want to take a gun, and no one can force me to. It is important to me that I preserve the little naked life that I have! No one here is 'rich' enough to fight. The politicians fight because they can avoid it. None of their sons are fighting! They are not in the front ranks. They were 'in love' with us so that we would hate the others. Stupidity wins over memory. They quarreled and we thought they would come to terms. But they did not go to war. They set us at odds, but provided well for their families. We here belong to no one because we do not want the war! However, the people have to remember and put an end to this!"

Luka Antovic, platoon commander first-class, is one of the guards. "I was sent here in order to exchange the

people. Also I am holding the people who are going to the city. This is a war; no one trusts anyone. It has to be this way; these people have to be here and at least behind the wire."

The other guards did not want to say their names. "It is not important who I am and where I am from. Everything here is without an identity. And, you journalists have done this thing, have heated up the hatred. We are all in the same pot here. What do you think, that it is easy for me to look at these people here? I have acquaintances, friends! Or they look at me. We lived together, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. It appears that politics and religion do not go together. These people here are innocent! Well, let's do this at once, cantons, confederation, I don't know, anything is acceptable to me.... I went with one of my friends to the city to accompany him. We sat down in the first cafe to entertain him. They returned both of us back to the camp 'dead drunk....' Now what do they say! Now in Geneva those who hate each other and those who did not rush into hatred are negotiating!"

Upon leaving, Lt. Col. Vasilevic asks for an impression. "I told you, this is a GATHERING CENTER, these are not prisoners, we are all together, eat the same, do the same...."

"Only some are behind wire, and people are exchanged...."

"This wire, now when I look at it, it is my defeat both politically and humanly...."

The "GATHERING CENTER" remains behind us "in its own world, with its own people." The well-known dramatic author Dusan Kovacevic captured this hell in his creative imagination. Defeated victors and victorious defeated people stay in it. The national, social, and political being of the people has been shattered, and the common man is lost!

Macedonian Politicians Discuss Ethnic Relations

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14, 15, 16 Oct 92

[Interviews with Nikola Popovski, Mahi Nesimi, Cedo Cvetanovski, Aleksandr Torteovski, Nebi Aljusevski, and Avzi Demiri by B. Geroski and V. Velevska; places and dates not given: "Legacy of the Collective Conscience"]

[14 Oct pp 4-5]

[Text] Current problems in the field of nationality and interfaith relations.

According to Aleksandr Torteovski (LD) [League for Democracy] the question of nationalism is a question of individual emancipation; Nikola Popovski (SDSM) [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] says that social problems are always initially manifested as nationality problems; Cedo Cvetanovski (MAAK) [Movement for All Macedonian Action] is against the development of nationality freedoms at the expense of someone else's

labor; Nebi Aljusevski (DPT) [Democratic Party of Turks] argues that all people do not have the conditions to be emancipated; and Mahi Nesimi (PDP) [Party for Democratic Prosperity] reminds us that relations have deteriorated over the years.

We began the discussion of the conference concerning the urgent problems in the area of internationality and interfaith relations with an attempt to "diagnose" the cause of the widening both of the front and of the intensity of the conflicts.

Emancipation

[Tortevski] In my opinion the question of nationalism is a question of individual emancipation of the person. The individual lack of emancipation is fertile soil for aggressive nationalism, and at this moment that is the greatest danger in this area. Individually, the unemancipated person defeats his complex by trying to appear as a member of a group, where he feels secure, where he is in a position to think up a threat to this group, and so forth. Subsequently, things escalate to conditions such as we now have in the area of former Yugoslavia. The people who talk about the national interest, more precisely the way in which they understand it, remove the pressure from me. Take these wretched people from Bosnia, who now do not have their own fatherland. What is now the national interest of the Serb, of the Croat, of the Muslim? If you look at these people as individuals, their interest is to have that which they have destroyed just in the name of a certain "higher" national interest. This means that if we deal with the individual, then the problems are solved more easily.

[Popovski] Basically, we in the SDSM, as a citizen's party, see the problem in the light of the tendencies in the structure of society that lead to a collectivist approach, regardless of whether we are speaking of nationalistic, religious, class, or any types of collectives. This means I think that part of the causes are due to the legacy of this collectivist and authoritarian conscience, but part are of an economic nature. I think that this may be understood according to an old definition, to the effect that social problems initially always are manifested as nationality problems. And normally, every nation or nationality accuses the other because it does not have enough rights, economic power, and so forth. We are aware that the problem of nationalism cannot be completely eradicated, and we think that in this sense the influence of the East is felt even in the Western political hemisphere. However, it is important that these tendencies are marginalized there, as opposed to our country, where they dominate, and in our country the parties with an ethnic orientation have captured a majority of the electorate and are dominant in the structure of the parliament!

Timidity?

[Cvetanovski] We do not have to solve the problem by examining the national interest from an "Olympic height" of civil emancipation. The problem is that the

deeper socioeconomic problems continue to exist, and are succeeding in appearing on the political scene ever more explosively. We have not made any changes in two years. What are these problems which stipulate that the national homogenization is a necessary precondition for achieving human and national rights? I will cite one example here. By law we have permitted people to use their own language even in official communication in the opstinas where the national minorities are in a more significant number. And all this is in order. However, even in conditions of the greatest loyalty, the Albanian population provides only 16 percent of the funds for education, and for supporting the opstina bureaucracy it provides around 27 percent. This means that if the opstina cannot ensure the right of official communication in the Albanian language, the Republic has to do it. In the name of MAAK I am empowered to report that we do not see that the problems between nationalities will be solved by legally restrictive remedies, nor by the development of national freedoms at the expense of someone else's labor, someone else's sweat. Solidarity of this kind leads to economic slavery.

[Aljusevski] I accept this thesis for individual emancipation which was put forward here. However, there is the following question: Up to now have all people had identical conditions for being emancipated? This is the dilemma—why during those 50 years were some people already emancipated and others not at all, when it is known that we all started approximately from the same basis? Let's answer that! With respect to interfaith relations, I will say the following. Communism, that is to say socialism, separated the mosques and the churches from the state. And this was good. Then we had fewer excesses than now. Now, some believe there is a right to interfere directly in the work of the churches or the mosques. And just these intrusions are leading to undesirable consequences.

Escalation

[Nesimi] The deterioration of internationality relations in Macedonia did not happen yesterday; they have been deteriorating for years. I can freely say that earlier, during the time of one party, possibly it was even worse, but these conflicts were not expressed since the state nipped them in the bud: People who emphasized the capabilities for national prosperity were stigmatized. As in former Yugoslavia the largest nationalities had the leading role, thus in the individual republics the "leading" nation has determined the degree of implementation of the rights of the nationalities. Fortunately, up to now in Macedonia we have not had a broader escalation of the conflicts, but relations even here were not solved as they should be. The current escalation is a result of the inaction of the legitimate government due to the inertness of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In many cases when there are excesses of such a nature the state reacts slowly or in general does not react. Up to now, and it looks like even now, in these cases the "main" nationality is favored. You know that we have examples of public meetings, the Albanians, the Turks, and the others

will be mentioned and with the ugliest words, their elimination is sought, and so forth, but as far as I know, no one has taken responsibility for that. We do not know of examples where the Albanians and the Turks behave in such a way as Macedonians, and measures have not been taken. An atmosphere in which a member of the dominant nation in the state may act toward others as he wants has been created!

[Box, p 4]

Towards the end of last week, the editorial board of VECER organized a conference on the theme "Internationality and Interfaith Relations—Current Problems" in which representatives of the leading parliamentary, and several extra-parliamentary, parties were invited to participate. Nikola Popovski of the Social Democratic Alliance, Mahi Nesimi of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, Cedo Cvetanovski of MAAK, Aleksandr Torteovski of the Democracy League, Nebi Aljusevski of the Democratic Party of Turks, and Avzi Demiri of the Albanian Democratic Union—Liberal Party participated in the conference.

The people in the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] explained their absence as being busy with the session of the parliament, the representative of OPOM [expansion unknown] Stefanovski by problems with gasoline, and the reformist-liberals and representative of the Democratic Party of Serbs did not explain their absence. We are publishing the comments at this conference in this and subsequent issues.

[Box, p 4]

A Heated Polemic: Nesimi, Cvetanovski, Torteovski

Switzerland Has Failed!

[Nesimi] If it is correct that the Albanians in Tetovo provide only 16 percent for their education, then I ask: How much do the Macedonians provide?

[Cvetanovski] Far more than their needs.

[Nesimi] Well, let's say that it is so. Now, I ask: Why is this? There are 25,000 people employed in the public sector in the opstina, and of them 4,000 to 5,000, perhaps 7,000 or 8,000, are Albanians, although I don't expect these data will be published. But with respect to what you are saying about some exclusive right for using the mother tongue, I will ask you this. Some books by Mr. Popovski and Mr. Todorovski from MAAK also are published in Albanian. According to your logic, the Albanians should pay extra in order to get these books in their language. The fact that in Tetovo 70-80 percent of the employees are Macedonians and that there is no director of a public enterprise who is an Albanian does not hinder you, but it hinders you that we speak in Albanian.

[Cvetanovski] Don't be mistaken; I didn't say that.

[Nesimi] But it hinders you when we have to pay extra to speak in Albania, Turkish, and so forth. This is the

question: If 36 or 37 "deputies" in the Tetovo "parliament" are Albanians, what language will be used?

[Cvetanovski] Only Macedonian.

[Nesimi] Only Macedonian?! And if all 50 are Albanians, again will they have to speak Macedonian among themselves?

[Cvetanovski] In official work, yes. Outside of that, I say sincerely, use Albanian freely....

[Nesimi] Yes, you can't forbid that to us!

[Cvetanovski] And in what language are all the documents to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the state to be written?! Or will you make a parallel state? You clarify this matter!

[Nesimi] We are not making a parallel state. We want everyone to speak as he wants. If it is easier for him, let him speak English. We will provide him a translator.

[Cvetanovski] Who is we?

[Nesimi] We, as an opstina.

[Cvetanovski] You provide it, that is your problem.

[Nesimi] We will provide one, from the funds of the opstina, not I as a citizen....

[Cvetanovski] From the state?

[Nesimi] Yes.

[Cvetanovski] But it can't do that!

[Nesimi] It is the duty of the state if it wants to have good relations between nationalities.

[Cvetanovski] There is no such state in the world, Mr. Nesimi. They do not even have that in Switzerland.

[Torteovski] It is a different situation in Switzerland. The canton is a state.

[Cvetanovski] And who there provides for bilingualism?

[Torteovski] The canton, normally.

[Cvetanovski] Then it will be the most expensive state, and it will go to ruin.

[Torteovski] God help us from failing like Switzerland!

[15 Oct pp 8-9]

[Text]

Nation-Forming Status Is Not a Magic Wand!

Current problems in the area of internationality and interfaith relations.

According to Demiri, one of the causes of the problems is the treatment of the Albanians as a national minority; Torteovski thinks that the term essentially changes nothing

but the question is one of civil equality; Nesimi wants Macedonia to be a country for all citizens; Popovski thinks that it is contradictory to want a civil constitution and at the same time nation-forming status for Albanians as a collective unit; and Aljusevski thinks that the constitutional system and order must be respected.

Part of the discussion of the conference concerning inter-nationality and interfaith relations dealt with the question of whether, in the current "overheated" situation, it is necessary to solve conflicts by opening the status questions through changes in the Constitution or with a pragmatic solution to the day-to-day problems.

Status

[Demiri] One of the causes of the current internationality problems is the treatment of the Albanians as a national minority. The Albanians cannot be treated in this way since in no other country is there such a large population with a status of national minority. In addition to this, the Albanians participated in all historic battles for the liberation of Macedonia.

In modern democratic developments in Europe the concept and practice of national minority, in the sense of second-class social groups subjected to domination and manipulation, has been superceded. In order to avoid national conflicts in the Republic of Macedonia it is necessary to find mechanisms by which majoritization of one nation over the other will be avoided: A taxonomic ordering of the questions concerning which a consensus has to be provided, creating mechanisms in the assembly so that agreement of all will be ensured.

Likewise, at this time it is very important for the agencies of the system to be transformed so as to truly reflect and serve all the citizens, representation to be closer to the national representation, with strict application of professional standards. The institutionalization of all areas of life must be examined, and the practice of problematizing and politicizing the educational situation must be stopped.

[Tortevski] With respect to the status changes, I think that little of what is significant is solved with the term that is used. The question is one of civil equality. Nothing is changed when the Albanians are called a people if they are deprived of rights. However, I would like to remind you of one more thing. The Macedonians feel threatened because of the enormous natural increase in the Albanian population. And I think rightly so. Because no country can withstand such a birth rate, especially at this stage of economic development. In addition to this, other problems, such as the problem of education in the mother tongue, are appearing now. The Democracy League had the unique position that an ideal family for Macedonia is a family with three children. Above these three children, everyone will have to support the luxury of the fourth child himself. The state has to intervene with tax measures, because it is not able to

close its eyes to such a situation of natural increase. Other than this, we are against the intervention of the government in many areas.

Nation-Building Status

[Nesimi] We are fundamentally against government intervention, that is, against restrictive measures with respect to the population policy. We start from the fact that the population, first of all, needs to be trained, educated, and that itself will produce a result with respect to reducing population growth. For example, I can say that not one Albanian who has a secondary education has more than two or three children, and I am not talking about those with higher education. In the meantime there is the question of why up to now the level of education among the Albanians is such that, in and of itself, it creates the conditions for a high birthrate. And if you ask the Albanian teachers they will tell you that they themselves are against this because in the primary grades they have cases where children come who do not have books because the parents cannot provide these children with the necessary materials.

As far as the question of the status changes is concerned, I must say that the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] continues to express demands for equality of the Albanians and that we have the status of a nation-building element. We consider that only in this way will peace be ensured in Macedonia. We are really in favor of having a civil constitution in Macedonia in which it is stated briefly and clearly that Macedonia is a nation of all citizens, without favoring a specific collective group. The PDP always has advocated that Albanians be a constituent element of this country.

[Popovski] You, on the one hand, call for a civil constitution, and on the other hand, seek nation-building status for the Albanians. Will you as an individual be sovereign in this country because you are an Albanian or because you are a citizen of Macedonia? You can't mix these two positions; you have to choose one, and the best thing is to be a citizen, because according to this logic the Chinese person in Macedonia will want to be a nation-building element.

[Tortevski] There is no mechanism or formula according to which it is possible to say that those that amount to 30 percent will be nation-building, and the others not. If this is done, what will it mean? That all others are in an unequal position with respect to the Albanians.

Reaction?

[Popovski] And not only that, but it is necessary to find a common denominator. If you insist on nation-building status determined on a nationality basis, in practice then the rights of those who do not want to be defined on this basis will be denied. For example, someone will declare himself to be Orthodox. And he may say: You are making arrangements for all nations, now do it for the Orthodox. Why is a sense of nationality a condition for nation-building status?

[Nesimi] If there is no insistence on only one nation, we are for that. In the meanwhile, the fact is that it is continually said that this is a nation only of Macedonians. In this sense we also say that it is not and cannot be a state only of the Macedonians.

[Aljusevski] What is the problem or difference if the term nationality or national minority is used? I think that we have to learn system and order. If we have finished talking somehow, and we have regulated it constitutionally, that means that this has to be applied this way. The name itself, the fact that someone will be called a national minority, a nationality, a people, and the like, doesn't make a difference. The real elements that contribute to a specific person being happy or not are civil rights.

In the sense of that which has been discussed in connection with the status questions, I think that we all have to declare that the citizen, and only the citizen, must be the bearer of all rights and freedoms in this society. The reaction of the Albanians to the constant emphasis on the label "Macedonian" may be understood since the greater the blow is the greater the reaction.

[Box, p 8]

Rejoinder: Torteviski, Nesimi

Telephone Book

[Torteviski] Next to you (Nesimi—editor's note) sits the representative of the Turks. Why then don't the Turks not get the same as in the sense of nation-building status that you seek?

[Nesimi] We do not have anything against that.

[Torteviski] Well, I do not have anything against the Albanians, the Turks, the Vlachs, the Gypsies, the Egyptians, and even 20 Chinese—you will make this article in the constitution like a telephone book!

[Nesimi] Let me explain: We are not against the Turks, etc., nation-building; at the same time we think that as a larger, second population in Macedonia....

[Torteviski] Why limit nation-building to two ethnic groups? Indeed, if there is a ratio of 1:4 between the Albanians and Macedonians, and you assert 1:3, and even somewhere it is said that you are saying 1:2, with respect to the Turks you are in the same ratio, isn't that right?

[Box, p 8]

Rejoinder: Torteviski, Nesimi

Second-Class Children

[Demiri] Because of the restrictive population policy the child who is fourth is denounced.

[Torteviski] By whom?

[Demiri] By society. First by the parent, then by society. From his very birth he is a citizen of this country that revokes his child allowance benefit.

[Torteviski] At the start this child is a second-class citizen, because he is the fourth child of his parents. Who cares for its children the best—the state or the parent?

[Demiri] The parent.

[Torteviski] And if he already has three children? Is there any of us who has a job situation that enables him to take care of eight children without problems?

[Demiri] However, what leads the parent to have eight children? You said beautifully that it is a question of individual emancipation. During the past 50 years we have not worked for that.

[Torteviski] Precisely, that is unquestionable.

[Demiri] There are also among Macedonians cases where there are seven or eight children among such people who have remained unemancipated.

[16 Oct pp 8-9]

[Text]

Discussion About Everything, Except for Peace

The current problems in the area of internationality and interfaith relations.

Popovski thinks that dialogue and tolerance are a condition for overcoming the current problems, Cvetanovski wants a clear accounting of who contributes what, Aljusevski is of the opinion that we all will provide funds for development if we agree on it, and Nesimi says that it is necessary to understand that no one loses if we have educated Albanians, Albanians in the parliament, in the government....

The last part of the conference concerning internationality and interfaith relations contains the thinking of the representatives of the political parties concerning the possibilities for overcoming the conflict situations in this area.

Dialogue

[Popovski] We as a party insist on certain principles with respect to the current national and religious split. First of all this means mutual tolerance, then continued mutual dialogue, which we believe at the present time exists only at an institutional level, that is, in the government and the parliament, and the compromises understood in the positive sense of the word. The compromises between all who live in this area are necessary because we cannot make a move to draw closer to anyone barricaded in his trench from the position of "protection of national, ethnic interests." It is necessary to make numerous attempts and approaches to eliminate tension from all sides, in order to arrive at a situation, country, or society,

if you wish, in which coexistence of such a motley national structure as we have in the Republic of Macedonia is possible.

Two principles which come from respecting civil rights, but also national feelings, govern this area in our party. These are, first, the right to preserve one's own national identity, and second, developing cultural identity through the use of creative work in one's own native tongue, preserving and developing customs, etc. In the meantime we insist on action in introducing this policy because we think that if we want this to be achieved overnight the opposite effect may be produced: Relations will be polarized to the degree that requests for curtailing all rights are initiated. Likewise it is clear that the economic capabilities for such living together are limited and balances have to be made here.

Accounts

[Cvetanovski] According to MAAK, we can negotiate everything connected with relations between nationalities except for peace. We have to base the policy on facts, by means of peaceful discussion, not with provisional calls for excesses. In relation to the demographic policy, colleague Aljusevski uttered a very painful truth—after 50 years we are all starting from the same basis, and we have come to the point where some are in conditions of economic backwardness and lack of emancipation. Is it in the interest of any of us to continue this degree of lack of emancipation further? I think that we cannot seek the reasons for this gap in the "majoritization" of the other group, nor in the justifications that someone was exploited, or that equality was not achieved. It seems to me that the basic conflict here is based on the well-known maxim: The more children there are the greater the poverty there is.

The question arises: Who can support such a demographic landing force, educate it, and provide it with civil and human rights as well as national rights on a European level? This country does not have an economic base for such a population growth. If afterwards we really want to find the resources for solving the problems, I do not think that we can exclude the subject of economic problems. In addition to this, because of the fact that a special status was given to Albanians in the past 40-50 years, even the Turkish population was neglected. We think that we have to start with clean accounts in this respect. Because, if a Flemming and a Walloon in Belgium know precisely how to calculate which national group contributes how much, we have to make this possible in our accounting system.

[Popovski] There is no need for you to take just the five negative examples from the 50 countries in Europe. You can fall into political determinism in this way. There is no need to introduce a situation where who pays how much according to national affiliation. Let's proceed according to other parameters: employees in agriculture and industry, industry and administration, poor and rich, developed and undeveloped regions, etc.

[Demiri] Its necessary to start from the actual situation. You, yourself, have said that the population growth is a consequence of a lack of emancipation. At this time we have to see how many of us are Albanians, how many Macedonians, Turks, what they need, and then we will see the possibilities, the means, if this can be reached. Let's take education—why not do a broader study in which intellectuals would be involved, Macedonians, Albanians, and Turks, in order to see where the funds are located and where they can go?

[Popovski] Well, here even you have to say that you made a mistake with the census, you can't avoid that.

[Demiri] Good, but you see when the census was made we did not exist as a party....

Indoctrination

[Aljusevski] There is talk of indoctrination from Albania in connection with the great growth of this population. In the meantime, it must be said that if the Turks in western Macedonia understand Albanian, in eastern Macedonia they do not know a word, but the greatest increase in Turks is there. This means that indoctrination is not a reason but the living conditions are one. The question arises here: Hasn't someone prompted it, if there is a larger number of children, then there are no possibilities for schooling, followed by a lack of emancipation and backwardness.

I think that we will provide the funds for development ourselves if we come to an agreement, if we are able to say that we are all friends here, and that ultimately that which is common for all prevails, without any divisions and prejudices because they do not lead to anything.

[Nesimi] I would not like to get into the area on which the gentleman from MAAK insists, but these are things that are based on the economy, since if we start from this then the conclusion that this is a country of the Macedonians thrusts itself forward, and the rest of us will have to provide for ourselves, for our national identity and development. Just that leads us to splits, autonomy, etc. Why, if this principle is taken, then we will ask ourselves if we need an orchestra, theater, and so forth. And we will not pay for these things, but we will create teams in sports ourselves which we will finance ourselves. In the meantime the question arises: What is the interest of Macedonia here, for all citizens to be satisfied and to contribute to this society or not? We look at this in this way and will insist that the thing that you are calling for (Cvetanovski, i.e. MAAK—editor's note) will not be applied in practice.

As far as demographic policy is concerned, it was thought that the current high population, actually, was imposed by the state, since the state itself is responsible for the Albanian not being educated, for being some kind of servant. Even today there is no accounting to see if some go to school or not, the parents do not take responsibility.... There are many examples where the Albanian parents, with secondary education, perhaps are

not so successful in their profession, but have a solid policy and do not have more than two or three children. And the other fortunate thing in all this is that there are a large number of families who have gone to the West, and the life there has imposed another dynamic on them—a smaller number of children—which is being transferred here. If we want good internationality relations it has to be clear to the ordinary person, to every Macedonian, that this country loses nothing if the Albanian is educated and advances, either in the parliament, government....

[Box, p 8]

Rejoinder: Cvetanovski, Popovski

Debatable Determinism

[Popovski] Why do you take national affiliation as the only criterion for distinguishing people in the society, even in relation to contributions?

[Cvetanovski] The question is perhaps debatable, but my personal position is that it is necessary to direct and establish future development on the basis of clean accounting between the ethnic collectivities. Whether we run away or not, it will return to us like a boomerang in all areas.

[Popovski] I and some other Albanian, who is employed for example as a journalist, have similar interests as employees in nonmanufacturing industry....

[Cvetanovski] It shows up when it is a matter of class foundations and qualifications.

[Popovski] An Albanian farmer and Albanian intellectual have different interests (the first seeks a reduction of the tax, for example) and in this sense I cannot have the same interest as the Macedonian farmer....

[Cvetanovski] Understandably this is a common citizens' interest.

[Popovski] Therefore I say that you can fall into determinism if you say that the only criterion for financing and for everything is national affiliation.

[Cvetanovski] I say that in addition to all other criteria we also have to involve this one. All this may be contested; in the meantime the fact is that just in the contact of the two national groups, economic interests are the reason for the cooling of their relations, and we dare not run away from that.

[Box, p 8]

Rejoinder: Cvetanovski, Nesimi

A Demographic, Intimate Matter

[Nesimi] If it is necessary to pay additionally for our own national development, then we will be asked if we will pay, and we will say: We need a theater, orchestra, culture....

[Cvetanovski] It seems to me that you did ask not to pay, at least for television.

[Nesimi] We did not ask, others have asked, and we pay more than you, more than we get; there are indicators....

[Cvetanovski] Well good, well good, I am not running away from that, let's place that on the table.

[Nesimi] If we start this way then we will come to conflicts.... I say to you that, with respect to demographic policy, we as a party consider that it is an intimate matter of the person and that there is no reason for us to slow down with it. If you are searching, slow down!

[Cvetanovski] Life will force you, it will force you as Berisha forced it.

[Nesimi] That is another matter, and if you want us to talk democratically, I am not interested in Berisha or anyone, but you want me to be interested in Berisha and Albania, and not Macedonia!

[Cvetanovski] Let the progress of your own population interest you, and the demographic element is one of the indicators of progress.

[Nesimi] And this demographic explosion was forced by the state....

Leadership Struggles in Gypsy Groups in Macedonia

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in Macedonian 21 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Panta Dzambazoski: "A Leadership Struggle for Power or..."]

[Text] *Open conflict of the Gypsy parties.*

Words of accusation are not spared in the interparty conflict of the Party for Total Emancipation of the Gypsies [PTsER] and the Democratic Progressive Party of the Gypsies [DPPR]. The president of the PTsER, Faik Abdi, is accused of plotting Muslim fundamentalism, but he thinks that such accusations are ludicrous and that those who utter them do not know their meaning.

The political pluralism of the party scene also has produced the first party of the Gypsies in Macedonia, the Party for Total Emancipation of the Gypsies, which, Faik Abdi, its president and current deputy in the parliament of the Republic, practically formed himself.

The party and Faik Abdi himself found great sympathy among the Macedonian public. The appearances of Abdi on the Assembly rostrum often extinguished the sparks that appeared between the left and the right parliamentary parties and complemented the picture of the Gypsies as a peace-loving, merry, and, for this time of crisis, fairly reasonable people. It has to be recognized that the president of the PTsER has become the most prominent man among the Gypsies.

The PTsER, as it appears from the very name, and from the many declarations of Abdi, first of all is a party that is based on cultural, educational, and social advancement of the Gypsies of Macedonia. Also, however, it is a party that is quite involved with everything that is called politics. The political pluralism has produced another party of Gypsies: the Democratic Progressive Party, to the birth of which, it may be concluded, certain internal party incidents in the PTsER contributed, when one group of young members of the leadership said that Faik Abdi was behaving as an absolutist and that he was not acting in the interest of the Gypsies. Abdi decisively refuted these words and it is believed that he had strong support not only in the PTsER, but also among the sympathizers themselves, that is by the majority of the Gypsies.

In recent weeks the conflict between the two parties has become particularly pronounced and words of accusation are not spared in public pronouncements. Many words were completely lacking any diplomatic-cultural facade. It seems that the target of the attacks of the Democratic Progressive Party is, first of all, the leader of the PTsER, Faik Abdi, whom it wants to have recalled from the Macedonian parliament because, it is said, he is working against the Macedonian interests, plotting Muslim fundamentalism, and so forth. Abdi did not fail to answer in his party announcements.

And, instead of cooperation of the two parties, there is a sharp conflict that threatens to divide the Gypsies themselves, and the conclusion of the conflict, in addition to the sharp words and accusations, may even take place before the court.

Who Desires Religious Hatred?

The secretary of the Democratic Progressive Party, Djunez Mustafa, says that according to the party's evaluations, with respect to the leadership of PTsER, Faik Abdi does not seek cooperation, while the vice presidents, Ildez Zendel and Bajram Avni, are prepared to settle the misunderstandings.

"Faik Abdi said about us that we are a party of five to 10 illiterate people, but actually things are the other way around, and besides that we have over 7,000 sympathizers. Our party," continues Mustafa, "thinks that Mr. Abdi is a professional who works in connection with the education and history of the Gypsies. We want to standardize the Romany language through a spelling book and grammar and not with imported elements, as he wants, hurrying to do it so that he will get exclusive credit for everything. If we waited 50 years, then we will wait a little longer, but everything will come in its place. We do not have enough personnel, and therefore we were against the Gypsy seminar. Therefore we sought discussions in the Ministry of Education.

"Also we have other comments," says Mustafa. "When there was the Congress of the PTsER, at the insistence of Mr. Abdi, the Gypsy hymn was played first, and then the Macedonian. We wanted the Macedonian flag to be in

the left corner of the Gypsy flag, but he is against it. Our party is not burdened with nationalism. Mr. Abdi was appointed as editor of the Gypsy edition of MRTV [Macedonian Radio and Television], he meddles in employment, he is considered to be a founder, but actually I am one of the founders," says Mustafa.

One of the most serious accusations against Faik Abdi is that he plotted Muslim fundamentalism. The secretary, Djunez Mustafa, reflects the position of the party concerning this matter. As a deputy, Faik Abdi ordered the president of the Mesihat of the Tarikats (in the Muslim religious community—editor's note), Shacir Ismail, who also is a council member in Chair opstina, to gather the dervishes and to find themselves in the "Mefa Baba" teke. Our party considers this to be counter to the Constitution. Mr. Abdi insists on using the dervishes for political purposes, forgetting that this may have consequences on the development of the creed of the Gypsies. We condemn the president of PTsER because he wants to provoke religious hatred and a connection with the great fanatic Muslim religious brotherhood—with a mass religious organization and with the intention of connecting with the mass position of Muslim fundamentalism. However, he always will be opposed and condemned by the Gypsy faithful. His intention was to form teke councils in order to be where the funds and donations go, but as a deputy does he have to interfere and promise translations of religious books and building of mosques?

The Target of the Attacks Is Faik Abdi

The president of PTsER, Faik Abdi, denounced these findings of the Democratic Progressive Party of Gypsies and thinks that this is a matter of a group of Gypsies from Shuto Orizari who are against progress.

[Abdi] I do not know what I've done wrong as a deputy. They, not having arguments, have used the big lie. I think that it is funny to the Macedonian people that they accuse me of Muslim fundamentalism, surely not knowing the meaning of these words. Why do I not cooperate with the Mesihat, and do we not say that first of all the Gypsies need education and schools? I have said more than once, and our party has stated many times, that Macedonia is our fatherland and that we do not recognize another to be dearer. It is sure that I have to bring them to court, but I am not sure if I am making them "heroes," because the just sentence should be jail.

Otherwise, president Abdi thinks that he personally is the target of the attacks and proposes that something "imported" is behind the Democratic Progressive Party and that it wants to do harm to the Gypsies. Muslim fundamentalism is a dangerous thing, of course, and now that which they want is to have Macedonia and all the Gypsies to be against me, says Abdi.

[Abdi] I am receiving a huge number of telegrams and announcements with support. Even the Gypsies from all of Macedonia wanted to have a meeting of support, but I stopped them. However, at the next plenary session of

PTsER we will brand these janissaries and political delinquents publicly and openly by name and surname.

Faik Abdi recalls 20 years ago when he was a delegate to the former Assembly (before 1984) and when, he says, the same thing was tried with the emancipation of the Gypsies, but there were evil opponents who called his efforts "Faik's policy." They liked it fairly well, said they would cooperate with the policy, and even called for help when foreign TV crews came to record Gypsy games, songs, and customs. The opponents at that time did not enter the party, calling it "communist." At the Congress he explains that they were to sing the Yugoslav hymn first, then the Macedonian, then they sang the Gypsy hymn. For Abid it was logical to sing the Gypsy hymn first (at a Congress of the Gypsy Party), and stupidity to throw the Macedonian flag into the Gypsy flag when this flag is for all the Gypsies in the world and is accepted as such.

[Abdi] This party is concerned only with me. I would not even be surprised if I saw my name in the party program, instead working for the emancipation of the Gypsies; they will be as the other people in Macedonia. Thus, they are only holding back this process, although everything was prepared with the beginning of this school year, under the motivation of "not committing a cardinal sin." But everything, including the program for reintegration of the Gypsies, is a result of the efforts of PTsER before the former Executive Council and before the government of the Republic of Macedonia. Let us not forget Macedonia is the second state after India that recognizes the Gypsies as a nationality and not only as an ethnic group. The policy in our republic is slanted, but, he said at the Gypsy seminar, the only obstacle may be our discord.

One thing is sure—the quarrels and lack of cooperation of the two Gypsy parties can only be to the detriment of the two parties, and of the unity of the Gypsies in the sense of communal life. Is this only a leadership battle for power and prestige, or is there something deeper in the open conflict of the two parties?

Former Prime Minister Kljusev on Fall of Cabinet
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24-25 Oct 92 pp 4-5

[Interview with former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Kljusev by Vera V. Adzhigogova and Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "They Convinced Me About Reconstruction, but They Overthrew Me"]

[Text] *Interview with Dr. Nikola Kljusev concerning relations at the top of the government and the circumstances of the fall of his cabinet.*

According to the former prime minister, what were the relations between him, the president of the Republic, and the president of the Assembly?

The former prime minister of the Macedonian Government, academician and professor Nikola Kljusev, left the helm of the executive authority without at least shedding light on the circumstances under which his expert cabinet fell. At his last appearance at the Assembly podium, Mr. Kljusev predicted many dilemmas, and only those trained in the intertwined relations in the government establishment were capable of reading "between the lines." This was the reason that we requested an interview of Dr. Kljusev in which he finally will show his cards.

In the beginning of the discussion Dr. Kljusev welcomed us with a little "dossier"—a record in which everything that was written in the newspaper concerning him, concerning his image, and his behavior was carefully noted. This was cause for a little argument, however, this did not stop Dr. Kljusev from speaking openly.

[VECER] On the occasion of the vote of no confidence in your government it was said that the reason why it could not hold out longer was the fact that there was no political support from any structure in the parliament. In your opinion were these the real reasons for destroying your cabinet?

[Kljusev] In order to give an answer to this question it would be necessary to say something about the structure of the parliament. We did not have a majority party that would form our own government. It is not by accident that President Gligorov is forming an expert government. I can say that the government was formed with the support of all the deputy groups, except for PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party], which means we had political support behind us when we proposed the program, my first report likewise. In the meantime the reasons involve the struggle for power. In particular between the parties, which until yesterday appeared to want early elections, but then were converted into protagonists of the struggle for power with the coalition. At the time of the days of Macedonian journalism I proposed that confidence in the government had left. I was criticized for this by the chief of state, for having posed this question at all.

[VECER] Why were you criticized?

[Kljusev] I was told: "There was nothing to predict this. What about confidence in the government? It is operating normally." Then I found myself in a dilemma. When a man sees that something is in disharmony with the environment, he asks himself what we have to do from then on to exist as a government, but almost all took it as hostile. And I said openly that I would leave. I said this in the government. Almost everyone asked that the question of confidence in the government be posed before the entire anti-inflation program, but it was indicated that now is not the time—the circumstances, the army.... And in these conditions, in general, no one took account of the fact that I had received the mandate to pose the question of confidence in the government.

Surprisingly, when the question of the confidence in the government came on the agenda, then they fell silent!

[VECER] Why do you think they fell silent?

[Kljusev] I personally cannot go into the intimate affairs of individual people. But I think that there are certain options. It would be natural, as I was informed, that the president was not fully informed about the goal of this action concerning confidence. So the president told me. Although I personally think that without his knowledge it is not possible to get a vote of confidence because he is a protagonist in granting the mandate. Possibly he had pressures from the parties. These pressures were ill-considered. If we examine their anatomy we will see that it is very ancient.

Consultations and Conflicts

[VECER] How did you feel when he did not get support from the mandator?

[Kljusev] I posed this question to the president even before I undertook the mandate. What if some situation happens in which it would be necessary to call for a vote of confidence? Then the thinking was since our views were close... "if the government falls normally I will have to go too."

[VECER] This means you were taken by surprise. Taken unawares?

[Kljusev] You see, everyone forms his own style over the course of time. But, perhaps even that was not said sincerely. There are always these moments when you have to look at yourself.

[VECER] At the outset you said that you did not make any more important decisions without consultations with Gligorov and Andov. Who recommended this procedure to you and why did you accept this method?

[Kljusev] Normally it was in the absence of another coordinating body to carry out consultations between the president of the government, the state, the Assembly, and the member of the Presidency. I thought that this is normal—some suggestions which the president of the Republic made will be taken into account. And then, in general, we did not think as it is possible to think now. At the time we had full confidence in the collaboration. The president of the Assembly was going off on his own. He always would produce some kind of conflict. And now it is a question to what degree were there positive features, to what degree was there paternalism, to what degree was there a power suggesting that certain processes be changed. Or, let us say, if a certain decision was made, the question immediately arose—why did you do this?

[VECER] And you, as a government, did you retreat?

[Kljusev] Precisely, we pulled back from certain things, let us say, concerning internal actions. The parties, including Stojan Andov, reacted instantly. Let's do this well in the Law for Privatization. We thought that such

a correspondence was positive, if in fact it is stated from the beginning, sincerely, with a sense of responsibility.

[VECER] However, you said that for one decision you did not consult President Gligorov. This was for compiling the military report?

[Kljusev] There were discussions even before that, that it was necessary to proceed in this way in order not to sacrifice our children. In the meantime, concerning the day of passage and signature of this document—I, myself, did that.

[VECER] Why? Was it hard for you to pick up the telephone?

[Kljusev] We thought that the government absolutely had to carry out this pact if it wanted to stop the euphoria of the military complex, which could have cost us hundreds of victims. And we truly carried out a positive action. The state security agencies completed it irreproachably. I hear that they are now replacing just those who were the most active, which is surprising.

Sudden Changes and Breakthroughs

[VECER] You considered the consultations to be a normal course of events. Again we have information that one department—for foreign affairs—wasn't led by the government?

[Kljusev] It is precisely that which we worked out closely with the president of the Republic. We had consultations. In addition to me he often called Blaze Ristevski. We exchanged ideas. We considered this to be an act of confidence in the government. The consultations were fruitful in many areas. This was all of 1991. There were no problems, and important events took place during this period: the census, the referendum, the Constitution, the army complex.... The government handled these problems very responsibly in direct cooperation with the president of the Republic. Of course, the president of the Assembly participated in these meetings. In the meantime, during this year, especially in February and March, there began to be breaks in this collaboration.

[VECER] When did you observe them?

[Kljusev] First, I sensed them from the concentration of the information in the cabinet of the president of the Republic. The government was cut off. Information from abroad, information from inside. It penetrated gradually but with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Defense being taken over. And on several occasions I made serious remarks to the president of the Republic, saying that I was cut off from these ministries. He answered me that this was to assist me. And I think that, perhaps, basically, the intentions were good. Because, the load that was carried in all these areas was very complicated and heavy and needed to be carried together. In the meantime, when the contacts of the ministries are analyzed with the president of the

Republic, and the prime minister finds out later, then this is another matter. About a circuitous path of information. It even takes place at a lower level—under secretaries go and correspond with the president of the Republic. I felt that that was unacceptable, especially in the area of foreign affairs. I even wrote a letter to all ministers telling them to inform the prime minister about every trip abroad, every contact. This was understood as a criticism by Denko Malevski for his irresponsible traveling to different countries without the government knowing about it. I think that here there was a breakdown that became more and more evident. And certain parties began to direct criticism to the effect that the president of the government is a marionette of the president of the Republic.

[VECER] Clearly, you did not say this or react to it. Why?

[Kljusev] Well, some things don't have to be said explicitly. Many things will remain unsaid because that is within the framework of a fair play relationship. Of course, some things will remain a state secret. We cannot make a caricature of the state.

[VECER] How did you tolerate this split?

[Kljusev] Well, this is what happened. A coalition was created. An ill-considered action came to light, this hasty decision by Andov to give carte blanche to his members to sign for (no)confidence in the government. Other things happened, 23 signatures were collected, but actually the whole time they corresponded and created a bad style for bringing down the government.

[VECER] Was the beginning of the fall of the government just when you were shut off?

[Kljusev] I would not say that that was the beginning. It was a symbiosis of several strong winds. Of many influences.

[VECER] What are they?

[Kljusev] Well, the thirst for the political government and to come to power. These parties that are in the coalition show this. Then the ill-considered and uncontrolled declarations of the president of the Assembly. In all contacts when we met, when he was irritated by the Assembly, he immediately began to make statements—we will call for elections, bring down the government.... That was a habit of his, to constantly say that. And of course those cracks which appeared more or less influenced opening the way for such an act.

Reconstruction and Disenchantment

[VECER] Was it declared in a timely fashion before the government crisis that you were offered to complete a reconstruction of the government?

[Kljusev] Precisely so. This was a matter of reconstruction of the government and I was preparing for such a thing for some time. However, that requires a procedure, discussions with the political parties. Even when I went

down to the Assembly, when the vote of confidence took place, half an hour before that I was with the president of the Republic. He convinced me that it was a matter of reconstruction. He proposed reconstruction and so it would be done. Andov said the same thing. In the meantime, as we saw, it did not come out this way. They told me that I had been lax, I had spoken laxly. Concerning the reconstruction, I have not spoken more clearly. This is a sign that everything was thought out from the beginning, and no one can convince me that it had not already been decided. Some of the parties even talked in the cafe about this. However, nothing to anyone. This government received a vote of no confidence, and we, as you know, accepted it. Time will determine how sensible this was and what it means.

[VECER] What minister disenchanted you the most?

[Kljusev] Personally, I felt all members of the government to be my coworkers. My personal disenchantment was more a matter of an evaluation. Let us say, from moral, ethical ground, Denko Malevski disenchanted me. He gave his notice one time. I convinced him—let us persevere on this difficult path. Then he gave his notice for moral reasons, concerning the Lisbon Declaration. All of us in the government thought that Denko would not be included in the new team for reasons of personal dignity. However, he is included. Here the ethical principles of the man have been destroyed. And here we have a disenchantment. Is it possible that there is someone who in the course of work distances himself, says certain things which simply cause alarm? I did not want to resolve them, but presented them to the president of the Republic.

[VECER] What kind of things?

[Kljusev] That is clear. He said: Insist on an independent state, but without me. I was educated in a Yugoslav community. Don't demand independence from me. I first understood it as an intellectual, as an idea, and I was amazed. The best thing is, I said to myself, this is being worked out with the president of the Republic. Then they constantly convinced me that he did not have such an idea. Possibly I was wrong here. Possibly I didn't have to be so indolent, so easy to get along. As soon as the situation with Risto Damjanovski occurred I had to tell him—take your briefcase out of the government!

[VECER] You gambled the lot with this declaration. Was it said in the government?

[Kljusev] Not at a meeting of the government. It was said first in my office, and in Ristovski's office, and in a commission of the government.

[VECER] Don't you regard Mr. Blaze Ristovski as your great disappointment? In some circles it is asserted that it was precisely he that was the final executioner of your government. Is it accurate that the vice president requested your dossier from the police?

[Kljusev] I think that I don't have to answer this question. This is a question of personality. It would be better to ask the vice president of the SDB [State Security Office], Slobodan Bogoevski, what he was looking for in Blaze Ristovski's office—four or five hours in his office. What kind of discussion did they have and how can an under secretary be allowed to speak for the president of the government?

Power and Manipulation

[VECER] In general, there was no cooperation between the government and the Assembly. Why?

[Kljusev] You see, some people in the Assembly had an old, ossified idea in their heads—that the Assembly is the highest, but the bearer of the executive power constantly has to do something. The radical change in the Constitution was not understood precisely by those who had approved it so that we have a division of power. The government was constantly accused of not doing this or that, but all laws that were requested we delivered. I wondered why the president of the Assembly (here is an enigma—the constitution does not set up a Presidency) does not put them on the agenda. This forced me, by means of the secretariat for legislation, to request of the Constitutional Court that it give us an explanation of the responsibilities of the divided authority. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court did not do that.

[VECER] Do you think that it could not or did not want to understand this?

[Kljusev] I think that the Assembly only has to perform its role as a legislative body. However, its foremost members are entangled in the work of the government. Andov went to other countries and talked about financial and economic matters, but I and the government did not know about it nor again did he submit a written report to us. I told that to him. Who authorized to talk about these matters?

[VECER] Did you discuss this with the president of the Republic?

[Kljusev] He was informed. I insisted that the relations of the division of power be clarified....

[VECER] How did he react?

[Kljusev] It seems that everything remained just with familiarization, but my impression is that it was manipulated by the parliament.

[VECER] Who manipulated it?

[Kljusev] Well, first the president of the parliament. He manipulated in a skillful way, and I think that it will turn out to be a boomerang for him in the near future. I think that things are already being realized.

[VECER] Stojan Andov, if we understood well, was praised that his party brought down the old government and that he

will do it with the new one if he thinks that it is necessary. How do you comment on these statements?

[Kljusev] That is precisely it. Andov is a controversial person, skillful at political manipulation, a pure product of a past time. He is a contentious, clever individual with ambitions for intrigue, I would say. It was not possible to establish an intellectual relationship with him. He changed his positions rapidly and even sometimes when the president of the Republic would take another position, he immediately corrected them. But his ill-considered exclusivism always provoked quarrels and arguments between us. Often when he met us he would get us into a trap and provoke a spark and a quarrel. The president of the Republic had a hard job calming us down here. He supported the spiral of destruction of the government and declared that he would destroy it and so forth. This means he has some support, some power. The question is: What is this power? I think that it is only intriguing, his manipulative role.

Oil and Pressures

[VECER] One of the first, as it is said, maestro moves of the new government was the way in which we obtained oil from Turkey and Bulgaria. Why didn't you and Mr. Andov, who then was in this function, think of this move?

[Kljusev] Who says that we did not think of it? Well, I will give you the whole history of that! However, in our analyses we are coming to the realization that Salonika is not the most optimal. In the meantime, I was not satisfied with the conditions in Makpetrol and said that the government should create competition. I requested that the Ministry of the Economy send letters to a number of companies. Do you know what happened? The ministry accepted it all too easily. The usual little letters were written to cooperate in the delivery of oil and so forth. I reacted sharply. Well, it doesn't work this way. Meetings are held, all of the characteristics, conditions, and concessions are written. Everything has to be said. And, then it appeared that Makpetrol offered cooperation with a certain Greek company so that they would supply us. In practice it is not only Makpetrol here. It is a four-legged beast: Makpetrol, refinery, the Economic Bank, and the Ministry of the Economy. They continuously presented us with problems before any tanker was purchased.

[VECER] Why?

[Kljusev] They constantly wanted to increase the price, constantly imposed conditions.... It is not a matter of Jovan Andonov opening the gates now. We made analyses before that, but the circumstances did not provide an economic preference. However, when it came to a crisis, oil was found then. In addition, at that time some of us said that we would activate a refinery in Burgas instead of the Skopje one, but they would accuse us of selling Macedonia to Bulgaria.

[VECER] While we are talking about Makpetrol, were the numerous oil crises that we had artificial?

[Kljusev] This question torments me: Who really manipulated the government and the political situation? Was there such a tendency? I sincerely say to you that I have begun, step by step, to have doubts. However, I do not have arguments.

[VECER] As prime minister were you not able to get precise facts?

[Kljusev] Something warned me about a ministry which was responsible for these acts. However, they did not complete things, although something was suspicious. In particular, let us say Makpetrol utilized all our reserves. It still owes the government 100,000 metric tons of oil, which it took from the reserves.

[VECER] What's the situation with the last tanker of around 93,000 tons, which you paid for?

[Kljusev] That's a good question. I skeptically signed the guarantee of \$11 million since the governor of the NBM [Macedonian National Bank] convinced me that the bank would provide a guarantee. However, if you asked me now where this oil is, and what has happened with it, if it really is blocked or lies in the warehouse, whether a commission has gone to check or not... don't ask me that, I don't know. Everything happened in September, after I had already left.

[VECER] Was it speculated for a long time that oil was taken to Serbia?

[Kljusev] We in the government also heard that. I requested that it be checked out by the state security agencies. It remained unclarified. The refinery told us that there were some reserves acquired from Serbia and they released them.

[VECER] Are you surprised that the government did not take account of such strategic matters?

[Kljusev] The government cannot be a policeman. If you get into rash questioning, it will be asked immediately: What is the government that it is doing that?! The government coordinates, indicates the possibilities of a solution, services the delivery, but it does not go into details of the anatomy of the business.

[VECER] It will not go into the details of that, but isn't it unclear how a decision will be suggested when there are no precise data?

[Kljusev] One man in the government was responsible for all that. He remains in the government, all the responsibilities were given to one man. A report about these matters was not submitted, first of all because of compromises and irresponsible statements.

Program and Prediction

[VECER] The new anti-inflation program of Crvenkovski's government is based on the program of your

government. In the meantime, only so-called aggregates have deteriorated. In general, what was the understanding of the destruction of the old program at that time?

[Kljusev] I was coordinator and director of the team for the program. Theoretically we studied everything thoroughly, all the models. We developed the idea of putting the program on a healthy footing in limited conditions. We knew that without financial support from outside we were walking a tightrope, and even the least disturbance of any anchor could throw it to pieces. It is pleasant to state that the realization came out as we thought it would. The effects were a rapid drop in the inflation from 72 percent in May to 6.6 percent in August. Now it would be 2 percent or zero, but then we had the fall of the government. Then stabilization of the market, a drop in the prices, a slight movement in public consumption, stability of the dinar, and confidence began to return among the people. The failure of the program first began with the pensions and with the demand for canceling the 30 stamps for traveling abroad, and finally there was the famous Law for Payments. The political capriciousness of a deputy.

[VECER] Do you really think that this was capriciousness?

[Kljusev] I said it metaphorically. There were some behind the scenes games here. These are only exponents. Behind them there are others, those cloudy forces that seek to create chaos, uncertainty, having Macedonia fall on its knees in order to fall into the embrace of the older brother. I do not see another logic and I cannot understand who is served by the ruin of the anti-inflation program. Do we ascribe it to the ignorance of the deputies? We had such a law proposed in the government but we rejected it. There were many protagonist economists in the government who accepted the program vigorously. And then only one was against it, the measures were not complicated, and he even requested retirement. He still remains in the government. And now, how is he conducting the program?

[VECER] Does this corrected program have a chance for succeeding?

[Kljusev] With the ruin of the program they tasted a bitter pill. Now this is a good cosmetic. There is something that has to be said, but the heterodox model of the program does not stand up. The introduction of a high rate of inflation of 23 percent monthly and to maintain the anchors of the heterodox model—that is impossible. It will lead to chaos. It is condemned ahead of time.

[Box, p 5]

Farcical Matters

Among the questions that we raised were those concerning the "Toyota" and the unsuccessful attempt to get a public position at the end of the mandate. He refused to talk about this. "You are twisting me around for some

little scandals, farcical things," and "Don't demand of me as a scientific worker that I answer banal questions." However, in connection with the post, he explained: "You think that it is a scandal. The evil thing here is how journalism behaves toward certain things in public. It is a natural thing for any citizen and employee to seek that which naturally belongs to him. If I wanted to decide the question of a certain monumental residence or villa I could have solved it previously as the president solved it."

Progress on Privatization in Macedonia Criticized

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in Macedonian 24 Oct 92 p 11

[Article by Biljana Tsrvenkovska: "It Is Time for Fair Play"]

[Text] *Waiting for privatization...*

Everything that is happening concerning the privatization that has taken place up to now in Macedonia and the delay in passing the new law confirms that those who are responsible for this for the time being are skillfully holding the ends in their own hands.

The chief dilemma at this time concerning any thinking or discussion about privatization in Macedonia certainly revolves around the question of when to expect passage of the law which will regulate everything. For those who have forgotten, let us remind them that the proposal for this law together with the proposal for its passage was accepted by the parliamentarians on 3 June of this year. However, the game around this very important process, upon which the entire reform of the system depends, began much before that—this only gave it a new twist. Evidently, we will have to wait for the disentanglement.

Transparent Perfidity

The two-day June assembly discussion, for those who were able to see them, brought to the surface those responsible for putting the brakes on passage of the law who, as has been said, began the game and continue to play it quite perfidiously. Political marketing was used to the maximum in this case, of course, on their behalf. This time the working class was used skillfully for manipulative purposes. They succeeded in convincing this most numerous and "most important" layer of society in socialism that "by passing and carrying out the law the workers will be completely removed from control of the property which they have created with their labor and identically removed from control of their rights that come from the labor relation." In fact, no one has checked to see if the workers think this way, but this has been proclaimed by the presidency of the Council of the Union of Trade Unions of Macedonia, who, at least during recent months, evidently is standing more unsteadily on glass legs than the other, independent, and professional labor syndicates are constantly cracking.

The directors also are making aggressive criticisms in the name of the working class, but probably it has become clear already to the workers themselves that they are not just concerned about the fate of the workers' rights and property, but about their own pockets and ownership rights, gained overnight and for free. Of course these are not arbitrary statements but are made on the basis of an examination of the change in the law for public capital, which the SOK [Public Bookkeeping Service] of Macedonia completed in the first half of this year. Only a few items provide a sufficient illustration: Of all of the recorded internal stocks worth 26.5 billion denars for 382 enterprises, only 2.6 billion were paid for in cash, and 1.8 billion by monthly withholding from wages. The greatest part of that paid out pays for the use of internal stocks issued in accordance with the Law for Personal Income—6.7 billion, but it is known that this way of payment is pure paper manipulation. If it is known that the new law provides for paid privatization and, likewise, provides for general control of everything which has been privatized up to now—that is, that which truly has been paid for up to now—and to eliminate that which has been taken with fictitious payments, it is easily possible to understand the revolt of the directors. This regulation cannot please anyone who considered himself to be a stockholder and owner of a good part of the enterprise, especially since the former law permitted the largest stockholders to become the directors, since the amount of the redemption of the shares granted was determined within the framework of the amount of the three-year personal income, and it is not difficult to guess whose personal income is the highest.

A Strange Conclusion

Therefore, the resourceful and skillful directors, precisely according to the principle of "the end justifies the means," in the recent storm of strikes and in the preceding negotiations with the government and the labor syndicate created an unnatural coalition with a workers' union, accepting implementation of the majority of the workers' requests, only not to be touched where it hurts the most—the stocks. How long the workers will be manipulated depends only on them. Unless it is not worth it to them—we are witnesses to their continuous dissatisfaction—it would be natural for them to want a change. But the change has to be radical—to change the socioeconomic life in the country from the roots. The reform that has to begin with this law must produce it. However, the obstructions which the parliament itself, among others, creates must be eliminated first. The president of the parliament concluded the two-day discussion concerning this law as he pledged that the government would "examine all criticisms and suggestions carefully and include them in the text of the law"? A strange conclusion, it must be noted. If all laws in all parliamentary democracies were made this way, probably there would not be a single finally formulated law in the world. However, there is a reason for everything, and in this case it is the intention of achieving consensus concerning this matter, which most people call, after the

Constitution, the most significant document upon which depends the future of Macedonia, which will be postponed longer. And it is not particularly necessary to emphasize who is most responsible for that.

However, the government has completed its work and, by accepting all constructive and justified suggestions, built them into the law and prepared its draft. However, because of the urgency of certain perennial and new political questions, economic questions, among which there is this one, do not get on the agenda for political examination in the parliament. Shouldn't we ask ourselves publically if it isn't time for fair play?

There is also another item which we dare not ignore. It is known that the program and law for privatization have been worked out in collaboration with a foreign expert team for which the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved technical assistance, the experts of which evaluated the whole project as very positive when it was completed. Likewise it is known that we will be seeking assistance—both technical and monetary—later on from the same bank. Probably if we want to get it, we will have to show a little more respect towards their expert thinking, and not devalue them with our own recipe, which most frequently results in failure.

Macedonian Health jSystem in 'Crisis'

93BA0128A in Macedonian 19 Oct 92 p 3

[Report on Skopje VECER interview with Minister of Health Jovan Tofovski by Dj. Vasilevska; place and date not given: "Cuts on All Sides"]

[Text] *Subject for today: How do we get over the crisis in the health system?*

Without broader public understanding, the Macedonian health system will have a hard time in getting over the crisis, and this means everyone making the right moves in his own domain: the responsible ministry, the government, and the parliament.

Minister of Health Dr. Jovan Tofovski has revealed part of the moves that he will make that are based on economical, efficient, and responsible behavior, and he has announced certain "shake-ups" in the Public Health Fund, the Law for Health Protection....

In the superstructure and in the area of expenditures, the Macedonian health system is experiencing its most serious moments at least in relation to the past. In an increasingly impoverished environment, and with a function that to a certain degree also penetrates the social sphere, as opposed to the timid breakthrough of the changes that in a more significant way overtook the other social spheres and the innovations that have been introduced, in practice it remains suspended between sky and earth.

The doubts are deepening in the sense of the ever-increasing blockage of the operation of the public health

system, and, since magic wands exist only in fairy tales, it is clear that this change at the top (the government, the ministries) does not possess the power "overnight" to beautify the picture of the condition in which the health system, as a component of the society as a whole, is found.

Conditions

The distinction between the needs for providing the basic functions for different purposes in this activity and the capabilities is enormous. The financial picture, even ignoring the debts, which amount to around 5 billion denars, is far from rosy: Only for September, for example, the needs reached 12 billion denars, but the revenues to the fund barely reached an amount of 6.6 billion denars. The public already knows the reasons for such a bad material-financial condition of the fund primarily due to the difficulty in collecting funds, basically contributed for health protection. First of all, on the basis of the wages where the deceptions are great, it was a matter of the public or of the private sector. The former, in part because of the irregular payment of wages, but also because they pay the smaller part of their contribution, and the rest in kind, coupons.... The latter—not only do they not pay, especially for the wage earners among them, but also for those who believe they are secure in their pay. This does not mean that the "disappointments" for other reasons are to be underestimated, because each denar is planned and significant for the functioning of the health system—the condition reflects what Minister of Health Dr. Jovan Tofovski found.

The shortage of funds in the health system may be illustrated by the following item of information—instead of 7,080 denars per four-member family, the average pay in the republic for August was taken as a base, and only 4,650 denars a month are put into the coffers of the fund. In spite of this, as Tofovski emphasizes, there has been an enormous and uncontrolled increase in the prices of medicines, and of the material expenses which the fund cannot keep up with, as well as its heavy indebtedness. The additional financial burden also comes from the disproportionate share of the budget allocated for facilities for health protection of the population which, according to the World Health Organization is an obligation of the state. Namely, 450 million denars are provided in the budget for this year, as compared with around 10 billion dinars!

Over and above the torment about collecting the money, there are inefficiencies in the health system itself: a certain degree of overemployment, overdimensioning, and unsatisfactory utilization of health facilities, inefficient behavior with respect to the consumption of medicines, unnecessary administrative expenses.... On the other hand, again because of the empty coffers of the fund and its nonliquidity, there are occurrences of black-mail, misuse (especially in the trade in medicines), hyperproduction of medical services presented, and "overbilled" hospital capacities. In a word, with a

greater or lesser degree of "stirring" on all sides, we are deceiving ourselves that we are taking steps forward.

Changes

If we start from the fact that nowhere in the world is health care cheap, and because a solid economic base is necessary for its normal functioning, with \$15-20 annually per inhabitant, which is what the situation is in our country, unfortunately, now we are talking about how we will get through the crisis. At this moment, because of the aggravated problem with a shortage of medicines, streamlining of consumption is imposed, which we will carry out by centralized and controlled supply and with a request for responsibility from the leaders for the health organizations. A certain amount of selection will be exercised in medical interventions, delaying procedures where this can be done without negative consequences for the health of a person. Streamlining the personnel, first of all by administrative retirement, and of facilities by closing them if it is justified, or by regrouping individual departments, will have to be carried out without delay. We will make expensive hospital treatment "cheaper" with an orientation toward outpatients, and we will exercise greater control over the outpatient market (paying in cash and kind) that the health organizations carry out. In a word, with our economy, responsible and economical behavior have to become axiomatic in the work, Tofovski emphasizes.

The minister basically has a positive attitude toward the new systemic measures that were introduced in the health system in the sense of the need for "legitimizing" the insured people, keeping an account for services and paying for them according to the price schedule. In the meantime, he thinks that even here there is room for

improvement, beginning with halving the expenses for printing insurance cards, and doing everything to obtain maximum simplification of the procedure, which will in any event be made possible by computerization of the health system.

"I think that it is necessary to have a partial change in the concept of the public health service, as well as a change in several articles in the Law for Health Protection (in the section concerning the rights of the insured and the obligations of the state). Likewise, it is necessary to eliminate certain weaknesses in the functioning of the Public Health Fund, with respect to the spending of funds for medicines in the financing of the health organizations, to which a certain amount of independence should be given in order that they may obtain greater motivation for more efficient operation. The fact is that the 'state' pharmacies are in a handicapped position as compared with the private ones, and in this regard it is necessary to devise a more efficient utilization of the personnel and for emphasizing production as a contribution toward better providing the market with medicine," says Tofovski.

However, the practice itself imposes the changes, and it is obvious that the "cuts," shallower or deeper, also have to be made from within, in the health system, also by the government, the responsible ministry, and the parliament, taking into account the required broader public understanding concerning treatment of a "seriously ill health system." It is also necessary to have changes in the understanding, relations, and views of this activity. The inherited burden is great, and, surely, will not be removed with a wave of the hand, but just by moves that will attract new people, and their skill will be evaluated in the operationalization of the ideas for a "better tomorrow," which, I say sincerely, have not been sufficient up to now.

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